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Abstract 
 
Since the open door policy was embarked upon in 1979, China’s banking sector has 
undergone gradual but notable reforms.  A key objective of the reforms implemented 
by the Chinese government is to build an effective, competitive and stable banking 
system in order to improve its efficiency and reliability.  This study employs both 
parametric stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and non-parametric data envelopment 
analysis (DEA) methods to assess and evaluate the cost efficiency of Chinese banks 
over the period from 1994 until 2007, a period characterised by far-reaching changes 
brought about by the banking reforms.  To this end, we first compare a number of 
specifications of stochastic cost frontier models to determine the preferred frontier 
model which are adopted in our efficiency analysis.  The preferred model specification 
for our sample is the one stage SFA model that includes the traditional input prices, the 
outputs and the control variables (that is, equity, non-performing loans and the time 
trend) in the cost frontier and the environmental variables (that is, ownership structure, 
size, deregulation, market structure and market discipline) in the inefficiency term.  
Moreover, we also employ two cost DEA models (traditional DEA and New DEA) as a 
complement to the preferred SFA model for methodological cross-checking purposes. 
Similar to the previous empirical literature, we find that in most cases only moderate 
consistency across the different techniques.  
 
The cost efficiency of Chinese banks is found to be 91% on average, based on our SFA 
model, over the period from 1994 until 2007.  Based on the results of the DEA and 
New DEA models, the average cost efficiency for Chinese banks over the sample period 
is about 89% and 87%, respectively.  We find that Chinese banking efficiency has 
deteriorated after China’s admission to the WTO, suggesting that the significant external 
environmental changes which arose from China’s WTO entry may have had a negative 
impact on its banking efficiency.  In addition, we find that the majority of Chinese 
 v
banks reveal scale inefficiencies and as asset size increases, banks tend to pass from 
increasing, to constant, and then to decreasing returns to scale.   
 
Our findings also show that both state-owned banks and foreign banks are more 
efficient than domestic private banks and larger banks tend to be relatively more 
efficient than smaller banks.  These and other results suggest that in order to enhance 
Chinese banking efficiency, the government needs to continue with the banking reform 
process and in particular, to open up banking markets, to improve risk management and 
corporate governance in Chinese banks and to encourage the expansion of banks.  
 
 
Keywords: Cost efficiency, Stochastic Frontier Analysis, Data Envelopment Analysis, 
Chinese Banking Reform. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction   
Financial sectors throughout the world have witnessed significant developments over 
the last thirty years.  The change of the environment in which banks operate has had 
substantial implications for the economic role of banks and their business activities. 
Deregulation, globalisation, financial innovation and technological progress have 
gradually reduced the costs of information processing and transmission and have been 
major forces impacting on the performance of the international banking sector 
(Girardone, et al, 2004).  However, banking systems in developing countries have 
traditionally been considered as prone to relatively high levels of government control 
and excessive government intervention and this in turn has inhibited competition and 
the efficient allocation of resources.  Bank performance in developing countries has 
been relatively poor because of this.  Fortunately, in many developing countries 
regulators and government instrumentalities have gradually become aware of the role 
banking deregulation plays in promoting competition and efficiency and have therefore 
implemented a number of reforms which aim to create an effective, competitive, and 
stable banking sector.  
 
The reforms to the Chinese economic system which began in 1979, have the aim of 
moving the country from a “planned economy supplemented with some market 
elements” to a “socialist market economy”.  As a part of these national economic 
reforms, the Chinese government has also liberalised and deregulated the operations of 
the Chinese banking sector.  The liberalisation and deregulation programme applied to 
the Chinese banking sector includes amongst other things: establishing a two-tier 
banking system, separating so-called policy lending from commercial lending, 
removing the credit ceiling on deposits and loans, reducing the systemic risk of the 
banking sector, gradually privatising state-owned banks, encouraging state-owned banks 
to seek listing on the stock exchange and relaxing foreign bank entry into the local 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
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market.  An officially-stated objective of the liberalisation and deregulation 
programme is to enhance the efficiency and productivity levels of the Chinese banking 
sector.  Therefore, it is important to investigate the efficiency levels of Chinese banks 
over the reform period.  Assessing the effects of the liberalisation and deregulation 
programme on Chinese banking efficiency will assist government instrumentalities and 
banking regulators in policy choice and will also enable bank management to improve 
the way in which they allocate resources across the various investment opportunities 
available to them.  With this in mind, we outline the objectives of the present study.  
 
1.2 Objectives and Motives of the Thesis 
Despite the large empirical literature which exists on the efficiency of the North 
American and European banking systems and the gradually increasing empirical 
evidence pertaining to developing countries, only a few empirical studies have been 
undertaken which investigate efficiency levels in the Chinese banking sector.  
Therefore, a principal aim of this study is to assess and evaluate the cost efficiency of 
the Chinese banking sector using both stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and data 
envelopment analysis (DEA).  We also explore the key determinants of Chinese 
banking efficiency and provide evidence about the consistency or otherwise of the two 
efficiency frontier approaches (SFA and DEA) employed in our empirical analysis.  In 
particular, this study seeks inter alia to address the following questions: 
 
1 Is accounting for heterogeneity across banks important for the SFA methodology?  
2 Do the SFA and DEA methods provide consistent results? 
3 What is the general level of cost efficiency of the Chinese banking sector and how 
has it varied over time?  
4 Have the banking reforms implemented by the Chinese government improved 
Chinese banking efficiency? 
5 Does cost efficiency vary across different bank types and size categories? 
6 Are there any economies or diseconomies of scale in the Chinese banking sector? 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
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7 Do returns to scale (economies of scale) differ across bank size categories?  
8 What are the main determinates of Chinese banking efficiency?  
 
Our study of Chinese banking efficiency is important for a number of reasons.  First, to 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to apply both parametric (SFA) and 
nonparametric (DEA) frontier techniques in the context of Chinese banking efficiency.  
The choice of which frontier method to use is often dependent on which is seen as the 
easiest to implement; seldom are any rational arguments given or any optimal criteria 
specified to justify the chosen frontier method.  Given this, we make comparisons 
between the results from the various frontier methods in order to make assessments 
about the robustness of the estimated cost efficiency scores obtained from our empirical 
analysis of Chinese banks.  Moreover, to the best of our knowledge this is the first 
empirical study to estimate banking efficiency using the New DEA model developed by 
Tone (2002).  Second, estimates of banking efficiency can be biased if bank 
heterogeneity (e.g. output quality, size, ownership structure, etc.) is ignored (Mester, 
1997).  However, to our knowledge, this is the first study to provide exhaustive 
empirical evidence on the effects of heterogeneity on Chinese banking efficiency levels.  
In other words we endeavour to fill an important gap in the literature by comparing a 
number of well-established stochastic cost frontier specifications which attempt to 
account for bank heterogeneity in different ways.   
 
Third, this research contributes to the existing Chinese banking efficiency literature by 
providing the most recent and comprehensive evidence on the impact of the Chinese 
government’s reform programme on the efficiency of the Chinese banking sector.  The 
sample period investigated by previous Chinese bank studies, as we shall see in Chapter 
3, is generally not long enough to shed much light on the impact of the Chinese 
government’s banking reform programme.  In contrast, this study uses a longer sample 
period (fourteen years) which covers both the second phase of banking reform (1994 
-2001) and the third phase of banking reform (2002-2007).  Fourth, the existing 
empirical literature does not provide clear and robust results with respect to the main 
determinants of Chinese banking efficiency.  Hence, this study investigates the impact 
of the potential determinants of Chinese banking efficiency, such as ownership structure, 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
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size, deregulation, market structure and market discipline - using both the one stage SFA 
procedure and the two stage DEA procedure.  The findings provide important insights 
into both policy issues and the efficiency with which bank management use the 
resources available to them. 
 
1.3 Research Methodology and Data  
In this study, we use both parametric (SFA) and non-parametric (DEA) frontier 
methodologies to measure the efficiency of Chinese banks.  In order to better estimate 
the cost efficiency levels of Chinese banks, we employ the so called one stage SFA 
model and then compare the empirical results we obtain from with four alternative 
stochastic cost frontier models.  This one stage SFA model allows us to simultaneously 
account for some heterogeneity factors (e.g. the level of equity on issue, asset quality, 
etc.) which may have an impact cost efficiency frontier and to estimate the effect of a 
set of environmental variables (e.g. ownership structure, size, deregulation, etc.) on 
bank efficiency levels. The translog functional form is used to estimate the underlying 
cost function.  Moreover, we also employ two DEA cost efficiency models as a 
complement to the preferred one stage SFA model to measure Chinese bank efficiency 
and then we use a variety of methodological cross-checking mechanisms in order to 
assess the robustness of the results obtained.  In addition, in order to investigate the 
key determinants of Chinese banking efficiency, we employ the so-called two stage 
DEA procedure.  More specifically, we use a Tobit regression model which regresses 
the efficiency scores obtained from the DEA models on a number of environmental 
variables such as ownership structure, size, market structure, etc.   
 
Our sample is an unbalanced panel which consists of 41 Chinese banks over the period 
from 1994 to 2007 and totals 397 observations.  The sample comprises the big four 
state-owned banks, three policy banks, twelve national and regional joint-stock banks, 
sixteen city commercial banks and six foreign banks. The data are mainly obtained from 
the Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (1994-2007) and BankScope.  
Additional data and double checks are made from other data sources, such as individual 
banks’ statutory annual financial reports, the China Banking Regulatory Commission’s 
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database and the China Statistical Yearbook, etc.   
 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis  
Our study is organised into eight chapters as fellows:  
Chapter 2: Efficiency: Meaning, Theory and Measurement 
This chapter first introduces the theoretical framework related to productive efficiency. 
Efficiency measures deviations in performance from the predicted performance of the 
“best practice” firms on the efficient frontier.  The main types of efficiency include 
technical efficiency, allocative efficiency, scale efficiency and economic efficiency. 
Then we briefly discuss various theories of the firm.  The traditional neoclassical 
theory of the firm views the firm as a rational entity which seeks to maximise profit.  It 
seeks to explain how the market works but other than this treats the firm as a black box 
which transforms resources into saleable goods.  The managerial theories of the firm, 
the behavioural theory of the firm and the X-efficiency theory of the firm highlight the 
possibility of internal inefficiency in the decision making processes of the firm and can 
explain why firms may not always operate efficiently.  This chapter also reviews the 
parametric and non-parametric frontier techniques which enable one to estimate the 
efficiency frontier levels of firms and measure the efficiency of a firm relative to the 
other firms in the same industry.  
 
Chapter 3: Empirical Studies of Bank Efficiency  
This chapter provides a review of the literature on international banking efficiency.  It 
first draws attention to empirical bank efficiency studies which employ two or more 
frontier approaches using a common set of data for the estimation and assessment of 
efficiency levels.   Here it is important to note that there is no consensus about the 
existence of a single best frontier approach for measuring efficiency.  Rather, the 
prevailing view is that methodological cross-checking is highly recommended in order 
to check for consistency across the various frontier approaches.  This chapter also 
reviews empirical studies dealing with the efficiency of the Chinese banking sector as 
well as other developing countries.  These studies mainly focus on investigating the 
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impact of deregulation and ownership structure on bank efficiency levels.   Finally, 
this chapter also surveys empirical findings on the impact of ownership structure, size, 
deregulation, market structure and market discipline on the efficiency levels of banks.  
These factors are generally considered as the key determinants of banking efficiency. 
 
Chapter 4: China’s Banking System and Reforms 
This chapter outlines the structural and institutional arrangements which characterise the 
Chinese banking sector as well as the banking reforms which have been implemented 
by the Chinese government over the last thirty years.  The chapter provides much of 
the contextual background needed for assessing the empirical results we obtain on the 
efficiency analysis of the Chinese banking sector in subsequent chapters.  Currently 
the Chinese banking system consists of a variety of institutions.  The most notable 
characteristic of the Chinese banking system is that state-owned commercial banks 
dominate the banking sector and are the main official source for the financing of 
companies.  As previously noted the Chinese government has implemented a series of 
banking reforms since 1979 with the aim of creating a safe and sound banking system.  
These reform measures can be subdivided into three phases and are discussed in detail 
in this chapter.  
 
Chapter 5: Methodology  
This chapter outlines the modelling framework used to measure the cost efficiency and 
scale economies of Chinese banks. The chapter first discusses five different stochastic 
cost frontier models which can be used to estimates cost efficiency levels in the Chinese 
banking sector.  The theme running through the chapter is that a comparison between 
the results of these five models might identify a preferred SFA model for our sample of 
Chinese banks.  Moreover, this chapter also presents two different DEA models as a 
complement to the SFA model for methodological cross-checking purposes.  Then, 
following the recommendations of Bauer et al. (1998), we introduce five consistency 
conditions through which to assess the compatibility of the efficiency estimates 
generated by the SFA and DEA models.  Finally, this chapter outlines the variables 
used in our empirical analysis, the sources from which we obtained our data and 
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provides a brief description of the data sample.  
 
Chapter 6: Empirical Results: A Comparison of SFA and DEA  
Chapter 6 is the first of two chapters that summarise the empirical results relating to the 
various efficiency methodologies outlined in the preceding chapter as they are applied 
to our sample of Chinese banks.  This chapter first assesses the importance of 
accounting for heterogeneity across banks by comparing the results of five different 
stochastic cost frontier models which are used to estimate efficiency levels in the 
Chinese banking sector.  Our analysis is based on log likelihood ratio tests and 
discusses the effects of bank heterogeneity on key parameter estimates, efficiency levels 
and efficiency ranks in order to obtain a preferred SFA model.  Moreover,  this 
chapter also checks the compatibility of the SFA, DEA and New DEA models using the 
distributional properties of the efficiency scores obtained under each technique (that is, 
mean, variance, skewness, maxima and minima, etc.), the correlations of rankings of 
efficiency scores across the various techniques, identification of the best and worst 
banks across the various techniques, the stability of efficiency scores over time and the 
relation between efficiency scores and standard non-frontier performance measures. 
 
Chapter 7: Chinese Banking Efficiency and Analysis 
This chapter empirically analyses the cost efficiency of the Chinese banking sector for 
the period from 1994 until 2007 using the preferred SFA, DEA and New DEA models.  
The analysis draws attention to how banking efficiency levels have changed as a result 
of the banking reforms implemented by the Chinese government.  It also examines the 
diversity of the efficiency scores between the different types of bank (that is, big four 
state-owned banks, state-owned policy banks, joint stock commercial banks and city 
commercial banks) and size classes (that is, very big, big, medium, small and very 
small).  This chapter also investigates whether scale economies exist for Chinese banks 
using both the SFA model and the DEA and New DEA models.  Our analysis in this 
chapter seeks to assist bank management and regulatory authorities by tracing the 
potential sources of banking inefficiency and by exploring the impact that ownership 
structure, size, deregulation, market structure and market discipline can have on the cost 
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efficiency levels of Chinese banks.      
 
Chapter 8: Conclusions and Limitations  
This chapter summarises the main findings of our study.  Policy implications are also 
discussed.  This chapter also draws attention to some potential limitations of our 
empirical work and points up some avenues for further research  
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Chapter 2 Efficiency: Meaning, Theory and 
Measurement 
 
2.1 Introduction  
The main objective of this chapter is to introduce the theoretical framework related to 
productive efficiency and the measurement of efficiency.  Section 2.2 briefly discusses 
the difference between the conventional and frontier efficiency approaches, which 
enables us to understand why the frontier efficiency approach is superior to 
conventional performance ratios.  Section 2.3 develops the concepts of efficiency and 
economies of scale and scope.  (In)efficiency will be defined as the departure of the 
individual firm from a benchmark, which is known as the efficient frontier.  Economic 
efficiency (or cost efficiency) is normally viewed as consisting of two components, 
technical and allocative efficiency.  Economies of scale is a measure of efficiency 
dealing with the size of the production unit being considered.  Founded on the 
economic concept of economies and diseconomies of scale, technical efficiency can be 
investigated further and decomposed into pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency.  
Section 2.4 briefly discusses various theories of the firm.  These theories seek to 
explain how the market works and why firms may not able to utilise their resources in 
the most efficient way possible.   
 
Section 2.5 reviews the main frontier techniques used to measure efficiency.  Generally, 
frontier techniques can be classified into two streams: non-parametric and parametric 
techniques.  Non-parametric techniques refer to the data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
approach and free disposal hull (FDH) approach.  They are mathematical programming 
approaches to estimating efficiency and represent an empirical implementation of 
Shephard’s distance function methodology.  Parametric techniques refer to the 
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), distribution free approach (DFA) and thick frontier 
approach (TFA).  These approaches require a pre-specified functional form for the 
best-practice frontier (cost, profit or production).  A firm is labelled inefficient if its 
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costs are higher or profits are lower than the best-practice firm after removing random 
errors.  In this section we also discuss the most widely used functional forms in the 
empirical literature on financial institutions and the main differences between the 
parametric and non-parametric approaches. Finally, section 2.6 summarises this chapter.  
 
2.2 Conventional and Frontier Efficiency Approach  
There are two main ways by which to measure the performance of banks.  The first is 
the classical approach, based on simple profit-cost analysis, which is the simplest and 
most naive measure of efficiency.  This approach is represented by conventional 
performance ratios which concentrate on examining financial ratios such as ROE, ROA1, 
capital asset ratio, growth rate of total revenue, and cost/income ratio all of which are 
commonly used by regulators, financial institution managers and industry consultants to 
evaluate performance.  However, conventional performance ratios fail to control for 
the influences of input price, output price and other exogenous market factors, which 
constrain the standard performance ratios from reaching closer estimations of the true 
performance.  In the last thirty years, academic research has increasingly focused on 
another approach; named Frontier efficiency (or X-efficiency) approach, to measure the 
performance of financial institutions.  Frontier efficiency measures deviations in 
performance from that of “best-practice firms” on the efficient frontier, controlling for 
the effect of a number of exogenous factors such as the prices faced in local markets.  
In other words, the Frontier efficiency method measures how well the financial 
institution performs relative to the predicted performance of the best firms facing the 
same market conditions in the industry.  It represents the ability of management to 
control costs and use resources to produce output.  Frontier efficiency measures 
summarise firm performance in a single statistic (efficiency score) that can control 
differences among firms in a sophisticated multidimensional framework that has its 
roots in economic theory (Cummins and Weiss, 2000).  Therefore, frontier efficiency 
appears to be superior to conventional performance ratios and obtains better estimates of 
the underlying performance of firms.  
 
                                                        
 
1 ROE is abbreviation of return on equity; ROA is abbreviation of return on total assets. 
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2.3 The Framework of Efficiency   
The primary purpose of this section is to introduce a number of commonly used 
efficiency concepts which may be employed in this study and to discuss how these 
measures may be calculated relative to a given frontier.  The concept of economic 
efficiency flows directly from the microeconomic theory of the firm.  Based on the 
ideas of Debreu (1951) and Farrell (1957) who built the standard framework of 
productive efficiency (production frontier), overall economic efficiency can be 
decomposed into scale efficiency, scope efficiency, pure technical efficiency and 
allocative efficiency.  Theoretically, a firm is fully efficient if it produces the output 
level and mix that maximises profits and minimises possible costs. 
 
2.3.1 Technical, Allocative and Cost Efficiency  
Farrell (1957) has proposed a method of measuring productive efficiency which uses an 
“efficient isoquant” estimated as part of the convex hull of the observed points.  Farrell 
proposes an assumption under which the production function is homothetic.  A 
homothetic function is a monotonic transformation of a homogeneous function in which 
the marginal rate of technical substitution is constant along a ray drawn from the origin.  
For instance, let a production function ),( 21 xxf be homogeneous of the first degree 
in 1x and 2x , and assume that the isoquant of this homogeneous production function is an 
efficient isoquant.  An (increasing) monotonic transformation of a homogenous 
production function yields a homothetic production function in [ ]),()( 21 xxfgXF =  
where g is a strictly increasing monotonic transformation.  A series of homothetic 
isoquants can be derived from the original (efficient) isoquant by appropriate scaling up.  
In other words, a proportional increase or decrease of all inputs should not affect the 
marginal rate of technical substitution along the isoquants.  A comparison between the 
efficient isoquant and any other isoquant for given output would indicate departure from 
full efficiency (Clemhout, 1968). 
 
The analysis of efficiency carried out by Farrell (1957) can be best illustrated, for the 
single output and two inputs case in the unit isoquant diagram (Figure 2.1).  
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Figure 2.1 Technical, Allocative and Cost Efficiency  
 
Source: Cooper et al. (2007, p.258) 
 
Farrell (1957) initially assumes that constant returns to scale (CRS) depicts the efficient 
production function or the frontier.  The technological set is fully described by the unit 
isoquant YY’ that captures the combination of the inputs (X1, X2) by which the firm can 
produce a certain output when it is perfectly efficient.  In the other words, YY’ shows 
minimum combinations of inputs needed to produce a unit of output.  Thus, under this 
framework, every package of inputs along the unit isoquant is considered as technically 
efficient while any point above and to the right of it, such as point P, is defined as a 
technically inefficient producer since the input package that is being used is more than 
enough to produce a unit of output.  Hence, the distance RP along the ray OP measures 
the technical inefficiency of a producer located at point P.  This distance (RP) 
represents the amount by which all inputs can be reduced without decreasing the 
amount of output.  Geometrically, the technical inefficiency level associated with 
package P can be expressed by the ratio RP/OP and, therefore, the technical efficiency 
(TE) of the producer under analysis would be given by the ratio OR/OP, which takes a 
value between zero and one. A value of one implies that the firm is fully technically 
efficient.  
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Allocative efficiency (AE) involves the selection of an input mix that allocates factors to 
their highest value uses and introduces the opportunity cost of factor inputs to the 
measurement of productive efficiency.  Allocative inefficiency can also be derived 
from the unit isoquant plotted in Figure 2.1.  Given information on the market prices of 
inputs (w1,w2), the isocost line CC through P is associated with  12211 kxwxw =+  and 
the slope of this line reflect the input price ratio.  However, this cost can be further 
reduced by moving this line in parallel fashion until it is tangential to the isoquant at Q.  
The coordinates of CC then give 0
*
22
*
11 kxwxw =+  achieving the minimal cost at the 
prescribed output level.   Now we note that we can similarly determine the relative 
distances of S and R to obtain the ratio OS/OR.  With respect to the least cost 
combination of inputs given by the point Q, the above ratio indicates the cost reduction 
that a producer would be able to achieve if it moved from a technically but not 
allocatively efficient input package (R) to both a technically and allocatively efficient 
one (Q).  Therefore, the allocative efficiency that characterises the producer at point P 
is given by the ratio OS/OR.   
 
There is another measure that is commonly referred to as cost efficiency or economic 
efficiency.  It can be represented by the ratio of minimal cost (wx*) to actual cost (wx0), 
that is, the ratio wx*/wx0 = OS/OP.  A cost efficient firm will choose its inputs and 
mixes according to their prices so as to minimise total cost.  Cost inefficiency may 
arise from two different sources.  One is deficiency in applying the technology 
(technical inefficiency) and another one is suboptimal allocation of resources (allocative 
inefficiency). Thus, total overall cost efficiency can be presented as the product of 
technical efficiency and allocative efficiency:  
 
Overall cost efficiency  =  allocative efficiency ×  technical efficiency 
                      =  OS/OR ×OR/OP = OS/OP  
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2.3.2 Economies of Scale  
Economies of scale (or returns to scale) refers to the rate at which output changes as all 
factor quantities are varied and measures whether firms with similar production and 
managerial technologies are operating at an optimal size (Molyneux et al. 1996).  
Specifically, economies of scale (or increasing returns to scale) exist, over a given mix 
of outputs, if a proportionate increase in firm’s outputs would lead to a less than 
proportionate increase in its total costs. Conversely, diseconomies of scale (or 
decreasing returns to scale) arise if a proportionate increase in a firm’s outputs would 
lead to a more than proportionate increase in its total costs.  Constant returns to scale 
occur if a proportionate increase in a firm’s outputs would lead to the same 
proportionate increase in its total costs.  
 
Economies of scale actually are based on the shape of the average cost curve and are 
explained in Figure 2.2.  The Figure shows a series of short-run average cost curves 
(SACs) and a long-run average cost curve (LAC).  Each short-run average cost curve 
represents the average cost of different-size firms during a short period of time.  The 
firm will choose the size that yields the lowest average cost for that particular level of 
output.  The long-run average cost curve is traced out from the SACs where each point 
of the LAC is to a point of tangency with a corresponding short run cost curve and it 
shows the least cost method of production for any level of output.  Scale economies 
appear as the slope of an average cost curve indicating how costs vary with output 
(Humphrey, 1990).  The downward-sloping LAC reflects economies of scale, because 
average costs of production decline as output increases.  This cost characteristic exists 
only up to a certain firm size known as the minimum efficient scale (MES).  A firm 
achieves the lowest attainable average cost at the point M and experiences constant 
returns to scale around that point.  Beyond point M, the upward-sloping LAC indicates 
diseconomies of scale, because the average cost of production increase as output 
increases.  
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Figure 2.2 Cost Curves and Economies of Scale  
 
Source: Humphrey (1990, p.38). 
Notes: SAC: short-run average cost curve; LAC: long-run average cost curve; MES: minimum efficient 
scale.  
 
2.3.3 Pure Technical and Scale Efficiency  
In Figure 2.1, the use of the unit isoquant assumes constant returns to scale (CRS), but 
this assumption does not always hold.  A firm using more of both inputs than the 
combination represented by R may exhibit variable returns to scale (VRS).  Thus, in 
general, technical efficiency can be further decomposed into measures of pure technical 
efficiency (PTE) and scale efficiency (SE).  In Figure 2.3, assuming the simple case of 
one input X and one output Y, P represents an existing bank.  OA represents the 
constant returns to scale frontier.  Firms can either lie on, or below the frontier but 
cannot be above it.  Therefore, the ratio of GR/GP represents the measure of technical 
efficiency of bank P which corresponds to OR/OP in Figure 2.1.  
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Figure 2.3 Pure Technical and Scale Efficiency 
 
 
The concept of scale efficiency ascertains whether or not the firm operates at an 
optimum size.  In order to measure scale efficiency, the assumption of variable returns 
to scale replaces that of constant returns to scale.  In the above figure, FEBCD 
represents a variable returns to scale frontier.  For the bank at point P, pure technical 
efficiency (PTE) equals the ratio of GE / GP.  Scale efficiency is the ratio of GR / GE 
or equal to TE divided by PTE.  The value of SE is unity when operating under 
constant returns to scale.  Values of less than unity reflect scale inefficiency.  Scale 
inefficiency could be caused by the firm having to operate under increasing returns to 
scale or decreasing returns to scale.  In order to investigate this, the non-increasing 
returns to scale frontier is developed, represented by OBCD.  If SE is not equal to 
unity and PTE is equal to GR/GP, decreasing returns to scale exists.  If PTE is not 
equal to GR/GP which is based on the frontier OBCD, then the scale inefficiency is due 
to increasing returns to scale.  
 
2.3.4 Economies of Scope  
Economies of scope exist if two or more products can be jointly produced with lower 
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cost by a single firm than the total cost that is incurred in their independent production 
(Molyneux et al., 1996).  For banks, this mean that potential cost savings are 
achievable through the joint production of financial services.  Conversely, 
diseconomies of scope arise if joint production is more costly than independent 
production.  
 
To illustrate the concept of economies of scope, we assume that a firm produces two 
outputs: y1 and y2.  If the two outputs are produced independently, their separate cost 
function are C(y1,0) and C(0, y2).  If the two outputs are produced jointly, the joint cost 
of producing is C(y1, y2).  Economies of scope exist if the total cost of producing the 
two outputs jointly is less than the combined cost of producing the same amounts of 
each output separately, that is, C(y1, y2) < C(y1,0) + C(0, y2).  If the inequality is 
reversed, then diseconomies of scope are said to exist.  Given this example, the 
measure of economies of scope can be measured as follows: 
SCOPE= 
 y2) C(y1, 
 y2) C(y1, -y2) C(0,  C(y1,0) +  
where SCOPE > 0 indicates overall economies of scope and SCOPE < 0 diseconomies 
of scope.  The estimation of economies of scope in the banking sector is not an easy 
task because of the lack of cost data for each output.  Therefore, our study will not 
analyse economies of scope for Chinese banks.  
 
2.4 The Economic Theory and Causes of Inefficiency  
Before turning to the review of frontier efficiency methodologies, we briefly discuss 
various theories of the firm.  The aim of this discussion is to link the theory of the firm 
with the frontier efficiency analysis literature.  The discussion will address the 
question of why firms may not able to utilise their resources efficiently.   
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2.4.1 Conventional Neoclassical Theory of the Firm 
The concepts of efficiency derive their basis from the microeconomic theory of the firm. 
The neo-classical theory of the firm stems from the static equilibrium framework first 
developed by Cournot in 1883.  The conventional neoclassical theory treats the firm as 
a black box which transforms resources into saleable goods.  This transformation of 
inputs into outputs is described by a production function or production possibilities set. 
 
The conventional neoclassical theory of the firm assumes that the firm is operating in a 
perfectly competitive market2.  In this market, all firms seek to maximise their profit 
which is accomplished by simultaneously maximising revenues and minimising costs. 
Consequently, a competitive general equilibrium is achieved by equating the marginal 
rates of substitution for all firms between any two economic variables (inputs or outputs) 
(Cohen and Cyert, 1975).  The competitive equilibrium leads all firms to earn only a 
normal profit.  In order words, firms cannot earn any more money than is necessary to 
cover their economic costs.  In the short run, it is possible for some individual firms to 
make abnormal profits.  The existence of abnormal profits will attract other firms to 
enter the market and compete with incumbent firms.  Competition between firms will 
drive the market price down until all firms are earning a normal profit in the long run.  
If any firm is unable to make a normal profit due to inefficient operation, then in long 
run, these inefficient firms will be either acquired by efficient firms or withdraw from 
the market.  Therefore, according to the conventional neoclassical theory of the firm, 
the firm which can efficiently allocate resources to produce the maximum level of 
output for given input will survive and the firm which is operating inefficiently will be 
driven out of the market.  In other words, in a perfectly competitive market, any firm 
that fails to reach the efficiency frontier will be forced out of the market and only 
efficient firms will remain.  Empirical research suggests, however, that not all firms 
operate on the efficient frontier and a number of firms do not produce at the point where 
long run average costs are minimised but still survive in the market.  Thus, the 
traditional neoclassical theory fails to explain why inefficient firms survive in the 
                                                        
 
2 The main characteristics of a perfectly competitive market: 1) a large number of producers and 
consumers in the market; 2) Goods and services are perfect substitutes; 3) Perfect and complete 
information between consumers and firms; 4) All firms are assumed to have equal access to resources and 
improvements in production technologies; 5) no barriers to entry into or out of the market.  
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market, and because of this some alternative theories have been developed to 
supplement the conventional theory of the firm. 
 
Demsetz (1997) noted that the firm in neoclassical theory reflects the imperatives of the 
price system.  If the price system works well, resources are allocated well.  But the 
traditional theory pays little attention to the internal workings of the firm and provides 
no analysis of the decision-making process and no explanation of the factors that 
determine business success or failure.  Therefore, the neo-classical theory of the firm 
has been challenged by alternatives such as managerial theories (Baumol 1959, Marris 
1964, Williamson 1964), behavioural theories (Simon 1959, Cyert and March 1963), 
and X-efficiency theory (Leibenstein 1966, 1979).  The literature on these theories is 
vast.  Here we can only present a very brief overview of theories that can explain why 
firms may not always operate efficiently.      
 
2.4.2 The Managerial Theories of the Firm 
The conventional theory of the profit-maximising firm has been criticised as being 
much too unrealistic and narrow in the modern economy where a divorce of ownership 
and control exists in large organisations.  In its place, managerial theories of the firm 
have been developed.  Each of the managerial theories argues that the controlling 
management group will pursue their own interests and utility, rather than maximising 
the profit of the firm, although they are always subject to some kind of profit constraint. 
For example, firm’s managers are most likely to seek those objectives from which they 
obtain prestige, power and greater personal monetary reward.  In so doing, costs may 
not be minimised and a level of organisational slack would be built into the system 
(Brewster, 1997). 
 
Baumol (1959) introduces the sales-maximisation model which argues that the 
managerial objectives (income, power, prestige, etc.) are highly correlated with sales 
revenue.  Thus, Baumol suggests that the prime goal of management would be to 
maximise sales revenue after achieving some minimum level of profit necessary to 
satisfy shareholders.  Marris (1964) develops a dynamic model of the firm by 
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assuming that the managerial objective is to concentrate on the maximisation of firm 
growth over time.  Williamson (1964) formulated a more general managerial 
utility-maximising model in which managers attempt to maximise their own utility 
rather than to maximise the profit of the firm. He suggests that managers manifest 
‘expense preferences’ which means managers achieve their objectives by spending some 
of the firm’s potential profits for unnecessary purposes thereby increasing managerial 
satisfaction or utility.   
 
In the 1970’s managerial theories of the firm have developed in terms of principal-agent 
analysis.  This analysis of the firm stems from two main sources.  One is the work of 
Spence and Zeckhauser (1971) and Ross (1973) which is concerned with problems of 
arranging contracts with imperfect and asymmetric information.  Another approach is 
known as “agency theory” as developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama 
(1980).  In principal-agent analysis the firm is considered as a nexus of contracts 
between a firm, the principal, and its subcontractor, the agent. The principals 
(shareholders) hire a group of agents (managers) to carry out certain tasks such as to 
maximise the value of the firm.  In the firm, the principals cannot have full knowledge 
and information about the firm’s operation and performance capabilities.  The agents, 
however, have more information or knowledge than the principals.  The existence of 
asymmetric information and uncertainty leads to a problem of “hidden action” or “moral 
hazard”.  The agents can pursue their own interests such as high salaries, better 
working conditions, on-the-job leisure, job security, etc. but the principals are unable to 
fully observe the actions of the agents.  In order to monitor the behaviour of the agent, 
the principal has to spend additional costs, known as agency costs.  Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) describe the costs of agency as the sum of monitoring expenditures 
incurred by the principal, bonding expenditures incurred by the agent and the value of 
the lost residual borne by the principal and attributable to the agency problem.  The 
principal also tries to affect and motivate the agent’s behaviour in the interests of the 
principal by creating an incentive compatible reward structure and remuneration 
package.  Overall, however, the principal-agent problem reduces the firm’s profit and 
induces inefficiency in the firm.   
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Principal and agent theory could be relevant particularly to Chinese banking efficiency 
studies.  In China, whenever the state banks (the major components of the Chinese 
banking sector) run into difficulty, the principal (the state) has to bail them out.  The 
agents (bank managers), knowing that the principal is the ultimate resort of help, lend 
relentlessly resulting in huge non-performing loans that might never be recovered and 
leading to operate inefficiently.     
 
2.4.3 The Behavioural Theories of the Firm  
The behavioural theory of the firm argues that, in practice, the firm’s ability, need or 
even desire to optimise (maximise) objectives may be questionable.  The business 
world faced by firms is characterised by uncertainty and the absence of complete 
information.  Under these circumstances, Simon (1959) developed a theory of the firm 
that emphasises satisficing and bounded rationality in the decision-making process 
instead of pursuing a maximisation goal3.  Individuals or groups in the firm want to act 
rationally, but they are unable to do so because they possess cognitive limitations in 
solving complex problems and in processing information (Brewster, 1997).  Therefore, 
bounded rationality exists in the process of decision-making and decision-makers 
exhibit ‘satisficing’ behaviour which is set in terms of some aspiration level, rather than 
optimising behaviour.  As a consequence, a firm operating this way will not keep costs 
down to a minimum and this results in productive inefficiency.         
 
Cyert and March (1963) note that, building on the work of Simon (1959), the firm as an 
organisation is not a unified structure but a coalition of various participants such as 
owners, managers workers customers and so forth.  Each of these groups or individuals 
will have varying interests and objectives.  Moreover, the firm itself has five objectives 
– production, inventory, sales, market share, and profit.  Some of the objectives may be 
conflicting.  Consequently decision-making within the firm is a continual process of 
bargaining and aspiration level, in which side payments are made to ensure compliance 
or to entice individuals into some subgrouping.  However, there may be a disparity 
between the resources available to the firm and the payments required to keep factors in 
                                                        
 
3 The word satisfice was coined by Herbert Simon as a portmanteau of "satisfy" and "suffice". 
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their posts.  The difference between total resources and total payments is termed 
organisational slack.  For instance, wages in excess of those required to maintain 
labour may be paid.  This organisational slack will increase unnecessary costs and 
reduce the overall efficiency of the firm.  In a stable environment, the payments may 
converge towards aspiration levels thereby leading organisational slack to be close to 
zero.  But in practice it is clear that the environment is not stationary.  Not only are 
there business cycles, but there is the onward surge of technological progress, which 
ensures that firms must continue to strive to maintain themselves on a best-practice 
frontier.  Given this flux, it is possible for inefficient firms to survive in the market (as 
long as they are not too inefficient) (Dobbs, 2000).  
 
2.4.4 The X-efficiency Theory of the Firm 
The X-efficiency theory which links behavioural theory and managerial utility theory 
was formulated in a succession of Leibenstein’s papers (1966, 1975, 1977, and 1978).  
X-efficiency describes the general efficiency of a firm (given the resources it uses and 
the best technology available) in transforming inputs at minimum cost into maximum 
outputs.  Leibenstein criticises the assumption of neoclassical theory that firms 
maximise profit.  He claims not only that firms cannot maximise profit but that many 
of them maximise managerial-utility instead (Demsetz, 1995).  
 
Leibenstein justifies his rejection of neoclassical theory by studies offering evidence of 
differential performance across firms.  Leibenstein argues as follows: 
 
One idea that emerges from this study is that firms and economies do not 
operate on an outer-bound production possibility surface consistent with 
their resources.  Rather they actually work on a production surface that is 
well within that outer bound.  This means that for a variety of reasons 
people and organisations normally work neither as hard nor as effectively as 
they could.  In situations where competitive pressure is light, many people 
will trade the disutility of greater effort, of search, and the control of other 
peoples’ activities for the utility of feeling less pressure and of better 
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interpersonal relations.  But in situations where competitive pressures are 
high, and hence the costs of such trades are also high, they will exchange less 
of the disutility of effort for the utility of freedom from pressure, etc. 
(Leibenstein, 1966 p 413) 
 
From the evidence, Leibenstein identifies two possible sources of inefficiency.  One is 
a divergence between price and marginal cost, named allocative inefficiency.  This 
divergence may be caused by monopoly, tariffs, and other impediments to competitive 
output rates.  Another is labelled X-inefficiency which stems from the failure of 
businesses to achieve the lowest possible cost functions for producing their goods and 
this can account for wasted resources.  X-inefficiency seeks to analyse intra-firm 
behaviour and relations and interactions of people within the firm, rather than the 
working of the price system.  Leibenstein shows that inefficiency deriving from 
X-inefficiency is significant in comparison to inefficiencies deriving form allocative 
inefficiency. 
 
Within X-inefficiency theory, Leibenstein (1978) identified non-maximising behaviour 
as the key idea of X-efficiency.  The degree of X-inefficiency is primarily determined 
by the level of effort of individuals within the firm. The problem of principal–agent 
relationships is an important source of X-inefficiency.  Moreover, due to the feature of 
incomplete contingent contracts between principals and agents, agents can evade the 
consequences of cost overruns and have no motivation to keep costs down.  Then firms 
will be more X-inefficient.  
 
2.5 The Measurement of Efficiency 
Farrell suggested constructing the efficiency frontier using the observed sample of firms 
in the industry in question.  The firms in the constructed frontier are defined to be 
efficient.  Each firm is compared to a point on the efficient unit isosurface then a 
relative measure of efficiency is determined.  Measuring efficiency and identifying 
peers by graphical techniques is only possible in simple cases.   When a firm has 
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many inputs and outputs, more sophisticated techniques must be used to solve this 
problem.  In the study of measuring efficiency, there are two separate streams: 
non-parametric approaches (data envelopment analysis, free disposal hull) and 
parametric studies (econometric studies, e.g., stochastic frontier, distribution-free). 
Non-parametric approaches are a linear programming technique for the evaluation of 
multiple-input/multiple-output firms.  Parametric studies aim at improving the 
standard OLS estimates with the addition of an asymmetric structure for the residuals, 
so as to account for the distance between empirical observations and the theoretical 
efficient frontier.  In this section, an overview of these frontier efficiency 
methodologies will be provided and our aim is to give a better understanding of the 
issues associated with measuring efficiency.  
 
2.5.1 Data Envelopment Analysis  
The idea of the non-parametric efficiency approach was originally presented in Farrell’s 
(1957) seminal paper.  However, his empirical work had been limited to the 
single–output case and did not deal with applications where large data sets with multiple 
input-outputs are involved.  Moreover, this mathematical programming idea did not 
receive much detailed attention for about two decades, until the paper by Charnes et al 
(1978) was published.  In this classic paper, they proposed a mathematical 
programming algorithm, termed data envelopment analysis (DEA), for assessing the 
performance of a set of homogeneous entities called decision making units (DMUs) 
which convert multiple inputs into multiple outputs.  This approach forms an empirical 
production frontier or envelopment surface and measures and calculates efficiency 
relative to the constructed frontier.  Since the pioneering work by Charnes et al. (1978) 
numerous papers have appeared which have extended and applied DEA methodology.  
Seiford (1997) lists over 400 papers in a comprehensive bibliography and Cooper et al. 
(2007) give over 2000 DEA references. Such rapid growth and widespread acceptance 
of DEA is testimony to its strengths and applicability.   
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CCR Model  
Here we provide a description of one of the most basic DEA models, the CCR model, 
which was proposed by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978).  This model is used to 
measure the overall technical efficiency of decision making units (DMUs). They 
introduced a measure of efficiency for each DMU that is obtained as a maximum of a 
ratio of weighted outputs to weighted inputs.  The ratio for every DMU has to be less 
than or equal to one.  Here, it is possible to reduce the multiple-output / multiple-input 
situation for each DMU to a single virtual output and a single virtual input ratio.  This 
ratio provides a measure of efficiency for a given DMU, which is a function of the 
weights of the virtual input-output combination- also called a function of the multipliers.  
Formally the efficiency for each DMU can be obtained by the following mathematical 
programming approach: 
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where it is should be noted that xij is the observed amount of input of the ith type of the 
jth DMU (xij > 0, i = 1,2,…,m,  j = 1,2,…,n) and yrj is the observed amount of output 
of the rth type for the jth DMU (yrj > 0, r = 1,2,…,s,  j = 1,2,…,n).  In other words, 
jth DMU uses an m-dimensional input vector to produce an s-dimensional output vector. 
Here, (xi0 , yr0) is the input-output vector of the producer being evaluated.  The 
objective function h0 tries to maximise the ratio of virtual output to virtual input subject 
to the constraint that this kind of ratio for each DMU must be less than or equal to unity.  
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The variables ur and vi are the weights of output and input which must be non-negative 
and are determined by the above programming approach.  However, a notable problem 
with this particular fractional formulation is that it has an infinite number of solutions; if 
(u*, v*) is optimal, then (αu*,αv*) will also be optimal for non-negative α.  Thus 
Charnes et al. (1978) have transformed the above problem into an equivalent linear 
programming problem.  They added an additional constraint ∑ =
=
m
i
ii xv
1
0 1 so that the 
above transformation is achieved and the non-uniqueness problem identified above can 
be avoided.  The notation changes from (u, v) to (μ, ν) to reflect the transformation.  
The new linear programming problem is equivalent to the equations in (2.1).  It can be 
written: 
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The above equations are known as the multiplier form of the DEA linear programming 
problem.  Because the concept of duality exists in linear programming, the dual for 
DMU0 can be derived as: 
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The above problem is referred to as the envelopment form of DEA.  Optimal solutions 
(θ, λ) are obtained for each of the DMUs being evaluated.  The value of θ is the 
efficiency score for the particular DMU0 and this efficiency score is a radial measure of 
technical efficiency, according to the Debreu-Farrell definition.  A set of constraints 
assures that the value of θ is always less than or equal to unity and the efficiency score 
for each observed DMU is relative to other DMUs.  DMUs for which θ = 1 are 
identified as the technically efficient while when θ < 1 we have a relatively inefficient 
DMU.  The optimal λ can identify a project (boundary) point located on the 
constructed production frontier when the problem seeks the radial contraction of the 
input vector.  Färe et al. (1994) point out that the CCR model imposes a feasible 
production set which is closed and convex, and presents constant returns-to-scale and 
strong disposability of inputs and outputs4.  In later sections, some extension DEA 
models which relax some of its restrictive properties will be discussed.  
 
The above DEA problem yields a piece-wise linear surface and some sections of this 
surface run parallel to the axes.  So this radial efficiency measurement causes a 
difficulty in that for an efficient point, it is possible to reduce inputs without altering 
outputs or increase output without altering inputs.  These input savings or output 
expansions are referred to as input or output slacks.  Some authors (e.g., Ali and 
Seiford, 1993; Cooper et al. 2004) develop the following linear programming algorithm 
to deal with these slack problems: 
                                                        
 
4 Constant returns-to-scale identifies inefficient units regardless of their scale size. 
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Here the −+ ir ss ,  are slack variables and ε is an infinitely small positive number. The 
above linear programming problem is solved by the two-stage procedure. The first stage 
minimises θ by solving (2.3).  θ is known as weak efficiency and also called Farrell 
efficiency.  Then we maximise the sum of slacks without altering the value of θ  
obtained from the first-stage results.  DMUs attain full efficiency if and only if θ = 1 
and all slacks: 0== −+ ir ss . This full strong efficiency satisfies the conditions for 
Pareto-Koopmans efficiency 5 .  In sum, this two stage procedure ensures the 
identification of an efficiency frontier point by maximising the sum of slacks required to 
move from a Farrell efficient frontier to a Koopmans efficient frontier (Coelli, et al., 
2005).  
 
BCC model 
In Charnes et al. (1978)’s original paper, it was pointed out that the model assumes 
constant returns to scale (CRS).  This assumption is appropriate only when all DMUs 
are operating at an optimal scale.  But in the real word many factors such as constraints 
on finance, government regulations and imperfect competition may cause some DMUs 
not to operate at the optimal scale.  Therefore, in this situation, the measures of 
technical efficiency using the CCR model will be confounded by scale inefficiencies. 
Subsequently Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) drop the CRS assumption.  They 
propose a model that takes into account the effect of returns to scale within DMUs 
                                                        
 
5 Pareto-Koopmans efficiency is a more strict definition of technical efficiency when contrasted with 
Farrell’s definition. It defines a DMU as achieving efficiency if and only if it is not possible to improve 
any input or output without worsening any other input or output.  
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called the variable returns to scale (VRS) model or BCC model.  The purpose of the 
VRS assumption is to attempt to determine the most efficient scale size for each DMU 
and at the same time, to identify its technical efficiency. 
    
Banker et al. (1984) adds a convexity condition for jλ : 1
1
=∑
=
n
j
jλ , which ensures that an 
inefficient DMU is only compared with similar sized DMUs.  With this added 
constraint, the reference set is changed from the conical hull in the case of the CCR 
model to the convex hull in the case of the variable returns to scale model.  This 
change ensures that the tested DMU is compared with a lesser number of combinations.  
Thus, technical efficiency scores provided by the CCR model are greater then or equal 
to those in the BBC model.  
 
The input-oriented BCC model for DMU0 in envelopment form can be written formally 
as: 
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Solving the above problem for each DMU, BCC efficiency scores, θ, are obtained. 
These scores are also called the pure technical score since they are obtained from a 
model which allows for variable returns to scale and eliminates the problem of scale 
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efficiency from the analysis.  
    
Furthermore, if 1
1
=∑
=
n
j
jλ  is replaced by 10
1
≤≤∑
=
n
j
jλ , then the non-increasing returns 
to scale (NIRS) envelopment model is obtained.  That is if we replace 1
1
=∑
=
n
j
jλ  
with 1
1
≥∑
=
n
j
jλ , then we obtain the non-decreasing returns to scale (NDRS) envelopment 
model.  These return to scale models are summarised in Färe et al. (1985), Aly et al. 
(1990) and Banker and Thrall (1992). 
 
In the preceding analysis, DEA models are called input-orientated DEA models.  The 
input-orientated DEA model maximises the proportional reduction in inputs as much as 
possible, given the current level of outputs.  On the other hand, it is also possible to 
seek the proportional augmentation in outputs keeping at most the current level of 
inputs.  Thus the output direction can also be applied in the above models.  In the 
oriented models the envelopment surface (efficiency frontier) remains the same for 
either VRS or CRS.  But the measures of inefficient firms may differ between the two 
methods.  The choice of an appropriate orientation is made according to which 
quantities (inputs or outputs) the managers have most control over.  Thus, for example, 
if producers are required to meet market demands, and if they can freely adjust input 
usage, then an input-oriented model seems to be appropriate.  Or the firms may be 
given a fixed quantity of resources and asked to produce as much output as possible.  
Then an output-oriented model would be more appropriate (see. Coelli, 1998).  
However, some researchers have pointed out that the choice of orientation has only a 
minor effect on the scores obtained and therefore it may not be a crucial issue (see. 
Coelli and Perelman, 1999).       
 
The DEA models of economic efficiency 
The above DEA models only use quantity data to capture technical efficiency and 
cannot account for allocative efficiency.  However, if price data are available, it is 
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possible to extend DEA models so that they measure economic efficiency.  The 
objective of extended DEA models is to minimise cost or maximise revenue or profit 
(see Färe et al.,1985; Aly et al.,1990; Lovell,1993) 
 
For the case of VRS cost minimisation DEA, economic (cost) efficiency can be solved 
by employing the following linear programming problem: 
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Where ∗0ix  is the cost minimising input quantities for the evaluated firm, given the 
input prices wio and output levels yro.  
    
Based on an optimal solution ( ∗ijx , λj) of the above linear programming problem, the 
cost efficiency of the evaluated firm is calculated as the ratio of the minimum cost to 
observed cost, that is, 
ijij
ijij
xw
xwCE
∗
= . 
 
The estimation of revenue efficiency is similar to that of the estimation of cost 
efficiency. However, the objective here is to maximise revenues by using an 
output-oriented approach rather than to minimise costs by an input-oriented approach.   
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A variety of other DEA models have been developed to address specific issues in the 
literature.  For instance, Banker and Morey (1986) proposed a model to assess DEA 
efficiency involving the effects of exogenous environment factors.  Land et al. (1993) 
developed a stochastic DEA model which tries to capture the influence of noise.  
Thanassoulis and Dyson (1992) proposed models to estimate target input and output 
levels to render a firm efficient under pre-specified preferences regarding improvements 
to output and input levels.  Tone (2001) proposed a slacks-based measure (SBM) 
model which deals with slacks directly but neglects the radical characteristics of input 
and outputs.  Tone (2002) developed the New cost DEA model which is motivated by 
the idea that the unit prices might not identical among DMUs.  
 
2.5.2 Free Disposal Hull  
Another non-parametric frontier model which has received some research attention is 
the Free Disposal Hull (FDH) model as first formulated by Deprins et al. (1984) and 
extended by Tulkens (1993).  The FDH approach can be viewed as a special case of 
the DEA model.  The FDH approach relaxes the assumption of convexity and 
presumes that no linear substitution is possible between observed input or output 
combinations on a piecewise linear frontier.  The FDH production possibilities set is 
composed only of the DEA vertices and the free disposal hull points interior to these 
vertices (Berger and Humphrey, 1997) and this ensures that efficiency evolutions are 
affected from only actually observed performances.  The FDH model is formulated by 
adding to equation (2.6) the additional constraints λj ∈ {0, 1}, j = 1,…,n to relax 
convexity.  The FDH problem is a mixed integer programming problem. The DEA and 
FDH frontiers are compared in Figure 2.4.  The FDH frontier has a staircase shape and 
envelops the data more tightly than the DEA frontier does.  Therefore, the FDH 
approach typically generates larger estimates of the efficiency score than does the DEA 
approach.  Consequently, slack is much more serious problem in FDH than in DEA.  
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Figure 2.4 Free Disposal Hull (FDH) 
 
Source: Lovell (1993, p 32)   
 
2.5.3 Functional Form for the Parametric Methods  
In some engineering or physical production processes, it is possible to determine the 
exact form of the production function.  However, in most industries, especially in the 
services sector, the exact production or cost function is not known.  Therefore, we have 
to use some approximation to the production or cost function, which specifies the 
algebraic (functional) form for estimating the relationship between the dependent and 
explanatory variables, through which to analyse efficiency.  This in turn means the 
measurements of inefficiency are the deviations of cost away from some minimal levels 
found in the data rather than from any true technologically based minima.   
 
Cobb-Douglas Functional Form  
The Cobb-Douglas functional form of the production function is widely used to 
represent the relationship of inputs to outputs, and was developed by Cobb and Douglas 
(1928).  The Cobb-Douglas form of the cost function is  
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or upon taking logarithms:  
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where, TC is total costs, yi is the ith output, pj is the price of the jth input and α0, αi and  
βj are parameters to be estimated, symbolising the cost elasticities of the outputs and 
input prices.  
 
The Cobb-Douglas cost function is homogeneous of degree one in inputs prices, only if  
∑
=
=
m
j
j
1
1β .  This linear homogeneity restriction is imposed in the estimation of the cost 
function and implies a proportional increase of all input prices results in the same 
proportional increase of total costs.  The Cobb-Douglas cost function is easy to 
estimate and the results are easy to interpret as well.  However, the main shortcoming 
of the Cobb-Douglas production function is that it is a first-order approximation and 
thus it exhibits a constant value for elasticity of scale.  Therefore, it is not possible to 
test within the Cobb-Douglas framework whether different firms exhibit different values 
for economies of scale (Kuenzle, 2005).   Consequently, some more flexible 
functional forms have been developed to address this problem.    
 
Translog Functional Form 
One of the most important developments for econometric frontier modeling was the 
development of the translog (transcendental logarithmic) production function by 
Christensen et al (1973).  They use a second-order Taylor expansion as a local 
approximation to some unknown ‘true’ underlying production function.  
    
Murray and White (1983) first used the translog function to estimate economics of scale 
for the banking industry, and since then the translog functional form has become one of 
the most popular functional forms through which to estimate bank efficiency.  They 
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proposed the translog cost function which relates minimum attainable costs to input 
prices and output quantities in an explicitly non-linear fashion6.  This type of flexible 
functional form permits variable returns to scale and estimates the typical U-shaped 
average cost curve.  The translog cost function can be specified as follows:  
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where, TC is total costs, yi is the ith output, pj is the price of the jth input and ε is the 
error term.  Because the duality theorem requires that the cost function should be 
linearly homogeneous in input prices, the following restrictions are imposed on the 
parameters of the cost function equation in order to satisfy the homogeneity condition: 
∑∑∑ === m
j
jh
m
j
ij
m
j
j 0;0;1 γδβ .  In addition, symmetry restrictions are imposed on the 
second-order parameters, that is, ikσ = kiσ ; ijδ = jiδ  and hjjh γγ = . 
    
While the translog functional form is one of most widely used functional forms in the 
empirical literature on bank efficiency, it has some disadvantages that have led some 
researchers to use alternative cost functional forms.  A limitation of the translog 
function is that it imposes a symmetric U-shape on the average cost curve.  The 
translog function does not necessarily fit the data well when it is far removed from the 
mean in terms of output size (Berger and Mester, 1997).  One approach to solve this 
problem is to use the Fourier functional form because a Fourier series is capable of 
representing any function form well throughout the entire range of data (Gallant,1982).  
The Fourier functional form contains a linear combination of the sine and cosine 
functions.  It gives a flexible and global approximation to the unknown cost or profit 
function.  Several studies have shown the Fourier-flexible functional form is superior 
                                                        
 
6Translog cost function is known as a nonhomothetic function and allows the ratios of cost minimising 
cost input demands to depend on the level of output.   
Chapter 2 Efficiency: Meaning, Theory and Measurement 
 36
to the commonly specified translog form in estimating bank cost functions (see, 
McAllister and McManus, 1993; Mitchell and Onvural, 1996; Berger et al., 1997; 
Berger and DeYoung, 1997). 
    
Other functional forms have also been specified in the bank efficiency literature. 
Diewert (1971) proposed the generalised Leontief cost function.  Mester (1992) 
estimated a hybrid translog function.  Berger et al (1993) estimated a Fussy normalised 
quadratic variable profit function and Pulley and Braunstein (1992) applied a composite 
cost function.  
 
2.5.4 Stochastic Frontier Analysis  
As a very popular method for estimating efficiency, the stochastic frontier analysis 
proposed by Aigner et al. (1977), Battese and Corra (1977), and Meeusen and van Den 
Broeck (1977), is motivated by the idea that deviations from the frontier might not be 
totally under the control of the DMUs being studied.  SFA allows for random errors 
associated with the choice of the functional form, resulting in a stochastic frontier.  It is 
often referred to as a composed error model where the part representing statistical noise 
follows a symmetric distribution and the other part, representing inefficiency, follows a 
particular one-sided distribution7.  
    
To illustrate the essential idea of the stochastic frontier approach, consider the 
single-equation stochastic cost function model: 
 
iiiiiiii uwyCwyCC ++=+= νε ),(ln),(lnln  
 
where Ci is the observed total cost, yi is a vector of outputs, wi is an input price vector, vi 
is a two-sided noise component, and iu is a nonnegative disturbance which represents 
                                                        
 
7 Statistical noise represents those external events which cannot be controlled by firms, such as luck, 
labor market conflicts, climate, topography and machine performance.  
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the individual firm’s deviations from the efficient cost frontier and serves as a proxy for 
both technical and allocative efficiency.  C(yi, wi) is a deterministic cost frontier and 
the stochastic cost frontier is C(yi, wi)exp (vi). 
    
The most common distributional assumption is the normal distribution for vi and the 
half-normal or exponential distribution for ui, proposed by Aigner et.al (1977) and 
Mester (1993).  The assumption of half-normal or exponential distributions term on 
inefficiency imposes a restriction that most firms are clustered near full efficiency, with 
higher degrees of inefficiency being increasingly unlikely (Berger, 1993).  But this is 
not necessarily true and the inefficiencies could be more evenly distributed.  Other 
studies have argued that alternative distributions for inefficiency may be more 
appropriate than the half-normal.  Stevenson (1980), and Berger and DeYoung (1997), 
for example, use the truncated normal model.  Greene (1990) considers the 
normal-gamma distribution model.  However, these flexible distributions of 
inefficiency may make it difficult to separate inefficiency from random error in a 
composed-error framework, because the truncated normal and gamma efficiency 
distributions may be close to the symmetric normal distribution assumed for the random 
error (Berger and Humphrey, 1997).  
    
The parameters of the frontier model and the composed error, εi, can be obtained using 
either the maximum likelihood (ML) estimation or the corrected ordinary least squares 
(COLS) directly8.  Some studies suggest that ML estimation is the preferred method. 
For example, Coelli (1995) and Olesen et al. (1980) show that ML estimation tends to 
outperform COLS in large sample sizes.  Specifically, “the ML estimator can be shown 
to be consistent and asymptotically normally distributed (CAN) with variances that are 
no larger than the variances of any other CAN estimator (that is,, the ML estimator is 
asymptotically efficient)” (Coelli et al. 2005, pp 218). 
 
Next step, observation-specific estimates of inefficiency can be obtained by using the 
distribution of the inefficiency term conditional on the estimate of the entire composed 
                                                        
 
8 See Battese and Coelli (1992, 1995), Coelli (1995) and Fried et.al (1993) 
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error term (Jondrow et.al.,1982).  In other words, inefficiency measures are taken as 
the conditional mean or mode of the distribution of the inefficiency term, given that the 
observation of the composed error term, that is, E[exp(u|ε)] is used to measure 
inefficiency.  
 
2.5.5 Distribution Free Approach 
The distribution free approach (DFA) is a panel estimation method which avoids 
imposing distributional assumptions on the error component. DFA was introduced by 
Schmidt and Sickles (1984) and Berger (1993).  DFA specifies a functional form for 
the efficiency frontier as does SFA, but it uses a different way to separate the 
inefficiencies from the residual.  DFA disentangles inefficiencies from random errors 
by assuming that inefficiencies are relatively stable and should persist over time.  
Random errors are ephemeral and should tend to cancel one another out over time by 
averaging.  In particular, a cost or profit function is estimated for each period of a 
panel data set.  The residual in each separate regression is comprised of the 
inefficiency and random error terms.  Since the random error component is assumed to 
average out over time, the average of a bank’s residuals from all of the regressions is an 
estimate of the inefficiency of the bank. 
    
Because no restrictive assumptions are imposed on the distribution of either inefficiency 
or the random error, the distribution-free approach is easier to implement than the 
stochastic frontier approach because it does not require the use of maximum likelihood 
methods to estimate the cost or profit function.  We can estimate the function either by 
generalised least squares (GLS), as in Schmidt and Sickles (1984) or by using ordinary 
least squares (OLS), as in Berger (1993).  The inefficiency is then estimated for each 
firm as the difference between its average residual and the average residual of the firm 
on the frontier.  This gives the formula:          
 
)ln)exp(min(ln ittitINEFF εε −=  
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where itεln is the average residual over the period and )min(ln tε is the minimum value 
of the average error term for all firms in the sample.   
 
A problem with DFA is that it may give misleading results if the period chosen is too 
long, the inefficiency component of the error term is not constant over time or if the 
number of available data years is not sufficient to average out the random error term. 
Thus the accuracy of the efficiency results may depend on the length of the period of the 
study.  De Young (1997b) shows that a six year time period is long enough to address 
all these issues.    
 
2.5.6 Thick Frontier Approach  
The thick frontier approach (TFA) was developed by Berger and Humphrey (1991, 
1992).  It specifies a functional form for the frontier cost function as do the other 
parametric frontier approaches.  But this approach estimates a thick frontier rather than 
a frontier edge for measuring efficiencies and also avoids distributional assumptions for 
cross-sectional data.  As it is usually implemented, this method estimates the cost 
function for both the lowest average cost quartile of firms and the highest average cost 
quartile of firms.  Firms in the lowest average cost quartile are assumed to be of 
greater than average efficiency and to form a thick frontier. Similarly banks in the 
highest performance quartiles are assumed to have less efficiency than average.  The 
differences in predicted performance between the highest and lowest average-cost 
quartiles reflect a combination of inefficiencies and exogenous differences in the 
regression.  The error terms within each of the frontiers are assumed to represent 
random error and luck.  In most applications, TFA predicts cost efficiency using the 
differences in the parameters of the upper and lower cost frontiers, whereas the 
differences in the lowest and highest cost function are estimated as exogenous factors.  
TFA does not provide point estimates of efficiency for individual DMUs but instead 
provides an estimate of the overall level of efficiency.  One potential disadvantage of 
TFA is that its assumptions seldom hold exactly.  Because of this TFA may not yield 
precise estimates of the general level of overall efficiency.  But Berger and Humphrey 
(1991, pp121) defend the thick frontier approach by nothing that “precise measurement 
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is not (our) main purpose.  Rather, (our) goals are to get a basic idea of the likely 
magnitude of inefficiencies”.   
 
2.5.7 Is There A ‘Best’ Frontier Method?   
The non-parametric techniques for estimating the frontier and the measurement of 
efficiency relative to the constructed frontier differ from the parametric techniques.  
The two approaches employ different techniques to envelop data more or less using 
different assumptions for random noise and for flexibility in the structure of the efficient 
frontier.  The primary advantage of the econometric approach is its ability to 
accommodate both the random error and the inefficiency component in efficiency 
estimation.  However, this methodology specifies the functional form that presupposes 
the shape of the efficient frontier and assumes a probability distribution for the 
efficiency level.  Once these assumptions are mis-specified, the measured efficiency 
will have errors.  The non-parametric approach avoids this type of specification error 
because it does not require a priori assumption about the analytical form of the 
production function or an assumed probability distribution for efficiency.  However, it 
suffers from the drawback that it does not allow for random errors owing to 
measurement error and luck in the optimisation problem and all deviations from the 
frontier are reported as inefficiency.  Since both parametric and non-parametric 
techniques have their own merits and the true level of efficiency is unknown, the choice 
of a suitable estimation method has been quite controversial.  Some researchers (e.g. 
Ferrier and Lovell, 1990; Bauer et al. 1998; Eisenbeis et al., 1999; Huang and Wang, 
2002) argue that it is not necessary to have a consensus on which is the best method for 
measuring frontier efficiency.  Instead, they recommend a checking process which uses 
more than one methodology to assess the robustness of results.  This methodological 
cross-checking provides useful information and diagnosis for regulatory analysis and 
the decision maker9.  
 
                                                        
 
9 Methodologies cross-checking is advocated by Charnes, Cooper and Sickles (1988)  
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2.6 Summary and Conclusion  
This chapter presents a theoretical framework relating to productive efficiency.  
Efficiency measures deviations in performance from the predicted performance of the 
“best practice” firms on the efficient frontier, facing a number of exogenous market 
factors.  Economic efficiency refers to the ability of a firm to select the input and/or 
output levels and mixes to optimise an economic goal, such as cost minimisation or 
profit maximisation (Lovell, 1993).  It can be decomposed into pure technical 
efficiency, allocative efficiency and scale efficiency.  When a firm maximizes the 
output from a given level of input, pure technical efficiency occurs.  Allocative 
efficiency measures the extent to which a firm is able to use inputs and outputs in 
optimal proportions, given prices and the production technology.  A firm has scale 
efficiency when it operates in the range of constant returns to scale.  Scope efficiency 
occurs when a firm operates in different diversified locations.  The economic (cost) 
efficiency analysis provides an overall, objectively determined, numerical efficiency 
value and ranking of banks.  Therefore, this research intends to focus on analysing cost 
efficiency levels in the Chinese banking sector.  
 
This chapter also discusses various theories of the firm which are related to the 
efficiency of firm.  Traditional neoclassical theory views the firm as a unified rational 
economic agent.  The firm should operate efficiently; otherwise the market will 
penalize the inefficient firm by driving it out of the market.   However, this theory 
does not explain why firms may not able to operate efficiently.  We then review some 
alternative theories of the firm such as the managerial theory of the firm, the 
behavioural theory of the firm and the X-efficiency theory of the firm.  These theories 
highlight the internal inefficiency of the firm and can explain why firms may deviate 
from the optimal level of resource utilisation.  
 
Finally, this chapter reviews the main frontier approaches (both non-parametric and 
parametric) used to measure the efficiency of firms.  The non-parametric approach 
constructs a piecewise linear combination or frontier that connects the set of 
‘best-practice observations’ in the data set under analysis and measures efficiency 
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relative to the constructed frontier.  It does not allow for random errors owing to 
measurement error and any deviation from the frontier is considered as inefficiency.  
The parametric approach allows for noise in the measurement of efficiency but it 
requires a pre-specified functional form for the efficient frontier and the distribution of 
efficiency.  It includes the stochastic frontier analysis, the distribution free approach 
and the thick frontier approach.  The main difference between these models is the way 
in which inefficiencies are separated from the random errors and the probability 
distributions assumed for the inefficiencies.  Both non-parametric and parametric 
approaches have their own advantages and disadvantages and there is no agreement in 
the literature regarding which approach can produce a better estimate of efficiency 
scores.  Therefore, methodological cross-checking is highly recommended for 
efficiency analysis.  The following chapter provides an extensive summary of the 
empirical evidence in the banking efficiency literature, especially those which employ 
two or more frontier techniques for the estimation of bank efficiency and seek to 
examine bank efficiency in emerging markets or developing countries. 
Chapter 3 Empirical Studies of Bank Efficiency 
 43
Empirical Studies of Bank Efficiency 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter briefly introduced relevant theoretical issues relating to the 
efficiency with which firms conduct their productive operations and reviewed both the 
parametric and non-parametric approaches utilised in the literature for both measuring 
and assessing efficiency.  Starting in the late 1980s, a substantial research effort has 
gone into measuring the efficiency of financial institutions, particularly commercial 
banks.  A comprehensive review of efficiency studies as they relate to financial 
institutions has been provided by Berger and Humphrey (1997).  They survey 130 
studies that between them apply at least five major frontier efficiency analyses to 
financial institutions across 21 countries.  Within this survey, applications of 
non-parametric (69 studies) and parametric approaches (60 studies) are split fairly 
evenly.  Therefore, this chapter focuses mainly on reviewing the related empirical 
literature on the efficiency of banks.  We are particularly interested in banking 
efficiency studies that have compared the parametric and non-parametric methodologies 
and have been applied to the data of developing countries, including China.  Moreover, 
this chapter also highlights the studies which have investigated the important 
determinants of banking efficiency.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows.  Section 3.2 briefly reviews 
empirical banking efficiency studies which apply two or more frontier techniques to a 
common set of data for the estimation and assessment of efficiency levels.  Section 3.3 
provides a brief survey of the literature devoted to banking efficiency as it affects 
transition and developing countries.  Section 3.4 reviews empirical studies on the 
efficiency of the Chinese banking sector.  Section 3.5 introduces a number of 
hypotheses that may help explain variations in the efficiency levels of banks and 
outlines the relationship between ownership structure, size, deregulation, market 
discipline and market structure and the level of banking efficiency.  Finally, section 3.6 
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summarises the main conclusions of this chapter.  
 
3.2 Evidence on Earlier Banking Efficiency Comparisons  
Despite the vast literature on banking efficiency, only a handful of studies have used 
two or more frontier techniques for the estimation of bank efficiency on the same data 
set.  These empirical studies aim to provide evidence about the consistency of 
efficiency frontier methods and obtain robust information regarding the efficiency of 
banks.  Table 3.1 displays the main research on financial institution efficiency 
comparisons.  
 
In the 1990’s proponents of methodological cross-checking started to debate the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of the parametric and non-parametric approaches for 
measuring bank efficiency. These studies applied both linear programming and 
econometric methods to common data sets and conducted explicit comparisons of the 
results obtained from the two methods for measuring efficiency.  This comparative 
method continues a practice initiated by Ferrier and Lovell (1990).  Ferrier and Lovell 
(1990) analysed the cost structure of 575 U.S. banks by applying both the SFA and DEA 
methodologies.  They find that both DEA and SFA methodologies generally draw 
similar conclusions on the level of average cost efficiency.  One interesting result they 
find is that the DEA cost efficiency score is usually higher than the SFA efficiency score.  
This result seems to contradict the expectation that the DEA model generally returns 
higher inefficiency scores than the SFA model (Coelli et al., 2005).  Ferrier and Lovell 
(1990) explain this outcome by suggesting that the DEA frontier is sufficiently flexible 
to envelop the data more closely than the translog cost frontier.  When they decompose 
cost inefficiency into technical inefficiency and allocative inefficiency, both techniques 
lead to different conclusions on the magnitudes of the above two inefficiency scores.  
Furthermore, the rank correlation coefficients between DEA and SFA technical 
efficiency and cost efficiency are 0.014 and 0.017, respectively, and are not significantly 
different from zero.  Thus, the efficiencies derived from DEA and SFA do not lead to 
consistent rankings.  Ferrier and Lovell (1990) argue that the linear programming 
model and stochastic frontier model differ both in structure and in implementation and 
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that the debate over the attractiveness of the two approaches will be substantial and will 
continue for some time. 
 
Drake and Weyman-Jones (1996) use both parametric (SFA) and non-parametric 
techniques (DEA) to the estimate cost efficiency of 46 British building societies.  They 
report that the inefficiencies in the building society sector are of the order of 12% to 
13% and that there is a very high rank-order correlation between the two sets of 
efficiency scores.  Resti (1997) provides further evidence on European banking 
efficiency.  He examines cost efficiencies for a panel sample of 270 Italian banks using 
multiple frontier techniques.  He shows that the mean efficiency scores range from 
66% to 76% under both DEA and SFA, and also that there is a very high positive 
correlation for score rankings between the two approaches.  Based on these similarities, 
Resti (1997) argues that results obtained from DEA and SFA do not differ substantially.  
Moreover, he reports that efficiency gaps exist when efficiency values are grouped by 
geographic areas and bank size.  Specifically, DEA and SFA generate very similar 
results grouped by geographic area classes but the results grouped by size classes are 
not consistent.  Resti (1997) also reports that for the Italian banks he studied DEA 
scores (variable returns to scale model) increase as bank size increases.  In contrast, the 
econometric approach yields results in the opposite direction; namely, that the efficiency 
of Italian banks declines with the size of the affected banks.   
 
A very significant study was authored by Bauer, et al. (1998), who applied four frontier 
approaches - SFA, DFA, TFA and DEA - on a panel data set of 683 large U.S. banks 
over the 12 year period from 1977 to 1988.  Bauer, et al. (1998) notes in particular that 
the approach taken in their study provides a comprehensive investigation of the 
consistency of the various frontier approaches that had not previously appeared in the 
banking efficiency literature. Bauer, et al. (1998, p. 87) argue that “it is not necessary to 
have a consensus on which is the single best frontier approach for measuring efficiency”; 
instead, they propose six consistency conditions that efficiency measures derived from 
the various approaches should meet if they are to provide useful information for 
decision makers.  Specifically, the efficiency estimates derived from the different 
techniques should be consistent in the distribution of efficiency levels, the rank order 
correlation of efficiency levels should be very high, and the identification of best and 
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worst practice firms should be the same.  Also the efficiency estimates should be stable 
over time and consistent with competitive conditions and traditional financial 
performance measures.  They argue that the first three consistency conditions may be 
designed for measuring the degree to which various approaches are mutually consistent 
and the remaining three conditions may be thought of as measuring the degree to which 
the efficiency measures derived from the various frontier techniques are consistent with 
reality or are believable. 
 
Bauer, et al. (1998) find that the mean cost efficiency of six parametric approach models 
is much higher than that of two nonparametric approach models, averaging 83% for the 
parametric models as against 30% for the nonparametric models.  The average 
rank-order correlation between the DEA and the parametric techniques is only 10%, 
which suggests that the nonparametric and the parametric approaches give only very 
weak consistency in their efficiency scores. Moreover, the identification of best and 
worst practice banks is not consistent between the DEA and parametric techniques.  
However, there is noticeable similarity in the distributional characteristics of the 
efficiency scores and the efficiency rank-order correlation when, instead of comparing 
the nonparametric with parametric approaches, the comparison is within one of these 
categories.  All approaches are stable over time although DEA generally shows slightly 
better stability than parametric techniques.  This may indicate that many banks tend to 
maintain their efficiency levels over time.  Bauer, et al. (1998) also find that 
parametric techniques seem to be more consistent with the competitive conditions in the 
market which suggests that because competition should drive most very inefficient 
banks out of the business, most of the remaining or “long term” banks should be 
reasonably efficient.  Finally, they show that parametric methodologies seem to be 
consistent with the standard non-frontier (that is, financial ratio) performance measures.  
The nonparametric measures, in contrast, are only weakly related to financial ratio 
performance measures.  In sum, Bauer et al. (1998) conclude that there is no dominant 
way to assess the efficiency of a firm’s productive operations - and banking firms in 
particular. Thus, when applying frontier efficiency analysis, the use of multiple 
techniques is highly recommended and the conclusions drawn from the methodological 
cross-checking analysis implied by the application of these multiple techniques should 
result in more robust and believable assessments of firm efficiency.  
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Eisenbeis et al. (1999) estimate the cost efficiencies of a sample of 254 large US bank 
holding companies over the period 1986-1991.  In order to compare the robustness of 
the results obtained, they employ both a stochastic frontier approach and a linear 
frontier approach.  They find that DEA inefficiency scores are two or three times larger 
than those generated by SFA, averaging 30% for DEA as against 15% for SFA.  After 
banks are classified into size-based quartiles, they find that the level and variation of 
smaller banks’ inefficiency scores on average are higher than those of larger banking 
firms.  Moreover, the inefficiencies seem to persist over time.  However, the 
persistence results are significantly greater for the linear programming estimates than 
they are for the econometric estimates.  Furthermore, the efficiency rank-order 
correlations between the two approaches range from a low of 0.44 to a high of 0.58.  
Eisenbeis et al. (1999) conclude from this that significant differences may arise in the 
efficiency measures provided by the DEA and SFA techniques.  Another contribution 
of Eisenbeis et al. (1999) is to explore the “informativeness” of the efficiency scores 
estimated by the DEA and SFA techniques10.  For both techniques they examine the 
relationship between bank efficiency and their risk-taking behaviour, managerial 
competence and stock returns.  They find that the SFA estimates have more 
explanatory power than the DEA estimates in explaining banks’ risk-taking behaviour, 
managerial competence and stock price return behaviour.  Summing up, they conclude 
that both parametric and non-parametric efficiency estimates produce reasonably good 
and “informative efficiency scores”.  However, the SFA estimates should be given 
more weight in assessments of banking efficiency than those provided by the DEA 
methodology.   
 
To the author’s knowledge, Huang and Wang (2002) is the only published study using 
an Asian data set which compares more than one variant of each efficiency assessment 
methodology.  They evaluate the economic efficiency and economies of scale of 22 
Taiwanese commercial banks over the period from 1982 until 1997, using DEA, SFA 
and DFA (Distribution Free Approach).  They report that the average efficiency score 
generated by DEA is roughly the same as that for the SFA and DFA approaches.  
                                                        
 
10 Most comparative studies only examine the consistency of the estimated efficiency scores obtained 
from two different approaches.  However, they do not in general explore the information content of the 
efficiency scores they obtain.    
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However, Spearman rank correlation coefficients between the parametric (SFA and DFA) 
and non-parametric (DEA) efficiency measures are quite small and this indicates that 
these two techniques are not consistent in their efficiency rankings.  However, like 
most previous studies, Huang and Wang (2002) report that whilst the efficiency 
measures they obtain are generally different across the alternative methodologies within 
methodologies the efficiency scores are generally quite stable across time.  
Furthermore, the Fourier flexible function seems to provide more stability and 
persistency in the efficiency measures over time than the translog function.  With 
regard to the consistency between frontier efficiency and traditional performance 
measures, Huang and Wang (2002) report that parametric measures (SFA, DFA) 
correlate more with conventional performance measures (that is, financial ratios) than 
do the non-parametric measures (DEA).  Regarding scale economics which is relevant 
for making decisions about mergers and acquisitions, Huang and Wang (2002) find 
evidence of scale economics under the parametric estimation approach.  This may lead 
one to the conclusion that mergers reduce average total costs.  However, against this 
Huang and Wang (2002) report no evidence of scale economies under the DEA 
methodology.  Finally, Huang and Wang (2002) conclude that the particular frontier 
method used to measure efficiency can result in significantly different conclusions 
across several dimensions of the efficiency spectrum (e.g., relative value of the 
efficiency score, correlation between efficiency scores over time, the existence of scale 
economies).  Given this, decision makers would be well advised to apply 
methodological cross-checking in order to insure that the conclusions they reach are not 
driven by chance and mis-specification.  
 
Weill (2004) provides evidence about the consistency of efficiency frontier techniques 
on a European banking data set.  He uses DEA, SFA and DFA to measure the cost 
efficiencies of banks in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Switzerland.  The study 
shows that the mean efficiency scores across the five countries vary widely, irrespective 
of the technique (DEA, SFA, DFA) used to measure efficiency.  Weill (2004) reports 
that the average efficiency scores between the parametric (SFA, DFA) approaches and 
the nonparametric (DEA) approach are broadly comparable. However, the SFA and 
DFA efficiency scores are somewhat dissimilar.  Against this, Weill (2004) also reports 
that whilst the SFA and DFA techniques return generally dissimilar measures of 
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efficiency for any given firm, yet the SFA and DFA efficiency scores are generally 
highly correlated.  However, the correlation between the DEA and SFA and DEA and 
DFA efficiency scores are generally poor.  These results are consistent with those 
reported by Bauer et al. (1998). Furthermore, Weill (2004) also investigates two 
important policy issues; namely, the relationship between cost efficiency and size and 
the link between differences in efficiency between banks and the specialised markets in 
which they trade and operate (e.g., co-operative banks, savings bank).  Here mixed 
results are obtained.  He finds some degree of consistency between efficiency and size 
from all three (DEA, SFA and DFA) frontier approaches.  However, the link between 
efficiency differences and specialisation is dependent on which methodology is used. In 
general, Weill (2004) finds that the efficiency scores from the three cost efficiency 
frontiers lack consistency, although there are some similarities between them.  
 
A recent bank efficiency study by Fiorentino et al. (2006) examines the robustness of 
the cost efficiency scores derived from the SFA and DEA approaches with five 
consistency checks.  Their examination of consistency conditions is in the spirit of 
Bauer et al. (1998).  The sample is collected from German universal banks according 
to year and banking group.  The efficiency measures from SFA and DEA are 
substantially different in magnitude and variation in average efficiency level.  They 
point out that the non-parametric (DEA) approach is much more sensitive to outliers 
due to the impact of measurement error11 .  This evidence supports Berger and 
Humphrey’s (1997) suggestion that DEA should be used with care when large 
measurement errors are known to exist.  The results also show that the efficiency 
scores obtained under the two methods are poorly correlated.  The mean rank-order 
correlation between the DEA and SFA efficiency scores is only around 20%.  However, 
when efficiency measures use DEA on a more homogenous banking group sample, the 
rank-order correlation increases to 45%.  Moreover, Fiorentino et al. (2006) also report 
that there is little commonality between the most and least efficient quartile banks under 
the DEA and SFA approaches.  Against this both the DEA and SFA techniques 
demonstrate reasonable stability in the efficiency scores they return over time.  With 
                                                        
 
11 Fiorentino et al. (2006) drop some extreme efficiency score observations and re-estimate the efficiency 
score with both DEA and SFA.  They find that the DEA score increases dramatically but the SFA score is 
much more stable.  
Chapter 3 Empirical Studies of Bank Efficiency 
 50
respect to the consistency of frontier efficiency measures and standard accounting 
performance measures (that is, financial ratios), they find that the correlation between 
frontier efficiency and traditional performance indicators is positive but quite low and 
may indicate that frontier measures contain additional information when compared to 
these standard performance measures.  In conclusion, Fiorentino et al. (2006) show 
that there is very little consistency between both the efficiency scores and the 
conclusions to be gleaned from them under the parametric (SFA) and non-parametric 
(DEA) techniques.  
 
Delis and Papanikolaou (2009) measure the cost and profit efficiency for 28 Greek 
commercial banks over the period from 1993 until 2005.  Their results show that the 
DEA average cost efficiencies are much lower than those of SFA.  Both approaches 
indicate that there is a positive relationship between cost efficiency and size, but the 
findings regarding the effect of ownership status are contradictory between the two 
approaches.  Finally, they conclude that the efficiency scores obtained from the various 
methods are substantially different over time.  
 
Overall, the empirical evidence from the recent literature generates mixed results for the 
comparison of frontier efficiency techniques.  Some studies find a strong relationship 
between the findings of the different techniques, whilst others report a lack of 
consistency between the parametric and non-parametric approaches.  But there is 
nonetheless some consensuses in the literature.  First, these articles demonstrate that 
neither the nonparametric nor parametric method have an absolute advantage over the 
other.  Nevertheless, in certain specific situations, depending on the number of units in 
the sample or on the amount of noise and inefficiency in the data, some estimation 
techniques may outperform others.  Second, because each approach has specific 
advantages and disadvantages in comparison to other approaches and the efficiency 
measures derived from different methods offer valuable information, it is advisable to 
use the parallel application of competing methods to cross check results.  The 
robustness or otherwise of the results should give the decision maker more useful and 
reliable information.  Third, the comparison of different methods within the same 
categories shows more consistent results than that between different categories.  Given 
the above conclusions, this study proceeds with an empirical analysis which uses both 
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parametric and non-parametric techniques applied to Chinese banks over an extended 
period of time in order add to the empirical evidence which is available in the area.        
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Table 3.1 Summary of the Frontier Efficiency Technique Comparisons  
Author/ Date Country  Sample  Methodology Results  
Ferrier & Lovell (1990) U.S. 575 banks, 1984  DEA, (VRS) SFA, (translog) 
 
DEA: Mean TE 84%; AE 95%; CE 79% 
SFA: Mean TE 91%; AE 83%; CE74% 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient: 0.014-0.018 
Mixed results: comparable mean but not consistent with efficiency 
rankings  
 
Drake and Weyman-Jones 
(1996) UK 
46  building 
societies, 1988 
DEA 
SFA 
 
DEA: Mean TE 95%; AE 92%; Mean CE 87.5%;  
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient 0.9715 
DEA and SFA providing extremely similar results   
 
Resti (1997) Italian  270 banks, 1988-92 DEA, (CRS; VRS)  SFA, (restricted translog)  
DEA: Mean CE 66%-76%  
SFA: Mean CE 69%-70%  
High correlation between two methods – 0.71-0.89 
DEA and SFA results do not differ substantially 
Bauer (1998) U.S. 683 banks, 1977-88 DEA, (VRS)  SFA; DFA;TFA, (translog) 
DEA: Mean CE 21%-39%  
Parametric: Mean CE 87%-88%  
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient: 0.1 (between); 0.756 (with 
same category)  
Parametric methods consistent with one another, but non-parametric 
and parametric not consistent  
Cummins and Zi (1998) U.S. 
455 life insurance 
companies  
1988-1992 
DEA, (VRS) 
FDH 
SFA; DFA, (translog) 
 
DEA: Mean CE 46%  FDH: CE 91% 
SFA Mean CE 61%-85% 
DFA Mean CE 91%  
Consistent within the set of econometric methods, while less consistent 
between econometric and mathematical programming    
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Table 3.1  Summary of the Frontier Efficiency Technique Comparisons (continued) 
Author/ Date Country  Sample  Methodology Results  
Eisenbeis et al. (1999) U.S. 254 large banks 1986-1991 
DEA, (VRS) 
SFA, (translog) 
 
DEA Mean CE 60%-72% 
SFA Mean CE 81%-92%  
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient : 0.44-0.58 
SFA seems to be more informative then DEA  
 
Huang and Wang (2002) Taiwan, (China) 
352 banks  
1982-1997 
DEA, (CRS; VRS) 
SFA; DFA, (translog; fourier flexible)  
 
DEA: Mean EE 58%-86.5%  
Parametric: Mean 63%-90% 
Low Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between DEA and 
parametric methods   
Translog and FF functional forms generate similar rankings. 
 
Casu and Girardone (2004) Italy  168 banks  1996-1999 
DEA, (CRS; VRS) 
SFA, (translog; fourier flexible) 
 
DEA: Mean CE 72% TE 86%  AE 83% 
SFA: Mean CE 68-74%  PE 82% 
Results consistent across methodologies 
 
Weill (2004) 
France, 
Germany, 
Italy, Spain 
Switzerland 
688 banks  
1992-1998 
DEA  
SFA; DFA, (fourier flexible) 
 
Mean CE: Fr 40-50%; Ger 60-83%  
It 67-84% Sp 63-78% Swi 44-65% 
No great similarities of efficiency level among different methods  
Efficiency rank correlations are high for parametric methods while 
quite low between non-parametric and parametric methods  
 
Fiorentino et al. (2006) Germany  34,192  banks  1993-2004  
DEA 
SFA, (translog) 
 
DEA: Mean CE 55%  
SFA: Mean CE 84% 
Average rank order correlation between DEA and SFA is around 0.2  
 
Delis and Papanikolaou. 
(2009) Greece 
244 banks  
1993-2005 
DEA (VRS) 
SFA, (translog) 
DEA: Mean CE 62%-90% 
SFA: Mean CE 72% - 85% 
Weak consistent rankings between DEA and SFA  
Notes: TE = technical efficiency; AE = allocative efficiency; CE = cost efficiency; 
Chapter 3 Empirical Studies of Bank Efficiency 
 54
3.3 Evidence on Bank Efficiency in Transition and Developing 
Countries 
Zaim (1995) examines the effect of financial liberalisation on the technical efficiency of 
Turkish commercial banks, using the nonparametric DEA approach.  The years 1981 
and 1990 represent the pre and post financial liberalisation period, respectively.  Zaim 
(1995) finds that the technical efficiency of Turkish banks has improved by 10%, on 
average after the implementation of the liberalisation programme implemented by the 
Turkish Government and which aims to create a more competitive banking environment.  
When the study decomposes overall technical efficiency into pure technical efficiency 
and scale efficiency, Zaim (1995) finds that most Turkish banks are operating under 
constant returns to scale and that technical inefficiency is mainly attributable to low 
pure technical efficiency. 
 
Isik and Hassan (2002a) use the SFA approach to estimate the cost and “alternative” 
profit efficiencies of Turkish banks.  The average cost and profit efficiencies over the 
years studied range from a low of 84% up to a maximum of 90%.  The correlation 
coefficient between the cost and profit efficiencies is poor (only 19%) suggesting that 
high cost efficiency does not necessarily lead to high profit efficiency.  Isik and Hassan 
(2002a) also examine the impact of bank size, corporate control and corporate 
governance and ownership on cost and profit efficiency.  Their results suggest that 
domestic private banks are much more efficient than state-owned banks and smaller 
banks tend to be operating more efficiently than larger banks.  
 
Hao et al. (2001) employ SFA to examine the cost efficiency of Korean banks over the 
period from 1985 until 1995.  The authors point out that during the period from 1960 
until 1980 the Korean government had a policy of consistent interference in the 
operations of banking and financial institutions and this, in turn, had an adverse impact 
on the efficiency of the banking system as well as on resource allocation throughout the 
Korean economy.  However, after 1980 the Korean government began to privatise 
banks and deregulate its financial sector in order to alleviate the problems caused by 
governmental interference.  Hao et al. (2001) show that the average cost efficiency 
score over the period from 1985 until 1995 is 89% and that there is no significant 
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efficiency improvement over this sample period.  In the second stage regression, Hao 
et al. (2001) seek to indentify the key determinants of Korean banking efficiency.  
They find that banks with higher rates of asset growth, fewer employees per value of 
assets in place, larger amounts of core deposits and banks that operate nationwide tend 
to be more efficient.  In addition, they find that efficiency levels are positively 
correlated with the level of foreign equity ownership but negatively correlated with the 
level of government ownership.    
 
Using a stochastic cost frontier approach, Karim (2001) investigates banking efficiency 
in the four ASEAN counties (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) over 
the period from 1989 until 1996.  The average cost efficiency of these ASEAN banks 
deteriorates over this sample period.  Karim (2001) suggests that the deterioration in 
efficiency over this period may have contributed to the Asian financial crises in 1997.  
Moreover, his results show that there are significant differences in banking efficiency 
across the four ASEAN countries.  On average, Thai banks are the most efficient, 
followed by Malaysian banks, Indonesian banks, whilst Philippino banks are the least 
efficient.  Karim (2001) also finds that privately owned banks are more cost efficient 
than state-owned banks and that larger banks tend to have higher cost efficiency scores 
than smaller banks.  
 
Ataullah et al. (2004) provide a comparative analysis of the evolution of the efficiency 
of commercial banks in India and Pakistan covering the period from 1988 until 1998.  
They employ two alternative DEA specifications (loan-based and income-based models) 
to measure technical efficiency.  They find that the overall technical efficiency of both 
Indian and Pakistani banks has improved gradually over the sample period.  In the case 
of Indian banks, this improvement is attributed to both increases in pure technical and 
scale efficiency.  For Pakistani banks, however, the increased overall technical 
efficiency is primarily attributed to an improvement in scale efficiency.  Moreover, 
comparing the results of the loan-based and income-based models, they find that banks 
are relatively more efficient in generating earning assets than in generating income.  
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Fries and Taci (2005) employ the Battese and Coelli (1995) one-step SFA estimation 
procedure to estimate the cost efficiency of 289 banks in fifteen East European 
countries over the period from 1994 until 2001.  During this period East European 
governments adopted policies which promoted the transformation of their socialist 
banking systems into market-oriented systems.  Fries and Taci (2005) find that there 
are non-linear variations in cost efficiency over time and that the early stages of reform 
were associated with greater cost efficiency improvements than the later stages of the 
reform process.  They also find that country level specific factors, such as banking 
systems with lower nominal interest rates, a higher proportion of total banking assets 
being owned by foreign majority-owned banks and higher intermediation ratios tend to 
be significantly associated with more favourable banking cost efficiency scores.  Fries 
and Taci (2005) seek to explain the variation in estimated efficiency scores over the 
period of their analysis by correlating the efficiency scores they obtain with bank level 
factors such as ownership structure, market share and the capital to total assets ratio.  
At the bank level, Fries and Taci (2005) find that private banks are more cost efficient 
than state-owned banks and that majority foreign-owned banks show the most 
favourable cost efficiency scores amongst the different types of private banks.  Fries 
and Taci (2005) suggest that one way of increasing the efficiency of the East European 
banking sector is for majority-owned foreign banks to take significant ownership 
interests in state-owned East European banks.  
 
Sensarm (2006) uses a stochastic cost frontier approach to investigate the efficiency and 
total factor productivity (TFP) of Indian banks during the period from 1986 until 2000.  
He employs a one-step estimation procedure to estimate the cost efficiency of Indian 
banks and then decomposes TFP into technical change, scale effect and efficiency 
growth.  Sensarm (2006) finds that banks have improved their performance during the 
sample period in terms of cost efficiency and TFP.  His results suggest that 
deregulation in the Indian banking sector has achieved the desired effect of increasing 
Indian banking efficiency.  Sensarm (2006) also investigates the role of ownership in 
determining cost efficiency and TFP growth.  The results show that foreign banks 
exhibit the worst performance in terms of both cost efficiency and productivity growth 
when compared with Indian state-owned banks and private domestic banks. 
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Kyj and Isik (2008) investigate the x-efficiency and scale efficiency of commercial 
banks in the Ukraine over the period from 1998 until 2003 using the DEA technique.  
They estimate both a common efficiency frontier for all banks and separate efficiency 
frontiers for each bank size group (small, medium and large).   They find that 
efficiency scores are significantly correlated between the common and separate frontier 
results.  Their results also show that the average technical efficiency is only 47% and 
that the dominant source of inefficiency is driven by poor management decisions (pure 
technical efficiency) rather than there being any scale inefficiencies.  They also 
examine the impact of size and ownership location factors on the efficiency of the 
Ukrainian banking sector.  Here they find that large banks tend to be more pure 
technically efficient but less scale efficient than small banks.  Moreover, the results 
suggest that joint venture banks with majority foreign ownership appear to be the most 
efficient and that a bank’s geographic location is also an important determinant of its 
relative efficiency. 
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Table 3.2 Bank Efficiency Studies in Transition and Developing Countries  
Author / Year Sample Method Variables Main  Results 
Zaim (1995) 
42 Turkish banks in 
1981 and 56 banks 
in 1990. 
DEA 
Outputs: demand deposits, time deposits and 
loans.  
Inputs: number of employees, interest expenses, 
depreciation and expenditure on furniture.  
 
The implementation of financial liberalisation enhances 
banks’ efficiency by 10% . 
Technical inefficiency is mainly attributed to low pure 
technical efficiency.  
State owned banks are more efficient than private banks. 
 
Bhattacharyya et 
al. (1997b) 
70 Indian banks, 
1986-1991. DEA 
Outputs: advances, investments and deposits.  
Inputs: interest expense and operating expense. 
 
Bank performance declined significantly between 1988 and 
1991. 
State-owned banks more efficient than foreign and private 
banks.  
Capital adequacy has significant impact on the efficiency of 
foreign and domestic private banks.   
 
Hao et al. (2001) 19 Korean private banks.  SFA 
Dependent variables:  total costs. 
Outputs: total loans, demand deposits and fee 
income.  
Input: borrowed funds and physical capital.  
Control variables: equity capital. 
 
Banks with faster growth rates, fewer employees, and larger 
amounts of core deposits and operating nationwide are more 
efficient.  
The financial deregulation in 1991 had no significant effect 
on the level of banking efficiency.  
 
Karim (2001) 
82 Indonesian, 31 
Malyasian, 27 
Philippine and 15 
Thai banks.  
SFA 
Dependent variables: total cost. 
Outputs: commercial and industrial loans, other 
loans, time deposits, demand deposits, securities 
and investment.  
Inputs: labor, physical capital, borrowed funds.  
 
The average efficiency levels of banks across the four 
countries are significantly different.  
Cost efficiency tends to decrease over the sample period. 
Private banks are more efficient than state-owned banks.  
The ASEAN banks, on average, experience increasing returns 
to scale. 
Larger banks tend to be more cost efficient.  
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Table 3.2  Bank Efficiency Studies in Transition and Developing Countries (continued) 
Author / Year Sample Method Variables Main  Results 
Hardy and Patti 
(2001) 
33 Pakistani banks, 
1981-1997. DFA 
Dependent variables:  profits; costs; revenues. 
Outputs: total earning assets.  
Input prices: price of borrowed funds and 
non-interest unit costs.  
 
Financial reforms have led to an increase in both revenue and 
cost but not in profitability. 
The public sector and privatised banks have made progress in 
improving cost efficiency and their relative profitability.  
 
Isik and Hassan 
(2002a) 
Sample of Turkish 
banks from 
1988,1992 and 
1996. 
SFA 
Dependent variables:  total costs; net income  
Outputs: Short-term loans, long term loans, off 
balance items and other earning assets. 
Inputs: labour, capital, loanable funds. 
 
The average cost and profit efficiencies are 90% and 84%, 
respectively. Very low correlation between the two efficiency 
measures.  
Domestic private banks are much more efficient than state 
banks.  
 
Isik and Hassan 
(2002b) 
36 Turkish banks in 
1988, 50 banks in 
1992 and 53 banks 
in1996. 
DEA 
 
Outputs: Short-term loans, long term loans, off 
balance items and other earning assets. 
Inputs: labour, capital, loanable funds. 
 
 
Cost and profit efficiencies of Turkish banks have declined 
over time. 
Inefficiency is mainly due to technical inefficiency rather 
than allocative inefficiency. 
The relationship between bank size and efficiency is strongly 
negative. 
Foreign banks are more efficient than domestic peers.  
 
Tsionas et al. 
(2003) 
19 Greek banks, 
1993-1998.  DEA 
Outputs: loans, investments and liquid assets. 
Inputs: labour, physical capital and deposits.  
 
The majority of Greek banks exhibit high efficiency levels.  
Inefficiencies are mainly attributed to allocative inefficiency 
rather than technical inefficiency. 
A positive but not substantial TFP change of the Greek 
banking system is associated with efficiency improvement for 
medium-sized banks and to technical change improvement 
for larger institutions. 
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Table 3.2  Bank Efficiency Studies in Transition and Developing Countries (continued) 
Author / Year Sample Method Variables Main  Results 
Ataullah, 
Cockerill and 
Hang (2004) 
Sample of 
Pakistani and 
Indian banks, 
1988-1998. 
DEA 
 
Loan-based specification: 
Outputs: loans and advances and investment.  
Inputs: operating and interest expenses.  
Income-based specification: 
Outputs: interest and non-interest income.  
Inputs: operating and interest expenses. 
 
The overall technical efficiency of the banking sector of 
both Indian and Pakistan has improved following financial 
liberalisation.  
The efficiency scores from loan-based models are much 
higher that those from income-based models.  
Sensarma (2006) 
A panel of 86 
Indian banks, 
1986-2000. 
 
SFA 
 
 
Dependent variables: total operating costs.  
Inputs: labour and capital.  
Outputs: fixed deposits, saving deposits, current 
deposits, investments, loans and advances and 
the number of branches.  
Environmental variables: time trend, 
deregulation, size and ownership. 
 
Both cost efficiency and total factor productivity have 
improved during the sample period.  
Foreign banks are the worst performers as compared with 
state owned and private domestic banks.  
Fries and Taci 
(2005) 
289 banks in 15 
post-communist 
countries.  
SFA 
Outputs: loans to customers and deposits. 
Inputs: labour and physical capital  
Control and environmental variables: per capita 
GDP; level of nominal interest rates, the density 
of deposits, market concentration ratio, 
intermediation ratio and asset share of foreign 
banks.  
 
Banking systems with lower nominal interest rates, a 
greater share of majority foreign-owned banks in total 
assets and a higher intermediation ratio trend to be more 
cost efficient. 
Private banks are more cost efficient than state-owned 
banks. 
Banks with majority foreign ownership are more efficient 
than domestic banks. 
 
Havrylchyk 
(2006) 
Sample of Polish 
banks, 1997-2001.  DEA 
Outputs: Loans, treasury bonds and off-balance 
sheet items. 
Inputs: Deposits, fixed assets and labour. 
 
Bank efficiency has not improved over the sample period.  
Foreign banks are more efficient than domestic banks 
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Table 3.2  Bank Efficiency Studies in Transition and Developing Countries (continued) 
Author / Year Sample Method Variables Main  Results 
Kraft et al. (2006) 
A sample of 
Croatian banks, 
1994-2000. 
SFA 
 
Dependent variables: Total costs. 
Outputs: loans to enterprise, loans to households 
and deposits to enterprise.  
Inputs: funds, labour and physical capital. 
Control variables: total assets, total equity and 
ownership.  
 
 
Privatisation does not seem to have an immediate effect on 
improved efficiency.  
Foreign banks are more efficient than domestic banks.  
 
Grigorian and 
Manole (2006) 
Banks in 17 
transition 
economies, 
1995-1998  
DEA Outputs: loans and investment securities. Inputs: funds, capital and labour. 
 
Banks in countries with lax foreign exchange exposure limits 
exhibit better performance.   
Banks with majority foreign ownership are more efficient 
than domestic banks 
Privatisation would improve bank efficiency.  
  
Kyj and Isik 
(2008) 
Ukrainian 
commercial banks, 
1998-2003  
DEA Outputs: loans and investment securities. Inputs: funds, physical capital and labour  
 
Average technical efficiency, pure technique efficiency and 
scale efficiency are 47%, 62% and 78%, respectively.    
Most small and medium sized banks are operating under 
increasing returns of scale.  
Large banks tend to be more pure technical efficient and less 
scale efficient than small banks. 
Majority foreign owned joint venture banks are the most 
efficient. 
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3.4 Evidence on Bank Efficiency in China 
There are only a few papers on Chinese banking efficiency that are written in English. 
Fortunately, there is a growing appreciation of the importance of the Chinese banking 
system amongst the international community and a steady stream of studies on Chinese 
banks has emerged in recent years that have used frontier efficiency approaches to 
measure relative efficiency.  
 
Wang et al. (2005) apply several nonparametric models including various DEA models 
(CCR, BCC, Bilateral, Slack-Based Measures) and the free disposal hull (FDH) model 
to evaluate the efficiency of sixteen Chinese commercial banks.  Their analysis shows 
that the FDH model seems to have difficulty in distinguishing between efficient banks 
and inefficient banks when compared with other nonparametric (DEA) models.  
Moreover, they find that private banks tend to have higher efficiency scores than the 
state-owned banks.  Although the study reaches some useful conclusions, it only 
estimates the different kinds of efficiencies (technical efficiency, pure technical 
efficiency, scale efficiency, etc.) of the sampled banks and does not explore what might 
be the driving factors behind the efficiency scores obtained.  
 
It is well known that the Chinese banking sector has undergone considerable 
deregulation since the 1990s.  Several studies investigate the impact of deregulation on 
Chinese banking efficiency.  In order to identify the changes of Chinese banking 
efficiency over the reform period, Chen et al. (2005) use DEA to estimate the cost, 
technical and allocative efficiency of 43 Chinese banks over the period from 1993 until 
2000.  The results show that the four big state-owned banks have higher technical 
efficiency and allocative efficiency than the joint-stock banks, especially the national 
joint-stock banks.  This contradicts some previous studies which find that joint stock 
banks are more efficient than state owned banks (for example, Karim, 2001).  
Moreover, both large banks and small banks show a relatively higher level of cost 
efficiency than medium sized banks.  This finding may indicate that the Chinese 
banking sector is not characterised by a U-shaped average cost curve.  Furthermore, 
Chapter 3 Empirical Studies of Bank Efficiency 
 63
Chen et al. (2005) find that the financial deregulation which was implemented in 1995 
improved both the technical and allocative efficiency of the Chinese banking sector in 
the early years after deregulation.  However, they also find that the impetus towards 
higher efficiency fell away after 1997.  This may be due to the impact of the Asian 
financial crisis, to the huge increase in non-performing loans as a consequence of the 
reckless lending policies pursued by many state owned banks or a variety of other more 
minor factors.  Chen et al. (2005) also provide evidence that technical efficiency 
makes a greater contribution to cost efficiency than does allocative efficiency, implying 
that Chinese banks need to improve their ability to minimise costs through more 
efficient use of their input factors. 
 
Economies of scale and/or scope in the banking industry have been studied extensively 
in developed countries (e.g., Mester, 1993, Mitchell and Onvural, 1996, Altunbas et al. 
2001).  However, relatively few studies in this area have focused on the Chinese 
banking sector.  Of those that do, Fu and Heffernan (2006) investigate economics of 
scale and scope in the Chinese banking sector over the period from 1985 until 2002.  
They use stochastic frontier and traditional non-frontier translog cost models to estimate 
both the ray and expansion path measures of scale and scope economies.   Their 
results show that the stochastic frontier model appears to outperform the traditional 
non-frontier model for measuring scale and scope economies.  Fu and Heffernan (2006) 
also find that the expansion path measures for the economies of scale and scope 
outperform the ray economies of scale and scope.  Moreover, they find that 
state-owned banks in the later phases of the reform process and joint-stock banks 
exhibited constant returns to scale which may indicate that the reforms have had little 
impact on banks’ optimal scale.  However, diseconomies of scale are found in 
state-owned banks in the early phases of the implementation of the banking reforms.  
Fu and Heffernan (2006) also provide evidence of significant economies of scope in the 
Chinese banking sector.  
 
Fu and Heffernan (2007) employ SFA to investigate the X-efficiency of the Chinese 
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banking sector over the period from 1985 until 200212.  The results show that, on 
average, the X-efficiency of Chinese banks ranged from a low of 40% up to a high of 
50%.  The joint-stock banks are more efficient than the state-owned commercial banks, 
having X-efficiency scores which ranged form 49% to 41%.  In order to analyse and 
explain the variation in these efficiency scores, Fu and Heffernan (2007) propose a 
two-stage regression procedure which employs efficiency scores as the dependent 
variable, regressed against a set of explanatory variables such as bank size, market 
structure and ownership, etc.  The results suggest that Chinese banking cost efficiency 
could be improved if more state banks are converted into joint-stock ownership, and if 
the state-owned banks change their soft budgetary constraints into hard budgetary 
constraints.  However, as Berger and Mester (1997) point out the two-stage approach is 
legitimate only if the additional explanatory variables in the second stage are exogenous 
and are not correlated with the input and output variables in the first stage.  Therefore, 
one serious problem for Fu and Heffernan’s (2007) study stems from the variables 
chosen in the second stage of their regression procedures.  Some of the variables 
employed in the second stage are endogenous – for example, the ratio of purchased 
funds to total assets, the ratio of total loans to total assets and the ratio of total 
investment to total assets – all of which are correlated with the input and output 
variables.  The endogeneity problem that this engenders makes the conclusions 
reached by Fu and Heffernan’s (2007) about the direction of causation somewhat 
problematic. 
 
Based on agency theory and budgetary constraints theory, Yao et al. (2007) argue that 
ownership reforms and hard budgetary constraints may be important for raising Chinese 
banking efficiency levels.  The study applies a single-stage SFA model to investigate 
the effects of ownership structure and hard budget constraints on Chinese banking 
efficiency over the period from 1995 until 2001.  The empirical results show that the 
average level of technical efficiency over the sample period is about 63%.  Yao et al. 
(2007) find that Chinese joint-stock banks are more efficient than their state-owned 
counterparts.  In addition, banks facing harder budgetary constraints tend to 
outperform banks that have been heavily capitalised by the state or regional 
                                                        
 
12 The sample has 187 observations collected from four state owned and ten joint stock banks. 
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governments. Finally, Yao et al. (2007) suggest that the Chinese government should 
reduce the way that it interferes in banking operations and also, to allow to re-capitalise 
from private sources. 
 
Kumbhakar and Wang (2007) employ an input distance function approach to examine 
the technical efficiency and total factor productivity changes of 14 national Chinese 
banks over the period from 1993 until 2002.  They adopt a one-step estimation 
procedure that incorporates explanatory variables into the efficiency analysis.  Here it 
should be noted that this one-step estimation procedure is superior to a two-step 
estimation procedure 13 .  Kumbhakar and Wang (2007) find that the big four 
state-owned commercial banks are less efficient than the joint stock commercial banks 
and that most Chinese banks are operating below the optimal scale.  In addition, they 
find that small banks tend to be more efficient than large banks and that deregulation 
has not improve Chinese banking efficiency significantly.  Their results also show an 
improvement in total factor growth, at the rate of 4.4% per annum, in the Chinese 
banking sector.  
 
Ariff and Can (2008) use the DEA technique to investigate the cost and profit efficiency 
of 28 Chinese commercial banks over the period from 1995 until 2004.  They show 
that the overall cost efficiency score (79.8%) is much higher than the overall profit 
efficiency score (50.5%), suggesting that the most important inefficiencies are on the 
revenue side.  Moreover, the joint stock and city commercial banks, on average, appear 
to be more efficient than the big four state-owned commercial banks.  They also 
employ a second stage regression procedure to investigate the influence of ownership 
structure, size, risk profile and key environmental changes on banking efficiency.  
They find that medium sized Chinese banks are significantly more efficient than their 
small and large scale counterparts and also, that credit risk is negatively related to both 
cost and profit efficiency.     
 
                                                        
 
13 The two-step estimation procedure suffers from some serious biases.  See Wang and Schmidt (2002) 
for details.  
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The issue of structure–performance relationships is important over the Chinese banking 
reform period. Fu and Heffernan (2009) develop a structured performance model for 
China’s banking system.  In order to examine both the market power hypothesis and 
the efficient structure hypothesis during the two distinct phases of regulatory reform 
(1985-1992, 1993-2002), the model incorporates measures of market share, 
concentration, X-efficiency, scale efficiency and an ownership dummy into the 
estimating equation14.  The results support the relative-market power hypothesis in the 
first reform stage but not during the second reform stage.  The efficient-structure 
hypothesis is also doubtful, because there is no significant positive relationship between 
efficiency and market structure.  Furthermore, they extend the model to test the “quiet 
life” hypothesis and the impact of the bank ownership effect.  They find that 
joint-stock banks are relatively more X-efficient than state-owned banks and also, they 
find that the “quiet life” hypothesis does not hold in the Chinese banking system15.  
Finally, Fu and Heffernan (2009) suggest that ongoing policy should be directed 
towards increasing the joint-stock banks’ market share, thereby reducing market 
concentration.  They also suggest that Chinese banking efficiency would be improved 
if interest rates were determined in a competitive market and not by government edict.   
 
Ownership is always a “hot issue” in the discussion of financial sector reform.  
Generally, it is believed that ownership structure is an important factor that affects the 
level of banking efficiency.  Berger et al. (2009) use the stochastic frontier approach to 
analyse the profit and cost efficiency of Chinese banks over the period from 1994 until 
2003.  They compare the efficiency of the big four state-owned banks, the non-big four 
state owned banks, private banks and foreign banks.  With respect to cost efficiency, 
the average efficiency across all banks is 89.7%.  Berger et al. (2009) find that foreign 
banks and non-big four state-owned banks are the most efficient Chinese banks, 
followed by the Big Four banks with private banks being the least efficient.  With 
regard to the profit side, the mean profit efficiency level is 46.7%.  Foreign banks are 
the most efficient, followed by private banks and non-big four state owned banks, with 
big four state owned banks being measured as the least efficient.  Berger et al. (2009) 
                                                        
 
14 A more detailed discussion of the market power hypothesis and the efficient structure hypothesis are to 
be found in a later section of this chapter. 
15 A more detailed discussion of the quiet life hypothesis is to be found in a later section of this chapter. 
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argue that the inconsistency between the findings for profit efficiency and cost 
efficiency of state-owned banks may be explained by the “skimping hypothesis” and 
government cost subsidies, etc.  To the author’s knowledge, Berger et al. (2009) are 
also the first to study the efficiency effects of minority foreign ownership in the wider 
(that is, international) banking sector16 .  The results show that minority foreign 
ownership is associated with higher efficiency either for both efficiency concepts (profit 
and cost) or for both categories of majority domestic ownership (non-big four 
state-owned and private domestic banks).  In other words, Chinese banks have 
benefited from minority foreign ownership during the transition deregulation period 
from 2002 until 2006.  Berger et al. (2009) also apply an additional set of robustness 
checks for “selection effects”.  The checks suggest that the effects of minority foreign 
ownership in most cases do reflect improvements above and beyond any selection 
effects.  Because of the efficiency benefits to foreign ownership of Chinese banks, they 
recommend that the Chinese government should reduce ownership restrictions and 
encourage more foreign ownership into Chinese banks.      
 
In conclusion, the extant Chinese efficiency studies have already provided some useful 
information for both government and academic researchers.  However, a few studies 
show mixed or contradictory results on the relative efficiency of state-owned banks and 
on the effects of prior regulatory reforms (for example, Fu and Heffernan (2007)).  
These studies use either the non-parametric or parametric approach to estimate 
efficiency levels for the Chinese banking sector.  But none of theses studies apply both 
(parametric and nonparametric) frontier approaches for cross checking purposes.  In 
this study we employ a variety of cross-checking mechanisms and in so doing we 
endeavour to fill this gap in the Chinese banking efficiency literature and to add to the 
evidence available in the research literature.   
 
3.5 The Determinants of Bank Efficiency 
As we noted in chapter two, the conventional neoclassical theory of the firm provides a 
                                                        
 
16 We know only of prior studies of majority foreign ownership in other nations (e.g. Fries and Taci 
(2005)).   
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poor basis for assessing the potential sources of differences in efficiency levels across 
firms and industries.  It assumes that the objective of the firm is to maximise profit and 
that all firms in the market should operate in this way.  However, we base much of our 
empirical analysis on alternative theories of the firm (e.g, agency theory, managerial 
theory, behavioural theory, etc.) and these theories generally provide a more robust basis 
for assessing the potential sources of differences in efficiency levels across firms than 
does the standard neoclassical theory.  Relying on these theories, the determinants of 
efficiency may be due to internal bank-specific characteristics (e.g. ownership structure, 
risk preferences, etc.) and various external environmental factors (e.g. market structure, 
government regulation, etc.). 
 
In the context of the banking sector, substantial research efforts have gone into 
exploring the determinants of efficiency.  For example, Mester (1996), Altunbas et al. 
(2001), Berger and Mester (1997), Isik and Hassan (2003), Girardone et al. (2004) have 
all empirically investigated the potential correlates of efficiency.  However, there is no 
consensus on the sources of the variations in measured efficiency (Berger and Mester, 
1997).  Moreover, the investigation of the sources of inefficiency in the banking sector 
is an important issue which can inform government policy and improve managerial 
performance.  Thus, the potential benefits from investigating the determinants of 
Chinese banking efficiency are very large.  
 
3.5.1 The Impact of Ownership Structure on Efficiency  
Based on different theories or hypotheses, such as the theories of the firm, 
principal-agent theory, and market discipline hypothesis etc., many studies have 
investigated whether different ownership forms may lead to different efficiency levels. 
These studies provide useful information on comparative managerial performance and 
offer potential insights into the direction of future government policies.  
 
State-owned versus private ownership  
State-owned and private firms (in our context, banks) might have different objectives 
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that are not closely aligned (Shapiro and Willig, 1990).  Generally, the principal goal 
of the government is to try to maximise social welfare.  Therefore, state-owned banks 
might be seen as vehicles for raising capital to finance projects with high social returns, 
but possibly low profit returns or to provide finance to favoured groups (e.g. state 
owned enterprises) which may perform quite poorly in purely economic terms (Clarke 
et al. 2005).  Moreover, according to public choice theories of government, politicians 
and bureaucrats might use state ownership to pursue their political goals, such as 
securing political office, accumulating power, seeking rents etc.  State-owned banks 
find it difficult to resist such harmful government interference, whereas private banks 
are more able to oppose it, and employ more sensible prudential lending policies and/or 
cost minimisation strategies as a consequence (Shirley and Nellis, 1991; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1994).  Furthermore, state-owned banks may face less competition than private 
banks.  State-owned banks may not have to worry as much about running into financial 
difficulties, because losses and excess costs are invariably covered by government 
subsidies.  This in turn implies that state-owned banks have less incentives to 
maximise profits or to minimise costs when compared to private banks - which have to 
make a normal profit over the longer term in order to survive.  Finally, state-owned 
banks seem to suffer more serious agency problems when compared to private banks.  
Alchian (1965) argues that because all citizens can be considered as the owners of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), SOE’s ownership will be more dispersed than with 
private firms.  Because of this non-transferable and widely distributed ownership of 
state-owned banks, private citizens have less motivation to monitor the performance of 
the management of SOE’s in comparison to the owners of private banks.  Hence, 
managers of SOE’s are likely to enjoy more freedom to pursue a personal agenda 
because of this.  In addition, private banks also face threats of hostile takeover or the 
possibility of bankruptcy when compared to stated-owned banks (Berglof and Roland, 
1998; Schmidt, 1996; Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva, 2003).  These threats provide a 
natural incentive for the managers of private banks to install more efficient operating 
procedures than will be the case with the managers of their state owned counterparts.  
 
According to the above theoretical arguments, state-owned banks may operate less 
efficiently than comparable private banks.  This lower efficiency may be due to greater 
political intervention, less competition, and weaker corporate governance (Shirley and 
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Walsh 2000).  However, it does not necessarily mean that private banks always 
outperform state-owned banks. Many factors could prevent private banks from 
performing efficiently, such as an under-developed capital market and inadequately 
developed procedures for takeovers and bankruptcy administration, etc. (Clarke, Cull 
and Shirley, 2005).  Moreover, state-owned banks are generally required to finance 
politically motivated projects.  This means that they will receive larger subsidies and 
more favourable government treatment than private banks.  This could reduce a bank’s 
costs and lead to greater efficiency, at least in the short run (Kraft et al., 2006).   
 
Empirical evidence is ambiguous on the relative efficiency of private banks and 
state-owned banks.  Fries and Taci (2004) examine cost efficiencies in 15 east 
European transition countries and they observe higher cost efficiency in private banks 
when compared to state-owned banks.  Bonin et al. (2005a)’s empirical results also 
show that state-owned banks in six transition countries, with respect to both cost and 
profit efficiency, are less efficient than private banks.  Likewise, state-owned banks in 
China are found to be less efficient than privately owned banks (Wang et al. 2005, Yao 
et al., 2007).  However, there are some studies which generate different results.  
Altunbas et al. (2001) find little evidence in support of the hypothesis that private banks 
are more efficient than publicly owned banks in terms of both cost and profit efficiency 
in the German banking sector.  Bhattacharya et al. (1997b) find that state-owned banks 
are more efficient than private banks in India.  Isik and Hassan (2002a) investigate the 
relationship between efficiency and ownership for Turkish commercial banks.  They 
report similar results to those reported earlier in that state-owned banks outperform 
private banks after controlling for several important determining factors (e. g. market 
structure, bank size and corporate governance, etc.).  
 
Foreign versus domestic ownership  
Berger et al. (2000) provide a comprehensive survey on cross-border banking 
performance in a globalisation context.  In this survey, Berger et al. (2000) propose 
two alternative hypotheses to explain the impact of foreign/domestic ownership on bank 
efficiency; namely, the global advantage hypothesis and the home field advantage 
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hypothesis.  Under the global advantage hypothesis, foreign-owned banks will be more 
efficient than domestic banks.  This arises from the observation that foreign banks may 
possess comparative advantages compared with domestic banks.  These comparative 
advantages stem from superior managerial expertise and experience, lower costs of 
capital, and the use of hard-information technologies and procedures in banking 
operations.  Moreover, superior risk management skills and access to higher quality 
services could also increase foreign banks’ revenues and reduce their costs in 
comparison with domestic banks.  According to Berger et al. (2000), there are two 
forms of the global advantage hypothesis; namely, the general and the limited forms. 
The general form asserts that foreign banks, regardless of the location of their 
headquarters, are able to out-perform domestic banks.  The limited form argues that 
only some foreign banks with headquarters in a particular set of nations are able to 
operate more efficiently than domestic banks.   
 
In contrast to the global advantage hypothesis, the home field advantage hypothesis 
suggests that domestic banks are generally more efficient than foreign-owned banks. 
There may be some adverse factors which weaken the foreign banks’ comparative 
advantages and increase their operating costs.  For example, a foreign bank’s 
headquarters, which by definition will be located in its “home” country, may find it 
difficult to monitor and evaluate the behaviour and effort of disparate managers because 
of the distances involved.  Moreover, the diseconomies of operation in the retail sector 
may lead to foreign banks finding it difficult to attract and maintain customers.   
Furthermore, foreign banks may face difficulties due to lack of knowledge about local 
markets or barriers of language, culture and regulations.  Therefore, foreign banks may 
fail to overcome these cross-border disadvantages and operate less efficiently than their 
domestic counterparts. 
 
There is a vast empirical literature which investigates the relationship between domestic 
and foreign ownership and bank efficiency.  Most studies are based on the experiences 
in the U.S. banking sector and find that foreign-owned banks have a significantly lower 
cost or profit efficiency on average than domestic banks (DeYong and Nolle, 1996; 
Hasan and Hunter, 1996; Mahajan et al., 1996 and Chang et al., 1998).  Berger et al. 
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(2000) investigate the relative efficiency of foreign versus domestic banks in five home 
countries – France, Germany, Spain, UK and the US.  They find that foreign banks in 
these countries exhibit both lower cost efficiency and lower profit efficiency in 
comparison to domestic banks.  This finding is consistent with most other U.S. studies 
and supports the home field advantage hypothesis.  However, after disaggregating the 
results by nation of origin, Berger et al. (2000) find that foreign banks from the United 
States are more efficient than their domestic counterparts.  This result is interpreted as 
supporting the limited global advantage hypothesis.  
 
By contrast, efficiency studies on developing and transition countries generally support 
the hypothesis that foreign-owned banks outperform domestic-owned banks.  Classens 
et al. (2001) investigate the differences in performance between domestic and foreign 
banks in eighty countries over an eight-year period from 1988 until 1995.  They find 
that foreign banks have higher profits than domestic banks in developing countries, but 
that the opposite is the case for developed countries.  Cross country evidence from 
transitional economies also suggests that foreign owned banks are more efficient than 
domestic-owned banks (Weill 2003; Bonin et al., 2005a,b; Fries and Taci, 2005).   In 
addition, there are some recent single-country studies of banking efficiency which 
analyse the relationship between ownership and banking efficiency.  Hasan and Marton 
(2003) use SFA to measure the efficiency of Hungarian banks and find that foreign 
banks and banks with a significant foreign ownership interest are generally more 
efficient than domestic Hungarian banks. They also demonstrate that the entry of 
foreign banks creates an environment in which the entire banking system is forced to 
become more efficient, both directly and indirectly.  Likewise, Isik and Hassan 
(2002a,b) on the Turkish banking industry, Kraft et al. (2006) on Croatia’s commercial 
banks and Sturm and Williams (2004) on the Australian banking sector generally find 
that foreign banks have substantially better efficiency scores than those of domestic 
banks.    
 
3.5.2 The Impact of Deregulation on Efficiency  
Whether the “regulated” or “market based” banking system performs better in 
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promoting economic development is a long-standing and heavily debated issue.  
Deregulation of the banking sector is motivated by a desire to prevent market failure, 
which in turn enhances the stability of the economy and the solvency of all financial 
institutions (see Stiglitz, 1994; Fry, 1995)17.  Hence, some researchers (e.g Mckinnon, 
1973; Shaw, 1973; Winston, 1998) argue that de-regulation of the banking sector will 
enable the financial system to perform its main function of allocating scarce economic 
resource more efficiently and thus benefit the whole economy.  
 
In the last three decades, a large number of countries, especially developing countries, 
have deregulated their banking systems and liberalised the operation of their financial 
markets.  The primary goal of this deregulation has been to create a competitive and 
flexible environment in which banks have more control over their operations and are 
forced to reduce their costs and improve the efficiency and productivity of the way they 
operate.  Deregulation of the banking system in developing countries frequently 
includes the following measures as summarised by Fry (1995): 1) removal of interest 
rate ceilings on deposits and loans; 2) removal of the credit ceiling; 3) reduction of 
government direct lending; 4) removal of restrictions on bank’s portfolios; 5) reduction 
of bank reserve requirements; 6) reduction of restrictions on foreign exchange 
transactions; 7) relaxation of foreign banks’ entry into the local market; 8) liberalisation 
of foreign investment and 9) privatisation of state-owned banks.   
 
An important aspect of deregulation is its impact upon the efficiency of the banking 
system.  Empirical studies hypothesise that banking deregulation enhances the 
efficiency and productivity of banks.  However, the empirical evidence on this matter 
is mixed.  Berg et al. (1992) examine the impact of deregulation on productivity 
growth in the Norwegian banking system during the deregulation period of the 1980s.  
They indicate that starting in 1984, restrictions on the volume of bank lending and 
interest rates were gradually removed in Norway.  As of 1988 Norwegian banks have 
been completely free to set interest rates and lending volumes as they wish.  They find 
                                                        
 
17 Market failure describes a situation in which the production or use of goods and services by the market 
is not efficient.  A market failure can occur for four main reasons: 1) imperfect competition; 2) 
externalities; 3) public goods; 4) asymmetric information (see Krugman and Wells, 2006 for details). 
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that the productivity of Norwegian banks was in decline prior to the deregulation period 
(1980-1984).  However, after deregulation took place (1985-1989), the productivity of 
Norwegian banks improved substantially.  Bhattacharyya et al. (1997b) investigate the 
total factor productivity (TFP) growth of Indian commercial banks over the long period 
from 1970 until 1992.  India introduced many deregulation measures in the mid- and 
late 1980’s in order to liberalise the operations of its banking sector.  The deregulation 
measures mainly included the relaxation of controls on interest rates, allowing foreign 
owned banks to enter the Indian banking sector and liberalising the restrictions on 
market entry for domestic banks.  Bhattacharyya et al. (1997a) find that the 
productivity growth rate accelerated substantially during the phase of gradual banking 
deregulation (1985-1992).  Gilbert and Wilson (1998) investigate the effects of 
deregulation on the productivity and efficiency of Korean banks over the period from 
1980 until 1994. They find that most Korean banks experienced efficiency gains during 
the period of deregulation as government controls were both lifted and relaxed.  
Likewise, in Turkey (Zaim, 1995), in Thailand (Leightner and Lovell, 1998), in Portugal 
(Canhoto and Dermine, 2003) and in Australia (Sturm and Williams, 2004) deregulation 
is found to have had a positive impact on the efficiency and productivity of the domestic 
banking sector.  
 
Although the principal aim of deregulation is to improve the productivity and efficiency 
of the banking sector, many empirical studies find that deregulation appears to lead to a 
deterioration or at least, no significant improvement in productivity or efficiency levels.  
In the early 1980s, the U.S. banking sector was substantially deregulated.  The key 
banking deregulation measures included removal of controls over interest rates, the 
allowing of interstate branch expansion and thrift institutions being allowed into 
consumer and business lending (Winston, 1998).  The empirical evidence for the U.S. 
shows that measured productivity and efficiency decreased following deregulation 
(Humprey 1993; Bauer et al. 1993; Humprey and Pulley, 1997; Wheelock and Wilson, 
1999).  This decline is mainly attributed to interest rate deregulation inducing a 
competitive scramble to pay higher interest rates on deposits (Berger and Humphrey, 
1997).  Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell (1996) find that the liberalisation of the Spanish 
banking industry following its admission into the European Economic Community has 
also had a negative impact on Spanish banking efficiency.  Similarly, the deregulation 
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of the Turkish banking sector during 1990s also resulted in a decline in banking 
efficiency (Denizer et al. 2000; Isik and Hassan, 2003).  Moreover, the major financial 
deregulation of the Korean banking system in the early 1990s is found to have had little 
or no impact on the level of banking efficiency (Hao et al., 2001).  
 
3.5.3 The Impact of Market Structure on Efficiency  
Efficiency analysis has been used to investigate a number of economic hypotheses and 
to offer insights through which to inform government policy and improve managerial 
performance.  One important issue that has been investigated is the effect of market 
structure on firm (bank) performance or efficiency.  Most empirical research on this 
issue mainly stems from the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm which 
links the conduct (firm behaviour) and performance of firms in terms of market 
structural characteristics, such as the number and size distribution of banks and entry 
conditions into the market.  The SCP paradigm asserts that firm concentration and 
other impediments to competition create market power in setting prices and engenders 
collusion that is less favourable to consumers.  In turn these factors affect both bank 
performance and banking efficiency.  From this perspective, high concentration is a 
useful signal of a potentially uncompetitive and hence, inefficient market.  An 
important critique of the traditional SCP model is that market structure measures seem 
to assume that all firms react in a similar way to changes in market concentration.  
Therefore, Cowling (1976) and Bos (2004) develop a market power model that is based 
on a straightforward extension of a Cournot oligopoly model.  The model 
accommodates asymmetric market structure and differences in collusive behaviour and 
describes the relationship between firm performance and market share.  This Cournot 
model does not measure exactly the same relationships as the SCP model.  The former 
concentrates on individual banks’ market share, but the latter focuses on the impact of 
market structure (Bos, 2004).   
 
More recent research has gone beyond the SCP paradigm, and tests some different 
hypotheses that directly link bank efficiency and market structure.  The “quiet life” 
hypothesis is one explanation of the relationship between efficiency and market 
concentration or market power.  The “quiet life” hypothesis is based on the famous 
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observation made by Sir John Hicks: 
 
       “The best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life.”(Hicks, 1935, p.8) 
 
Banks with more market power can charge higher prices in excess of competitive levels, 
and then managers may enjoy a “quiet life” stemming from the benefits of these higher 
prices.  Due to high profitability led by an insufficient level of competition or other 
market distortions, management may not control the costs of their operations to the 
maximum possible extent.  In addition, market power may allow managers to pursue 
non-profit maximisation objectives, such as expense preference behaviours (e.g. plush 
offices, first class instead of economy class travel, etc).  Such behaviours will raise 
costs and reduce measured cost efficiency.  Therefore, banks with more market power 
or in higher concentrated markets may exhibit lower cost efficiency than do other banks.  
In order words, the “quiet life” hypothesis suggests that market power or concentration 
is negatively related to cost efficiency.   
 
Efficient structure theory is another alternative explanation for the relationship between 
market structure and the efficiency of firms.  The efficient structure hypothesis 
proposes that more efficient banks tend to have lower costs of production and that they 
use these lower costs of production to gain greater market share and markets become 
more concentrated because of it.  Therefore, there is a positive relationship between 
market power or concentration and bank efficiency.  There are two versions of the 
efficient structure hypotheses, the X-efficiency structure hypothesis and the 
scale-efficiency structure hypothesis.  The X-efficiency structure hypothesis argues 
that efficient banks with better management and better production technologies have 
relatively lower costs and therefore obtain a higher market share and this leads to higher 
concentration in the market (Demsetz, 1973; Peltzman, 1977).  The scale-efficiency 
structure hypothesis asserts that banks producing at a more efficient scale level than 
others, will have lower unit costs and higher unit profits.  These scale efficiency firms 
are assumed to gain larger market shares that may result in higher market concentration, 
yielding a positive profit-structure relationship (see Lambson, 1987; Berger, 1995). 
There are many empirical studies that deal with the impact that banking structure has on 
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the efficiency of banks, but these produce generally ambiguous results.  Berger (1995) 
investigated the relationship between bank concentration and efficiency in the U.S. 
banking industry by testing two comparative hypotheses; namely the efficient structure 
hypothesis and the relative-market power hypothesis18.  Berger (1995) developed a 
series of regression models which directly included measures of both market structure 
and efficiency to test the above hypothesises.  He reported limited support for both the 
relative-market power hypothesis and the X-efficiency structure hypothesis.  Goldberg 
and Rai (1996) examine the relationship between concentration and performance for 
European banks.  In contrast to Berger (1995), they find strong evidence in support the 
X-efficiency structure hypothesis.  Berger and Hannan (1997) tested the “quite life” 
hypothesis on a U.S banking dataset.  They found strong evidence that banks in more 
concentrated markets exhibit lower cost efficiency, thereby supporting the “quite life” 
hypothesis.  Isik and Hassan (2003) test both the “quite life” hypothesis and the 
efficient structure hypothesis for Turkish banks.  Their results do not show a 
significant relationship between market power and efficiency and seem to support 
neither of the hypotheses.  
 
It is also important to note that the various hypotheses have potentially opposing policy 
implications.  If high profits are generated by market power, then anti-trust actions 
may be socially beneficial since they will move prices towards competitive levels and 
allocate resources more effectively.  However, if high concentration is created by high 
efficiency, then breaking up efficient firms that have gained large market shares or 
forbidding them to acquire other firms may raise costs and lead to less favorable prices 
for consumers (Berger and Humphrey, 1997).  Therefore, this study will test these 
hypotheses using data from the Chinese banking sector.  The results may give 
explanations for the difference in measured efficiency across Chinese banks and help 
the Chinese government and other policy makers to take the right policy initiatives in 
relation to the Chinese banking sector.   
 
                                                        
 
18  The relative-market power hypothesis asserts that banks with large market shares and 
well-differentiated products are able to earn supernormal profits (Shepherd, 1982)  
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3.5.4 The Impact of Size on Efficiency  
Alongside the measurement of bank efficiency, investigation of the impact of size on the 
estimated efficiency levels of banks is a fairly standard practice.  Analysis of the 
relationship between size and bank efficiency provides useful information for regulators 
and allows bank managers to assess the optimal scale at which to conduct their 
operations.  Within the banking literature, size has often been found to be an important 
factor that drives variations in efficiency across banks.  It is often argued that larger 
banks possess more flexibility in financial markets and are better able to diversify their 
credit risks (Cole and Gunther, 1995).  Moreover, larger banks may have more 
professional management teams which are more effective in cost control, thereby 
resulting in higher profits (Evanoff and Israilevich, 1991).  Casu and Girardone (2006) 
also point out that larger banks may have experienced economies of scale and scope 
from growth and joint production opportunities.  All these factors enable large banks to 
exploit their size advantages and achieve more efficient operating outcomes.  On the 
other hand, larger banks are more complex and therefore more difficult to manage.  
Hence, bureaucratic problems may arise in large banks, and these lead to less efficient 
operating outcomes for the affected banks (Delis and Papanikolaou, 2009).  
 
Here it is interesting to note that there is no consensus in previous empirical studies 
about the relationship between bank size and banking efficiency.  Berger et al. (1993) 
use both the logarithm of total bank assets and the logarithm of the number of bank 
offices to proxy for bank size.  They find a significant positive relationship between 
the two size measures and the level of banking efficiency, suggesting that larger U.S. 
banks tend to be more efficient.  Other studies find similar results, such as Miller and 
Noulas, 1996; Altunbas et al; Hasan and Marton, 2003; Ataullah and Hang, 2006; 
Perera et al., 2007.  Isik and Hassan (2003) divide Turkish banks into three size 
categories according to their total assets; namely, small banks, medium sized banks and 
large banks.  This size classification allows for the testing of a potentially 
non-monotonic relationship between banks size and efficiency.  They find that medium 
sized banks are more efficient than both small and large banks in terms of technical 
efficiency.  However, a note of caution is in order here as the cost efficiency estimates 
they employ do not vary much across the three size categories.  Similarly, Aly et al. 
(1990), Mester (1993), Pi and Timme (1993), Berger and Hannan (1998) and 
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Havrylchyk (2006) do not report a significant relationship between size and banking 
efficiency.  A number of other studies, however, find a significant negative relationship 
between size and banking efficiency and suggest that small banks may posses 
operational advantages that bring about higher efficiencies (e.g. Hermalin and Wallace, 
1994; De Young and Nolle, 1996; Isik and Hassan, 2002; Girardon, et al., 2004; 
Kumbhakar and Wang, 2007)  
 
3.5.5 The Impact of Market Discipline on Efficiency  
There are some studies that have attempted to link two distinct issues: market discipline 
and bank efficiency.  They investigate whether or not market forces act as an effective 
discipline mechanism on bank efficiency levels.  Market discipline in banking can be 
described as “private counterparty supervision” (Greenspan, 2001).  Private sector 
agents (stockholders, depositors or creditors) face costs that are positively related to the 
risks undertaken by banks and make portfolio and investment decisions on the basis of 
these costs (Berger, 1991).  The concept of market discipline incorporates two distinct 
aspects: market monitoring and market influence.  Market monitoring refers to private 
agents able to evaluate a bank’s true condition and incorporate those assessments 
promptly into the bank’s security price and deposit rates.  Market influence is the 
process by which market monitoring engenders bank (managers) to respond to 
counteract adverse changes in the bank’s financial position (Bliss and Flannery, 2002).  
Market discipline may reduce the moral hazard incentives and/or improve the efficiency 
of banks by forcing some of the relatively inefficient banks to become more efficient or 
to exit from the industry.  But the disciplining role of the market may not materialise 
because of a lack of corporate transparency (e.g. obscurity in the way the bank’s 
financial information is presented to potential investors).  Moreover, government 
sponsored protection policies may also undermine market discipline.  For example, a 
“too big to fail” policy reduces the incentives of shareholders to monitor risk.   
 
The listing of banks on the stock exchange will explicitly impose supplementary 
disclosure requirements, corporate governance norms and added regulatory pressure and 
thereby enhance the operation of market discipline.  Market discipline may also force 
banks to place a greater emphasis on risk, income and expenditure management, which 
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in turn improves banking efficiency.  Thus, many empirical studies on banking 
efficiency consider the stock exchange listing of banks as an important determinant of 
efficiency and test the proposed market discipline hypothesis using it as an important 
determining variable in their regression equations.  Girardon et al. (2009) compares 
cost efficiency between listed and not-listed European banking institutions.  The 
results show that listed banks appear to be more cost efficient than their non-listed 
counterparts. Similarly, Ray and Day (2009) find that the profit efficiency levels of 
listed Indian banks are higher than those of non-listed banks.  Berger and Mester (1997) 
find that listed U.S. banks tend to have both higher cost and profit efficiencies.  But 
here we should emphasise that the empirical evidence is not always compatible with the 
market discipline hypothesis.  Havrylchyk (2006) finds that the listing effect has no 
impact on Polish banking efficiency and this in turn is compatible with the hypothesis 
that the Polish capital market exerts only weak discipline over bank management.  Isik 
and Hassan (2003) find that there is no significant relationship between being listed on 
the stock exchange and the levels of X-efficiency for Turkish banks. Isik and Hassan’s 
(2003) results also indicate that public scrutiny does not exert much market discipline 
over Turkish banks. 
 
3.6 Summary and Conclusion  
In the context of the banking sector, substantial research efforts have gone into 
measuring the efficiency of banks.  However, the studies use different frontier 
methodologies and different input and output variables.  It is difficult to make 
comparisons between many of the studies on banking efficiency because of this.   
Therefore, some researchers have used two or more frontier techniques to measure the 
efficiency of banks on the basis of the same dataset in order to provide more definitive 
and useful information for decision markers. However, these studies often produce 
ambiguous results for the comparison of parametric (SFA, DFA and TFA) and 
non-parametric (DEA and FDH) frontier efficiency approaches.  Some studies find that 
the different frontier approaches generate similar results, while others report a lack of 
consistency between the different frontier approaches.  Moreover, the studies generally 
conclude that there is no consensus on which is the best frontier approach for measuring 
banking efficiency.  Indeed the use of multiple frontier techniques is generally 
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recommended for methodological cross-checking purposes.     
 
This chapter reviews many empirical studies dealing with the efficiency of the Chinese 
banking sector as well as other developing countries.  This is particularly relevant to 
our study as our principal objective is to investigate the relative efficiency of the 
Chinese banks.  In recent decades, most banking sectors in developing countries have 
experienced institutional, structural and legal changes through implementing 
programmes of deregulation and/or liberalisation of banking operations.  Therefore, 
most banking efficiency studies dealing with developing countries focus on 
investigating the impact of deregulation and ownership structure on bank efficiency 
levels and also attempt to shed light on the effectiveness of the reform programme and 
the optimal architecture of banking systems.  This chapter also reviews empirical 
evidence on the impact of ownership structure, size, deregulation, market discipline and 
market structure on bank efficiency levels.  These factors are generally considered as 
the key determinants of banking efficiency.  In the following chapter, the main 
structure of the Chinese banking sector and the banking reforms undertaken in China 
over the last thirty years will be discussed and summarised.  
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China’s Banking System and Reforms 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Since the late 1970’s the Chinese government has gradually implemented a series of 
reforms aimed at improving the stability and efficiency of its banking system.  Hence, 
over the last thirty years, the Chinese banking sector has experienced significant 
institutional and structural changes.  The main objective of this chapter is to outline 
and summarise the important institutional mechanisms and structures of the Chinese 
banking sector and to review the history of Chinese banking reforms since the late 
1970’s.  In particular, this chapter provides the background necessary for 
understanding the empirical analysis of Chinese banking efficiency presented in 
subsequent chapters of this dissertation.  
 
Section 4.2 discusses the important attributes of the Chinese banking sector and 
provides a description of the roles, characteristics and current standing of different types 
of banking institutions in China.  Section 4.3 briefly reviews the evolution of the 
reforms that have taken place in the Chinese banking sector over last three decades.  
As previously noted, the aim of the reforms is to improve the stability and efficiency of 
the Chinese banking sector.  Finally, section 4.4 provides some brief summary 
conclusions for this chapter. 
 
4.2 The Structure of China’s Banking Sector  
The Chinese socialist banking system was established in the late 1940s based on the 
system in the former Soviet Union.  The Soviet–style central planning system 
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condemned the Western banking model to almost complete irrelevance.  Before 1983, 
the Chinese banking system followed a mono-bank model.  The central bank, People’s 
Bank of China (PBC), had some of the functions of a central bank but simultaneously 
engaged in many commercial banking operations.  In 1979, China embarked on 
market-oriented economic reforms in order to improve resource allocation in the 
domestic economy.  These included a number of significant reforms to redesign and 
rebuild the banking sector.  As the numerous reforms were implemented, China’s 
banking system became quite diverse, so that there is now a wide range of banking 
institutions in place.  According to the China Banking Regulatory Commission’s 
(CBRC) classification scheme, at the end of 2007, China’s banking sector consisted of 3 
policy lending banks, 5 large-scale commercial banks, 12 joint-stock commercial banks 
(JSCBs), 124 city commercial banks (CCBs), 29 locally incorporated foreign bank 
subsidiaries, 42 urban credit cooperatives (UCCs), 17 rural commercial banks, 8,348 
rural credit cooperatives (RCCs), 113 rural cooperative banks, 19 village and township 
banks, 4 lending companies, 8 mutual credit cooperatives, 4 financial asset management 
companies, 1 postal savings bank, 54 trust companies, 73 finance companies of 
enterprise groups, 10 financial leasing companies, 2 money brokerage firms, and 9 auto 
financing companies.  China's banking sector comprised a total of 8,877 banking 
institutions, made up of a total of 189,921 outlets and 2,696,760 employees.  The total 
assets of China’s banking sector reached RMB 52.6 trillion in 2007, with an annual 
average growth rate of 17.5% over the period from 2003 until 2007 (see Figure 4.1 for 
further details).  One of the main features of the Chinese banking sector is that 
state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) dominate the banking system and are the main 
official source for the financing of companies (see Figure 4.2 for further details).   
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Figure 4.1 Total Assets of China’s Banking Sector (2003-2007)            
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Figure 4.2 Market Share by Assets of Chinese Banking Institutions, 2007 
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4.2.1 The Banking Authority  
Today China’s banking system is accountable to two regulatory authorities, the People’s 
Bank of China (PBC) and the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), both 
ultimately overseen by the State Council of the People’s Republic of China.  The PBC 
is currently structured so as to focus more of its attention on monetary and credit policy 
in order to ensure overall financial stability and the provision of financial services, and 
it aims to promote economic development and the stability of prices.  The PBC sets 
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interest rate bands for deposits and loans, the reserve requirements and the 
rediscounting rate.  It also undertakes open market operations in order to manipulate 
bank liquidity and the money supply and provides lending facilities for selected banks 
charged with the financing of government backed infrastructure and development 
programmes. 
 
The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was established in 2003 to take 
over the functions of banking regulation and supervision from the PBC in order that the 
PBC could concentrate on monetary policy issues and other central bank responsibilities.  
The CBRC focuses on the supervision of banking institutions, capital adequacy issues 
and the restructuring of the banking sector.  Its regulatory objectives include protecting 
the interests of depositors and consumers, maintaining market confidence and stability 
in the banking system, enhancing banks’ competitiveness, educating the public in the 
knowledge of modern finance and combating financial crimes.  In contrast to the 
multiple and overlapping regulatory agencies in the US and other western economies, 
the CBRC is the primary banking regulatory authority in China.  
 
4.2.2 Five Large-scale Commercial Banks  
The biggest four state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs), commonly known as the Big 
Four, were initially founded as fiscal budget distributors to state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) in specific sectors of the economy.  These are: the Agricultural Bank of China 
(ABC), the Bank of China (BOC), the China Construction Bank (CCB), and the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC).  The Big Four initially specialised 
in sectoral business based on policy-related lending.  Since 1994, the Big Four have 
moved from their original operating mandates into commercial and consumer credit.  
However, the huge legacy of non-performing loans inherited from the policy lending 
mandate imposed on them by government instrumentalities continues to constrain their 
earnings and profitability.  In 2006, the CBRC officially defined the Bank of 
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Communications (BOCOM) as a SOCB, and along with the Big Four formed the new 
Big Five SOCBs19.  The CBRC has set up a special supervision department to oversee 
these five large-scale Commercial Banks.  The five large banks’ total assets reached 
RMB 28 trillion in 2007.  The Big Five banks’ assets as a proportion of total banking 
industry assets has fallen over the last decade (from 77% of total assets in the banking 
system in 1997 to 53% at the end of 2007).  In spite of this, the presence and influence 
of the Big Five will continue to dominate China’s banking system. 
 
? The Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) was set up in 1949 to facilitate financial 
operations in the agricultural sector and rural areas.  Today, ABC’s business 
has developed from its original brief of rural credit and settlement to a wide 
range of financial business transactions.  ABC has extensive outlets covering 
urban and rural areas of China.  It now (2007) has 447,519 employees across 
24,452 branches and banking offices in Mainland China, two overseas branches 
in Singapore and Hong Kong, and three representative offices in London, Tokyo, 
and New York.  According to information recently released by the Agricultural 
Bank of China, the ABC has become the third largest bank in China in terms of 
total assets, which had reached RMB 6.05 trillion at the end of 2007.  Its total 
deposits and total loans had reached RMB 5.28 trillion and RMB 3.48 trillion 
respectively in 2007.  In addition, the operating profit reached a record high of 
RMB 96.13 billion with a growth rate of 65.30% over fiscal year 2007.  In 
2007, ABC ranked 65th among the "Top 1000 Banks" in The Banker, and 277th 
among Fortune's Global 500. 
 
? The China Construction Bank (CCB) was originally created in 1954 to 
administer and disburse government funds for construction and infrastructure 
related projects.  Until 1994, CCB had gradually become a full service 
                                                        
 
19 The size of BOCOM is much larger then that of JSCBs, and its shares are spread among different state entities. 
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commercial bank.  Its business now consists of corporate banking, personal 
banking, and treasury operations.  It maintains a leading position in 
infrastructure loans and residential mortgages.  Today, it holds about two-thirds 
of residential mortgages in China.  In October 2005, the CCB was publicly 
listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and by the end of 2007, the CCB 
became the nation's second largest bank in terms of total assets, which totalled 
RMB 6.598 trillion.  
 
? The Bank of China (BOC), founded in 1912, is the country’s oldest bank.  It 
originally specialised in international financial transactions such as foreign 
exchange services and extending trade credit, but now the BOC is mainly 
engaged in commercial banking, including corporate and retail banking, 
treasury business and financial institution banking.  It also conducts investment 
banking and insurance activities through its subsidiaries.  The BOC is the most 
international of all the commercial banks in China.  At present, it has in excess 
of 11,000 domestic branches and over 600 overseas branches, and representative 
offices covering 27 countries and regions.  In 2006, the BOC held an initial 
public offering (IPO), both on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange, in which it raised around 22.5 billion U.S dollars of new equity 
capital.  Recently, the BOC has also made further efforts to attract strategic 
investors from overseas.  Foreign shareholders now hold a 20% stake in BOC.   
 
? The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) is the youngest of the 
“Big Five” banks, and was founded in 1984.  ICBC primarily engages in 
corporate and retail banking and treasury operations throughout China, and has 
strong profitability.  The ICBC followed several other major banking 
institutions in China in implementing western auditing and accounting 
procedures in 2003 when it appointed KPMG as its auditors.  The compound 
annual growth rate in ICBC’s after tax profits between 2003 and 2007 exceeds 
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38%.  In 2007, the group’s after-tax profits amounted to RMB 81.99 billion, 
representing a 65.9% growth over the previous year.  In 2006, ICBC was 
simultaneously listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange, and ranked as the world’s largest ever initial public offering.  
At the end of January, 2008, ICBC’s market capitalisation had risen to USD 
227,514 billion, making it the largest bank in the world in terms of market 
capitalisation20.  
 
? The Bank of Communications (BOCOM) was founded in 1908 and is one of 
oldest banks in China.  It was restructured and re-constructed in 1987, 
becoming China’s first state-owned shareholding commercial bank.  In 2004, 
BOCOM further deepened the reform of its shareholding structure by 
introducing mainland and overseas strategic investors like the National Social 
Security Fund, China SAFE Investment Ltd (Huijing) and HSBC21.  Today 
(2007), the BOCOM is one of the Big Five leading commercial banks in China, 
and has an extensive network of over 2,600 branches covering over 148 major 
cities in mainland China.  In 2005, BOCOM was listed on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange and in 2007 it was listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange.  
Now BOCOM has grown into a well-established modern commercial bank, and 
has four key business divisions: corporate, personal, fee-based and international 
business. 
 
4.2.3 Policy Banks  
Three policy banks were created in 1994 in order to take over the policy lending 
obligations that were previously assigned to the original big four stated-owned 
commercial banks.  Each of these policy banks provides credit for specialised sections 
                                                        
 
20 http://financialranks.com/?p=69 
21 HSBC bought a stake of 19.9% of Bank of Communications with RMB 14.46 billion.  
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of the economy.  The Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC) is mainly 
engaged in the state policy oriented agricultural finance business and extends credit for 
agriculture and agricultural economic development.  The China Development Bank 
(CDB) is primarily responsible for providing loans for capital investment projects and 
large infrastructure projects consistent with national economic objectives.  The 
Export-Import Bank (EXIM) grants trade credit, export insurance, and working capital 
loans for firms involved in international trade and investment.  Policy banks fund 
themselves primarily through the issuance of bonds, and they accept few deposits.  The 
combined assets of the three policy banks have grown rapidly, and by the end of 2007 
represented 8.1% of total bank assets in China.  The policy banks are deliberately 
exempted from many of the prudential controls imposed on Chinese commercial banks, 
and profitability is only a residual objective for their managers.  Therefore, by the end 
of 2007, its in-balance sheet non-performing loans amounted to RMB 85.5 billion.  
 
4.2.4 Joint-stock Commercial Banks 
Since the late 1980s, the Chinese government has granted permission for the 
establishment of commercial banks with a diverse ownership structure, and there are 
currently 12 joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) with national licenses; these 
represent the second tier of Chinese banks.  These banks are CITIC Bank, China 
Everbright Bank, China Merchants Bank, Huaxia Bank, China Mingsheng Bank, 
Shenzhen Development Bank, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, Guangdong 
Development Bank, Industrial Bank, Evergrowing Bank, China Zheshang Bank and 
Bohai Bank.  Because they were established more recently than the original Big Four 
banks, they are not burdened with any historical baggage (in particular, in relation to 
non-performing loans) and therefore, are more agile and responsive to market 
requirements.  These joint-stock commercial banks constitute an important part of 
China’s banking system. According to statistics maintained by the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission, by the end of 2007 the total assets of the joint-stock 
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commercial banks was RMB 72.5 billion, up 33.1 % on a year on year basis, and 
together accounting for 14% of the total assets in the Chinese banking sector.  
 
Joint-stock commercial banks are allowed to engage in a wide variety of banking 
services including accepting deposits, extending loans, as well as providing foreign 
exchange and international transaction services.  They regularly finance small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs), an area where the state-owned banks have 
traditionally been weak.  Some of JSCBs have professional advantages in specific 
business areas: for example, Minsheng Bank emphasises trade finance services, and has 
the objective of building a domestic first-class bank, strong in trade financing; China 
Merchants Bank focuses on retail banking services, and has issued more than 10 million 
credit cards; whilst the Industrial Bank has made great advances in institutional banking 
services; China Everbright Bank has become a leader in the financing business.  
JSCBs maintain much smaller branch networks than SOCBs, typically operating in fast 
growing areas or their region of origin, although they are generally allowed to operate 
nationwide.  Given their smaller size and a corporate culture oriented more to the 
private sector, they are more “nimble” than their state-owned counterparts and have 
been successful at increasing market share at the expense of the large-scale (or 
state-owned) commercial banks.  
 
JSCBs typically have a diverse ownership structure.  The equity ownership of these 
banks is distributed among the state (central government, local government, 
state-owned enterprises), private, and foreign investors.  With the exception for CITIC 
bank and China Everbright Bank, they have no owners with an outright majority 
position.  But the government still has a controlling stake in many of these joint-stock 
banks (See Table 4.1 for further dertails).  There is a trend at the moment for JSCBs to 
make private equity issues thereby moving them towards a private ownership structure.  
For example, China Mingsheng Bank, founded in January 1996, is China’s first bank to 
be owned mostly by non-government enterprises, and China Zheshang Bank, founded in 
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2004, is 89.66% owned by private individuals and institutions.  State-owned enterprise 
investment in some JSCBs is undertaken purely for the returns (that is, dividends and 
capital gains) they expect to receive from them because they do not expect to have a 
controlling interest in the affected banks due to the dispersed nature of the share 
ownership.  Recently, foreign ownership participation in JSCBs has increased 
substantially as well.  The most prominent example was, in 2004, where Newbridge 
Asia AIV III, L.P. (a U.S. investor group) purchased an 18% stake in Shenzhen 
Development Bank.  As a result, the Shenzhen Development Bank became China’s 
first shareholding commercial bank with a foreign institution as the largest shareholder.  
By the end of 2007, seven JSCBs had introduced international strategic investors in 
order to gain advanced international management skills. 
 
In order to improve the banks’ management, JSCBs are also encouraged to list on the 
stock exchange so as to ensure additional external monitoring.  Since Shenzhen 
Development Bank went public in 1991, there have been six other JSCBs listed on the 
stock exchange, and these are CITIC Industrial Bank, China Merchants Bank, Huaxia 
Bank, China Mingsheng Bank, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, and Industrial 
Bank.  
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Table 4.1 Ownership Structure of JSCBs (2007) 
 Largest Shareholder 
Government 
Ownership a 
Private 
Ownership b 
Foreign 
Ownership 
CITIC Bank CITIC Group (62%) 64.18% 15.82% 20% 
China Everbright 
Bank 
China SAFF Investment Ltd. 
(Huijin) (70.88%) 
84.7% 15.3% 0% 
China Merchants 
Bank 
HKSCC Nominees LtdC. 
(17.88%) 
46.53% 53.47% 0% 
China Mingsheng 
Bank 
New Hope Investment Co., 
Ltd. (5.9%)c 
5.1% 94.9% 0% 
Huaxia Bank 
Shougang Corporation HQ 
(10.19%) 
38.87% 47.15% 13.98% 
Industrial Bank 
The Finance Bureau of 
Fujian Province (20.4%) 
46.35% 33.67% 19.98% 
Guangdong 
Development Bank 
Citigroup (20%) 
China Grid Corp (20%) 
China Life Insurance Group 
(20%) 
75.26% 0% 24.74% 
Shenzhen 
Development Bank 
Newbridge Asia AIV III 
L.P. (16.7%) 
0.2% 83.1% 16.7% 
Shanghai Pudong 
Development Bank 
Shanghai International 
Group (23.57%) 
46.88% 49.34% 3.78% 
China Zheshang Bank 
Zhejiang Communications 
Investment Group CO.,Ltd. 
(10.34%) 
10.34% 89.66% 0% 
Bohai Bank 
TEDA Investment Holding 
co., Ltd. (25%) 
72.01% 8% 19.99% 
Source: Own calculation based on banks’ annual reports.  
a “Government Ownership” includes central government, local governments, state-owned enterprises. 
b “Private Ownership” includes institutional investors, corporate investors, individual investors, etc  
c HKSCC Nominees Ltd. is a subsidiary of the Hong Kong Securities Clearing Company Ltd., which acts 
as the common nominee for the sharers held in the Central Clearing and Settlement System Depository in 
Hong Kong  
 
4.2.5 City Commercial Banks 
Since the mid-1990s, City commercial banks (CCBs) have been created through the 
restructuring and consolidation of urban credit-cooperatives (UCCs), but they are very 
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small in terms of market share.  Some of the largest CCBs are in a similar position to 
JSCBs, but the small CCBs still resemble the UCCs.  By the end of 2007, there were 
124 city commercial banks, with total assets of RMB 33.4 billion, accounting for 6.4% 
of total banking institution assets in China.  Equity ownership of CCBs is mainly 
distributed between local governments and urban enterprises.  For historical reasons it 
is common for local governments to hold a large bulk of city commercial banks’ shares, 
and as a result, CCBs are often directly controlled by local governments and experience 
greater pressure to lend for policy purposes.  Weak governance and a large proportion 
of nonperforming loans have been a common feature of CCBs.  
 
The scope of city commercial banks’ business tends to be concentrated in the cities 
where they were founded.  Unlike the joint-stock commercial banks, CCBs are not 
usually allowed to operate at the national regional level, and this impedes their potential 
for expansion.  However, the supervisory authorities are gradually relaxing these 
limitations for CCBs which are well-managed and performing well, and over time it is 
expected that CCBs will be allowed to engage in trans-regional operations.  For 
instance, the CBRC gave approval to the Shanghai Bank in 2005 to establish a branch in 
Ningbo.  Promoting trans-regional development and expanding business operations in 
other regions or cities will help CCBs overcome the negative impact of regional 
economic fluctuations.  In order to improve management and accelerate the 
restructuring of ownership, some large city commercial banks have invited investment 
from strategic foreign investors in the last few years, and by the end of 2007, nine city 
commercial banks featured such investors22.  
 
CCBs lend to small and medium size enterprises and collective and local residents in 
their municipalities.  However, there are some banks whose operating performance and 
                                                        
 
22 These nine city commercial banks are Shanghai Bank, Beijing Bank, Nanjing Bank, Ji’nan City Commercial 
Bank, Xi’an City Commercial Bank, Nancong City Commercial Bank, Tianjing City Commercial Bank, Ningbo City 
Commercial Bank, and Hangzhou City Commercial Bank.  
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asset quality has been poor.  As the restructuring and reforming of state-owned and 
other big commercial banks continues, city commercial banks may be marginalised and 
become acquisition targets for the “big players” in the banking sector.  
 
4.2.6 Rural and Unban Credit Cooperatives 
China’s banking sector also features other types of banking institutions which are 
unique to its command economy.  These include rural and urban credit cooperatives 
(RCCs and UCCs respectively), typically providing financial services to small-and 
medium-sized enterprises and individuals.  Together, RCCs and UCCs accounted for 
8.5% of the total assets of the Chinese banking sector in 2007. 
 
Nowadays, rural credit cooperatives are more important and numerous then urban 
cooperatives, after the consolidation of the latter into city commercial banks.  Rural 
credit cooperatives provide financial services for agricultural production, farmers and 
town and village enterprises.  Today, RCCs have become the mainstay of rural 
financial institutions and provide financial services for around 800 million people living 
in rural areas (almost two-thirds of the total Chinese population).  The agricultural 
loans granted by RCCs across China stood at RMB 1,399.8 billion, which accounted for 
about 88% of total agricultural loans from all financial institutions.  
 
4.2.7 Foreign Banks 
The entry of foreign banks was expected to bring great benefit to China’s financial 
system.  But, to date, they have played a rather minor role in the Chinese banking 
sector.  By the end of 2007, 193 banks from 47 countries and regions had set up 242 
representative offices in China.  The assets of foreign banking institutions totalled 
RMB1.25 trillion, only accounting for about 2.4 percent of total banking assets in China 
(see Figure 4.3 for further details).  
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Figure 4.3 Total Assets and Market Share for Foreign Banks (2001-2007) 
Unit: RMB 100 million
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Sources: Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (2001-2006); CBRC annual report 2007 
 
Initially, foreign banks were only allowed to provide foreign-currency intermediation in 
order to facilitate the operations of foreign investors and enterprises in China.  The 
Chinese currency business has only gradually been opened to foreign banking 
institutions since 1996 when foreign banks were allowed to provide local currency 
services for the first time but even then there were restrictions on the cities and 
provinces in which foreign banks were allowed to trade (geographical coverage).  A 
milestone in the financial liberalisation process was China’s accession to the WTO in 
late 2001.  Since December 2001, foreign banks can offer foreign currency 
transactions to all Chinese enterprises and individuals, and, by December 2006, under 
the terms of the accession agreement, China removed all geographic and 
customer-related restrictions on foreign banks.  Foreign banks are no longer treated 
differently from domestic banks, and today there are 25 locally incorporated foreign 
banks and 57 foreign bank branches which have been licensed to provide RMB business.  
They have access to the lucrative bank card business and provide Chinese currency 
business to Chinese nationals.  Foreign banks have a distinct advantage over Chinese 
banks in respect to consortium loans, foreign trade financing, retail business, funds 
management and financial derivatives because of their broader international trading 
connections which allow them to spread risk and to secure different types of customers 
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(Tong, 2005).  Foreign banks will expect to play a more important role in attracting 
foreign capital, intensifying competition in the Chinese banking sector, introducing 
advanced management techniques and experience, and promoting the improvement of 
efficiency and the corporate governance of Chinese banks.   
 
4.2.8 Non-banking Financial Institutions: 
According to CBRC, there are five major types of non-banking financial institutions; 
namely, trust companies, finance companies of enterprise groups, financial leasing 
companies, auto financing companies and money brokerage firms.  These institutions 
increase the amount of credit available in the financial system, and are currently 
governed by the CBRC’s regulations and supervision.  Together they account for about 
1.8% of the Chinese banking sector’s total assets.  
 
4.3 China’s Banking Reform  
Chinese authorities have embarked on a number of steps to ensure that the banking 
sector will be able to support continued rapid rates of growth in the real economy.  
Basically, China’s banking reforms can be divided into three distinct periods: first from 
1979 until 1993; second from 1994 until China’s entry into the WTO in 2001, and third 
post-WTO accession after 2001.   
 
4.3.1 China’s Banking Reform before 1994  
Prior to 1979, the Chinese banking system followed a mono-bank model, where the 
People’s Bank of China (PBC) combined the roles of central and commercial banking 
and thereby sought to assist the government in fulfilling the various state production 
plans.  The changes began in 1979 when China embarked on a series of 
market-oriented economic reforms.  Between 1979 and 1984, the banking system 
Chapter 4 China’s Banking System and Reforms 
 97
expanded by establishing four state-owned specialised banks – Bank of China (BOC), 
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) 
and China Construction Bank (CCB), with each having its own specific business focus.  
The big four state-owned banks assumed responsibility for the lending functions of the 
PBC, and the PBC was left to focus on its central banking responsibilities alone.  In 
addition, nonbanking financial institutions, such as investment and trust corporations 
and insurance companies, also emerged and multiplied during this period.  The 
mono-banking system has changed into a two-tier banking system consisting of a 
central bank (PBC) and various kinds of other financial institutions.  From 1985 the 
Big Four were allowed to enter into a variety of commercial banking services, and the 
segmentation of these four specialised banks gradually diminished (Fu, 2004).  
However, competition among them was very limited until the mid-1990s, because their 
lending decisions were based on the government’s national credit plan rather than the 
commercial viability of the banks’ investment activities23.  Stated-owned banks also 
served as policy-lending conduits for the government, and provided loans to 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs).  The industrial reforms which began in 1984 also 
meant that the number of loss-making SOEs dramatically increased.  As a result, the 
state-owned banks accumulated an enormous volume of non-performing loans 
(Kumbhakar and Wang, 2007).       
 
In the mid-1980s, the PBC relaxed barriers to entry for new banks in order to inject 
competition into the banking sector.  Between 1985 and 1993 a number of new 
medium and small-sized commercial banks were established through merger, 
restructuring, or incorporation with the objective of providing competition for the Big 
Four banks.  In 1987, the Bank of Communications (BOCOM) was restructured and 
became China’s first joint-stock commercial bank (JSCB).  Several JSCBs, including 
CITIC Bank, China Merchant Bank, Shenzhen Development Bank, China Everbright 
                                                        
 
23 In order to maintain control over aggregate credit, the PBC established an annual credit plan for the nation as a 
whole and for each of the specialized banks, and directed bank financing of enterprise.  
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Bank, Industrial Bank, Guangdong Development Bank and Hua Xia Bank, followed in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Unlike the Big Four which are wholly owned by the 
government, these new banks’ shareholders included central and local governments as 
well as other private institutions.  This equity structure means they can raise funds 
from various channels outside of the state and are wholly responsible for their own 
lending policies.  Consequently, their loan portfolios are much healthier than the Big 
Four (Cousin, 2007). 
 
The early 1990s also saw a rapid expansion in quasi-banking institutions; namely, Rural 
Credit Cooperatives (RCCs) and Urban Credit Cooperatives (UCCs).  These credit 
cooperatives are depository institutions established primarily for the purpose of 
encouraging thrift among persons of modest means (Saez, 2004).  Both UCCs and 
RCCs could undertake deposit and lending business with the public.  However, the 
management of these banks is often dominated by local government officials who use 
their influence to pressure the UCCs and RCCs to make loans of doubtful commercial 
viability and their loan portfolios are invariably loaded with non-performing loans as a 
consequence.   
 
As an important part of banking reform, China has also gradually opened its banking 
operations to foreign competition.  Beginning in 1978, foreign banks were allowed 
back into China for the first time since 1949.  However, there were restrictions on the 
banking activities they are allowed to undertake (business scope) and the cities and 
provinces in which they were allowed to trade (geographical coverage).  In 1985, 
China promulgated the Administrative Regulations on Foreign Banks and Sino-Foreign 
Joint-Venture Banks in the Special Economic Zones Regulations.  These regulations 
clearly restricted foreign banks in that they could only provide foreign exchange 
business to foreign firms and citizens in five special economic zones24.  In 1990, 
                                                        
 
24 Five special economic zones are Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen, Shantou, and Hainan. 
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foreign banking institutions were allowed to undertake foreign currency business in 
Pudong New Zones in Shanghai.  In 1992, foreign financial institutions were allowed 
to expand their operation into 13 other large Chinese cities on the East Coast mainland.   
 
Another important reform in the late-1980s was the introduction of some flexibility into 
the lending rate so that banks were allowed to adjust the interest rates they charged on 
commercial loans within a certain margin of the administrated rate set by the PBC.  
Specially, both UCCs and RCCs were given flexibility with respect to lending rates and 
could charge rates that are between 30% and 60% higher than the rates set by the Big 
Four, the JSCBs and many other banks.  However, such flexibility was not extended to 
deposit interest rates. 
 
4.3.2 China’s Banking Reform between 1994 and 2001  
By the early 1990s, the asset quality of state-owned banks (SOBs) had deteriorated very 
significantly and so the government was forced to reconsider the wisdom of pervasive 
political intervention in regards to banks’ credit and lending decisions.  Policy loans 
have accounted for more than one third of total loans for SOBs (Chen and Shi, 2004).  
To ameliorate this problem, the government established three policy banks in 1994 to 
strip off the SOBs’ policy based loans and accelerate the transformation of SOBs into 
true commercial banks.  The three policy banks are China Development Bank (CDB), 
China Export-Import Bank (EXIM) and China Agricultural Development Bank (ADBC).  
They are funded by the issue of bonds and all three banks are wholly owned by the state. 
Thus, they are in charge of specialised lending on behalf of central government, and 
they are not for profit institutions but are none the less expected to break even.   
 
Two major legislative reforms occurred in 1995.  The Law of the People’s Bank of 
China of the People’s Republic of China (normally referred to as the Central Bank Law) 
was enacted in March, 1995.  The Central Bank Law further enhanced the legal status 
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of the Peoples’ Bank of China (PBC) and reduced the ability of government 
instrumentalities to intervene in and even dictate monetary policy in China.  According 
to this law, the PBC is under the leadership of the State Council, but should not be 
subject to interference by local government, other administrative organs and individuals 
(Schueller, 2003).  The main functions of the PBC are to implement monetary policy, 
supervise financial institutions and to regulate the financial system in China.  The 
Commercial Banking Law, also promulgated in May 1995, aims to establish a 
diversified market-oriented and independent modern banking system.  It officially 
defines the major state-owned banks as commercial banks which are to be based on 
market principles, and the Commercial Banking Law also defines a series of 
requirements for commercial banks to encourage market-based management and pricing 
principles.  For example, a bank’s senior managers must have at least a university 
degree in finance and eight years’ experience in the financial sector.  After these 
reforms, Chinese banking legislation was compatible with the provisions of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (Chen, et al., 2005). 
 
However, the growing problems which many banks had at this time with 
non-performing loans and capital adequacy requirements pushed the government to 
speed up the pace of banking reform.  Key reforms consisted of abolishing the loan 
quotas system, reorganising the PBC, introducing a risk-based loan classification system, 
recapitalising the state-owned banks and disposing of non-performing loans.  By 
January 1998, the PBC had abolished the credit plan system (for both working capital 
loans and fixed investment loans) which had previously applied to commercial banks.  
In lieu of this credit plan, the PBC set an indicative non-binding target as an indirect 
monetary policy and began the promotion of asset liability ratio management and risk 
control.  In other words, the PBC no longer gave instructions as to how loans should 
be allocated in each quarter and year, and instead, provided only voluntary guidance 
(Chen and Shi, 2004).  This reform granted banks greater freedom in setting their own 
lending targets in accordance with their commercial instincts.  In order to eliminate the 
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perverse influence of local government on banks’ lending policies and also, to improve 
the effectiveness of monetary policy, in September 1998 the 31 provincial branches of 
the PBC were replaced with 9 trans-provincial branches (Mo,1999).  Furthermore, the 
senior managers of the 9 trans-provincial branches of the PBC are now appointed by the 
PBC itself, rather than local government officials (Fu, 2004).    
 
In the 1980s, the PBC made only a token effort to classify bank loans by their quality, 
and before 1995, each of the major banks employed its own system and standards for 
classifying non-performing loans (Lardy, 1998).  In 1995, the PBC formally set 
four-category loan classifications: normal loan, past due loan, doubtful loan and bad 
loan.  According to this system, the past due loan, doubtful loan and bad loan were 
non-performing loans, although banks were not required to make provisions against any 
overdue loans.  This system is based on the payment status of the loan rather than on 
any risk assessment.  After the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the PBC recognised the 
importance of risk management in the banking sector and then introduced an 
internationally accepted loan classification system in 1998.  The new credit risk 
management system was comprised of a five-category loan classifications system: 
normal, special attention, sub-standard, doubtful, and loss (See Table 4.2 for further 
details).  Non-performing loans consist of sub-standard, doubtful, and loss, and banks 
make provisions according to the defined risk category of the loans (Mo, 1999).  The 
five-category loan classification system was initially implemented on an experimental 
basis and was not fully implemented by all banks until the beginning of 2002.  
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Table 4.2 Four Category and Five Category Loan Classification  
 Four-category loan classification  Five-category loan classification 
Performing loans Normal 
loans 
No problem with 
repayment of principal 
after the due date 
 Normal loans No reason to doubt 
borrower’s ability to repay 
the principal and interest 
of loans in full and in a 
timely manner 
   Special 
Mention loans 
Borrowers are able to 
serve their loans currently 
but some specific factors 
may adversely affect 
repayment. 
Non-performing 
loans 
Past due 
loans 
Missing repayment on the 
principal not the interest 
after the due date 
 Sub-standard 
loans 
The payments on principal 
and interest can be fully 
covered by normal 
operating income and 
losses possibly 
(overdue >90 days). 
Doubtful 
loans  
No repayment on principal 
within two years after the 
due date. 
 Doubtful 
loans 
Borrowers cannot pay 
back the principal and 
interest in full and 
significant losses will 
occur even if the 
collaterals are exercised 
(overdue> 180 days). 
Bad loans Only in the unlikely event 
that the borrower is 
declared bankrupt or goes 
through liquidation  
proceedings  
 Loss loans The principal and interest 
of loans cannot be 
recovered or only a small 
portion can be recovered 
after exhausting all 
possible collection efforts 
and legal procedures 
Sources: PBC Annual Report 1995, 2002; Cousin, 2007, p84 
 
In order to rehabilitate the balance sheets of the four largest state-owned commercial 
banks, the Chinese government injected RMB 270 billion of capital in to the Big Four 
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in the form of special government bonds.  A brief summary of the capital injection 
procedure was as follow: first, the PBC lowered the legal reserve requirement from 13% 
to 8%, freeing up about RMB 270 billion of bank liquidity.  Then, the Big Four used 
the additional liquidity to buy government bonds issued by the Ministry of Finance.  
Finally, the Ministry of Finance transferred the receipts of this purchase to the Big Four 
as fresh equity capital (Garcia-Herrero, et al, 2006).  This recapitalisation procedure 
resulted in a significant improvement in the big four SOCBs’ capital adequacy ratios 
without changing the overall assets and liabilities on the banks’ balance sheets.  In 
1999 the average capital adequacy ratio for the big four SOCBs was 6.19%.  However, 
it is still less than the 8% recommended by the 1998 Basel Accord (Chen and Shi, 
2004).  
 
In order to reduce the volume of non-performing loans and rehabilitate the reputation 
and international competitiveness of the state-owned banks, in 1999 the government 
created four asset management companies (AMCs) specifically for the purpose of 
purchasing and managing a substantial amount of non-performing loans from each of 
the state-owned banks.  The original idea was to assign one AMC to each SOCB.  
Thus, Cinda AMC was assigned to the China Construction Bank (also China 
Development Bank), Oriental AMC was assigned to the Bank of China, Great Wall 
AMC was assigned to the Agricultural Bank of China, and Huarong AMC was assigned 
to the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China.  These AMCs were under the 
supervision of the PBC, with guidance from the State Securities Supervisory Committee 
of China and the Ministry of Finance, and were given a budgeted life-span of 10 years.  
In 1999-2000, the four AMCs had purchased RMB 1.4 trillion of non-performing loans 
at their book values (equivalent to 19 % of the total loans of the state-owned banks).  
These nonperforming loans were mainly issued before 1995 by the Big Four and the 
China Development Bank (for further details, see Table 4.3).  This asset purchase 
enabled the Big Four to reduce their average ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans 
down to 25% (compared to 35% before the purchase of the non-performing loans by the 
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AMCs) (Shirai, 2002).  The AMCs sought to recover the purchased assets as much as 
possible through asset restructuring, securitisation, debt equity swaps and outright asset 
sales (Lardy, 2000).   
 
Table 4.3 NPLs Disposals at State-owned Banks  
Asset Management Companies 
Purchased Value  
(RMB billion) 
NPLs Received From 
Hua-rong AMC 407.7 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
Great Wall AMC 345.8 Agricultural Bank of China 
Oriental AMC 267.2 Bank of China 
Cinda AMC 350 
China Construction Bank 
China Development Bank 
Source: Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking 2000. 
 
Interest rate liberalisation is another important pillar of bank reform in China, as it 
enhances the role of market forces in resource allocation.  In 1995, regulations were 
issued under the title of the PBC Programme of Deepening Interest Rate Reform during 
the Ninth Five-year Plan Period and marked the beginning of interest rate liberalisation.  
The approach towards interest rate liberalisation has been gradual in the second wave of 
banking reform which, as previously noted, began in 1994.  Table 4.4 summarises the 
major developments in the interest rate liberalisation programme during the second 
stage of banking reform.  This table shows that lending rates were liberalised before 
deposit rates; interest rates on large and long term funds were liberalised before those 
for small and short term funds and, interest rates on foreign currency were liberalised 
before those for domestic currency.  
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Table 4.4 Interest Rate Liberalisation Process between 1993 and 2001  
Year  Key Interest rate liberalisation measures  
1996 The nationwide inter-bank market was created, and the inter-bank money market rate was 
freely determined by market forces.  
Lending rate bands changes were allowed to± 10% around the reference rate. 
1997 The interest rate in the bond repo bank market was liberalised.  
1998 The issuing rate of government bonds was determined by market supply and demand. 
The interest rates on loans to small business by commercial banks were allowed to widen 
from 10% to 20% of reference rates; RCCs increased the upper limit of lending rates 
from 40% to 50% of reference rates.    
1999 Interest rates on loans to SMEs by commercial banks were allowed to be as high as 30% 
above the reference rate set by the PBC. 
Interest rates on long-term large-value deposits by insurance companies started to be 
liberalised. The interest rate on over RMB 30 million deposits with maturity of about 5 
years for insurance companies became negotiable.  
2000 The foreign currency interest management system was overhauled. The restrictions on 
foreign currency loan interest rates were moved; For deposits of over US$3 million, 
interest rates could be negotiated between the financial institutions and their customers.   
Source: PBC Annual report 2005 
 
During the second wave of banking reforms, the Chinese government encouraged 
greater competition by easing the licensing and entry requirements of new small and 
medium domestic banks.  Two new national joint-stock commercial banks, the 
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank and the China Mingsheng Banking Corporation, 
were created in 1993 and 1996, respectively.  During this period, most small and 
medium sized commercial banks, established in the mid-1980s or early 1990s, began to 
operate nation-wide with a diversified ownership (that included private institutions and 
not just the government) in direct competition with the state-owned banks (that is the 
Big Four).  For example, the Hua Xia Bank was fully owned by the Capital Iron and 
Steel Company when it was established in 1992.  In 1995, the Hua Xia Bank 
transformed itself into a national joint-stock commercial bank with thirty-three 
shareholders.   
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During the 1990s many urban credit cooperatives (UCCs) incurred severe losses and 
became insolvent.  In order to alleviate this problem, the supervisory authorities (the 
PBC, local government, etc.) started the reform of UCCs from 1995 onwards.  A major 
instrument used in this process was to transform and merge UCCs into city commercial 
banks (CCBs).  For instance, the Bank of Shanghai was created through the merger of 
some 110 credit cooperatives.  Between 1995 and 2001, about 2,200 UCCs were 
transformed into 110 city commercial banks (Cousin, 2007).  CCBs were established 
in the first place to provide financial services to small and medium enterprises, 
individuals and local government. 
 
Between 1993 and 2001, the Chinese government implemented a series of reforms in 
order to further open up the banking sector to foreign competition.  In 1994, the State 
Council further relaxed geographic restrictions on foreign banks’ operations.  It 
allowed foreign banks to trade foreign currency in an additional 11 non-coastal cites, 
including Beijing.  At the end of 1996, the PBC approved nine foreign banks, subject 
to the prescribed requirements, to engage in local currency business in the Shanghai 
Pudong New Zone on a trial basis, and soon after six foreign banks were also allowed to 
undertake RMB business in Shenzhen.  Up to 2001, 32 foreign banks obtained 
permission from the PBC to conduct RMB business in Shanghai, Shenzhen and their 
adjacent regions.  In 1999, the PBC further relaxed geographical restrictions on foreign 
banks and allowed them to operate in all major Chinese cities.  A crucial milestone in 
the financial liberalisation process was China’s accession to the world Trade 
Organisation (WTO) in December 2001.  According to China’s WTO commitments, 
China agreed to gradually lift all geographic, business scope and customer restrictions 
in relation to foreign banking institutions by 2006.  This means that China’s banking 
sector has now been completely opened up to foreign banks.  China’s admission to the 
WTO will intensify competition among banks and increase bank internationalisation, 
thus bringing China to a new stage of development. 
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4.3.3 Chinese Banking Reform after WTO Entry 
China’s entry into the WTO at the end of 2001 marked the beginning of a new era.  In 
order to comply with its WTO commitments, the Chinese government progressively 
removed regulatory obstacles and adopted numerous reforms to open up its banking 
sector to competition – both domestic and foreign.  Over the period from 2002 until 
2006, the cities and provinces in which foreign banks were allowed to trade 
(geographical coverage) as well as the banking activities they were allowed to undertake 
(business scope) were gradually widened.  By the end of 2006, all Chinese cities 
allowed foreign banks to engage in both local and foreign currency business with all 
types of customers.  Table 4.5 illustrates the major changes during the transition period 
in relation to the geographical coverage and business scope of foreign banks.  However, 
in late 2006, the CBRC imposed new rules that foreign banks must be locally 
incorporated as legal entities before they can conduct local currency business for 
Chinese citizens.  The CBRC also encouraged locally incorporated foreign banks to set 
up independent risk control, accounting and IT systems so that as far as possible, 
adverse circumstances arising out of their foreign operations would not impact on their 
Chinese (domestic) operations (that is, to minimise risk overflow).  This prudent 
supervision measure may lead to further delays in foreign banks’ access to China's retail 
banking market (Berger, et. al., 2007).  By the end of 2007, the CBRC had allowed 21 
foreign banks to change their Chinese mainland branches into locally incorporated 
banks registered in China. 
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Table 4.5 Opening of China’s Banking Sector (2001-2006) 
Time Business Services  customer Restrictions Geographic Restrictions 
Dec. 
2001 
Foreign currency 
business  
No restriction – Chinese and 
foreign enterprises and 
individuals  
No restriction – all of 
China 
 Local currency business Only with foreign enterprises and overseas citizens  
Only in Shanghai, 
Shenzhen, Dalian and 
Tianjin.  
Dec. 
2002 Local currency business 
Only with foreign enterprises and 
overseas citizens 
As in 2001 plus 
Guangzhou, Nanjing, 
Qingdao, Wuhan and 
Zhuhai 
Dec. 
2003 Local currency business 
With all Chinese and foreign 
enterprises and overseas citizens 
As in 2002 plus Ji’nan, 
Fuzhou, Chendu and 
Chongqing  
Dec. 
2004 Local currency business 
With all Chinese and foreign 
enterprises and overseas citizens 
As in 2003 plus Beijing, 
Kunming Xiamen, 
Shenyang and Xi’an 
Dec. 
2005  Local currency business 
With all Chinese and foreign 
enterprises and overseas citizens 
As in 2004 plus Ningbo, 
Shantou, Harbin, 
Changchun, Lanzhou, 
Yinchuan and Nanning 
Dec. 
2006 Local currency business 
No restriction –Chinese and 
foreign enterprises and 
individuals 
No restriction – all of 
China 
Source: CBRC 
    
In order to increase the efficiency of regulatory and the supervisory functions of the 
banking sector and leave the PBC free to focus on its responsibilities as a central bank 
(monetary policy issues), it has previously noted that the Chinese government created 
the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) in March 2003.  The CBRC is a 
ministerial-level organisation under the control of the State Council and is responsible 
for supervising banks, asset management companies, trust and investment companies, 
and other depository institutions.  In 2004, the CBRC’s legal status was reconfirmed 
by the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Banking Supervision and 
Administration.  Moreover, in 2005 two existing laws, the Law of the People’s 
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Republic of China on the People’s Bank of China and the Law of the People’s Republic 
of China on Commercial Banks were revised to accommodate China’s commitments on 
entry to the WTO as well as to improve the efficiency of the banking sector.  The exact 
division of powers between the CBRC and the PBC has been clarified by these laws 
(Hansakul, 2004).  These laws all aimed to improve the level of banking sector 
supervision.  In the last several years, the CBRC has also focused on encouraging 
Chinese banks to adopt best international banking practices.  This involves resolving 
issues related to capital adequacy, non-performing loans and corporate governance 
(Cousin 2007).  
 
In order to enhance risk management in the banking sector, the CBRC promulgated new 
capital adequacy rules, Regulations Governing Capital Adequacy of Commercial Banks, 
in February 2004.  This new regulation is based on the 1988 version of the Basel 
Capital Accord (Basel I) as well as parts of the New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) 
promulgated in 200225.  It also allowed for the fact that Chinese banks would face 
potentially stiff competition when China’s WTO commitments opened the Chinese 
banking sector to foreign banks commencing in December 2006 (Cousin, 2007).  The 
new rules provided a precise mechanism for calculating the capital of commercial banks 
and required commercial banks to replenish their capital base to meet a minimum 
capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of 8% on or before January 1, 200726.  According to a 
CBRC spokesman’s statement, under the new stricter rules the CAR of commercial 
banks may actually decrease by an average of 2% when based on the computation 
procedures implied by the “old” (1995) CAR rules.  This in turn means that the “new” 
(2004) CAR rules will impose more stringent capital adequacy requirements on all 
Chinese banks.  The regulatory authorities also urged Chinese banks to establish risk 
management structures and rating systems.  In response to this the leading three 
                                                        
 
25 Three pillars of Basel II were incorporated into the new regulations.  They are minimum capital requirements, 
supervisory reviews and market discipline.  
26 The minimum bank CAR of 8% was prescribed in earlier Commercial Bank Law.  However, this earlier Law did 
not provide any detailed calculation methods or definitions of the CAR’s components, and as a consequence, this 8% 
requirement had not been enforceable.  
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commercial banks, the Bank of China (BOC), the China Construction Bank (CCB) and 
the Industrial & Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), have been developing new internal 
rating and credit risk management systems which are based on the Basel II framework.  
 
The international five-category loan classification system was introduced for Chinese 
commercial banks in 1998.  However, it was not until 2003 that the CBRC required all 
commercial banks to adopt this risk-based loan classification system - at which point the 
existing parallel four-category loan classification system was phased out.  Under the 
new system, bank loans are classified as performing (normal and special-mention) and 
non-performing (sub-standard, doubtful and loss) based on their inherent risks.  This 
loan classification system has facilitated reform by making the actual situation of the 
banks more transparent to regulators and bank managers. 
 
State-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) play a vital role in China's economic and 
social development and they also take a leading role in the country's banking system. 
Therefore, in 2003, the State Council initiated the “pilot state-owned bank-overhaul 
program” to accelerate reform of its state-owned banks through the process of infusing 
new capital, resolving problems with non-performing loans and improving corporate 
governance.  The Bank of China (BOC) and China Construction Bank (CCB) were 
selected as pilot banks for the state-owned banking reforms.  In December 2003, the 
State Council injected USD 22.5 billion in fresh capital into these two banks 
respectively.  This capital injection was accomplished through a new established 
state-owned investment company, the Central Huijin Investment Co., Ltd (Huijin), 
which acquired funds from China’s official foreign exchange reserves.  The two banks 
used their new capital along with undistributed profits to provision or write-off, the 
equivalent of USD 23.4 billion in non-performing loans (Brean, 2007).  Similar capital 
injections were extended to other big state-owned commercial banks.  Huijin injected 
RMB 3 billion to the Bank of Communications (BOCOM) in 2004 and USD 15 billion 
into the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) in 2005.  In addition to the 
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capital injections, the big SOCBs transfer their non-performing loans to the asset 
management companies (AMCs) referred to earlier.  These transfers totalled more than 
RMB 1,200 billion, some at face value, and some at discounted prices (see Table 4.6 for 
further details).  For example, in June 2004 Cinda AMC won the auction to purchase 
RMB 278.7 billion of distressed assets from BOC and CCB at 31% of their book 
values27.  After the capital injections and transfers of non-performing loans, there was 
a dramatic improvement in the SOCB’s balance sheets (see Table 4.7 for further details).  
In contrast, there has been little progress in reforming the Agricultural Bank of China 
(ABC).  The ABC’s problems were regarded as more serious than those of the other 
four banks and as inextricably related to rural financial-system reform, so its bailout and 
restructuring program have required much more consideration.  
 
Table 4.6 SOCB’s Capital Injections and Disposal of NPLs since 2003 
Bank 
Capital Injections 
 
NPLs  Transfer to AMCs 
Institution 
Amount 
(RMB 
billion ) 
Date AMCs 
Face 
Value 
(RMB 
billion) 
Actual 
Paid 
(% face 
value) 
Date 
ICBC Huijing 124.0 Apr. 2005  
Huarong 
Huarong 
Cinda 
Greatwall 
Oriental 
246.0 
22.7 
58.1 
257.0 
121.2 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
May 2005 
June 2005 
June 2005 
June 2005 
June 2005 
BOC Huijing 186.4 Dec. 2003  
Oriental 140.0 100% May 2004 
Cinda 149.8 31% June 2004 
CCB Huijing 186.4 Dec. 2003  
Cinda 56.9 100% May 2004 
Cinda 128.9 31% June 2004 
BOCOM 
Huijing 3.0 June 2004 
 Cinda 64.1 50% June 2004 
Ministry of 
Finance 
5.0 June 2004 
Social 
Security 
Fund 
10.0 June 2004 
Totals  514.8    1244.7   
Sources: Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (2003-2006), Okazaki (2007), AMCs press releases.   
                                                        
 
27 Unlike the 1999 non-performing loan transfers at face value to the AMCs, on this occasion the bad loans were sold 
in a bidding process involving the four AMCs.   
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Table 4.7 Financial Restructuring in SOCBs 
 ICBC  BOC  CCB  BOCOM  ABC 
 
NPL 
Ratios 
(%) 
CAR 
(%) 
 
NPL 
Ratios 
(%) 
CAR 
(%) 
 
NPL 
Ratios 
(%) 
CAR 
(%) 
 
NPL 
Ratios 
(%) 
CAR 
(%) 
 
NPL 
Ratios 
(%) 
CAR 
(%) 
2003 21.7 -8.8  17.8 5.4  9.3 6.7  13.3 1.9  30.7 -19.6 
2004 19.5 -8.3  5.7 8.0  3.8 12.0  3 9.7  26.8 -18.6 
2005 4.5 10.0  5.4 10.2  3.8 13.6  2.5 11.2  26.3 -21.7 
2006 3.8 14.2  4.8 13.6  3.3 11.1  2.1 11.1  23.6 -17.5 
2007 2.7 13.1  3.1 13.3  2.6 12.6  2.7 14.4  23.5 N/A 
Sources: CBRC, Bank annual reports. 
Notes: Non-performing loan (NPL) ratio = total non-performing loan amount / total loan amount.   
      Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) = capital / risk weighted assets.  
 
As an important part of the banking reform process, the Chinese government has 
encouraged foreign strategic investment by foreign financial institutions into Chinese 
banks in recent years.  Its hope is that Chinese banks will acquire risk management, 
advance technology, international operations experience and fresh capital from their 
foreign partners and thereby improve their core competitiveness.  For their part foreign 
financial institutions have shown considerable interest in investing Chinese banks 
because of the favourable opportunities it offers for them to expand into China without 
the risk and hassles of establishing their own local affiliates.  It also allows the foreign 
financial institutions to form strategic partnerships and to acquire an understanding of 
Chinese business culture and customers that would not otherwise be possible.  
Therefore, the introduction of foreign strategic investors is a win-win game.   
 
In December 2003, the CBRC issued a regulation regarding foreign equity investment 
in Chinese financial institutions.  According to the regulations, a single foreign 
investor can hold up to a 20% ownership stake in a local bank, and total foreign 
investments in one domestic bank are not permit to exceed 25 % of total equity.  
Therefore, foreign strategic investors have only been permitted to take a minority stake 
in Chinese banks and have very little involvement in the direct management of the 
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affected banks.  Most strategic foreign investments took place between 2004 and 2006.  
Initially, foreign ownership participation was focussed on Chinese small and medium 
sized commercial banks but eventually spread to big state-owned commercial banks.  
Since 1996, when foreign strategic investors were first permitted to invest in Chinese 
banks, 29 foreign institutional investors have acquired a stake in 21 Chinese banks with 
a total investment of USD19 billion by 2006 (see table 4.8 for further details)28.  
 
Another strategy used by the Chinese authorities in order to improve Chinese banks’ 
corporate governance and management efficiency is to encourage Chinese banks to list 
on stock exchanges through the device of an initial public offering (IPO).  The Bank of 
Communications (BOCOM) successfully launched an initial public offering (IPO) on 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in June 2005 and raised USD 2.2 billion in share 
capital.  This successful IPO has been view as a model for shareholding reform.  
Bank of China (BOC) and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) also 
completed IPOs on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 2005 and 2006 respectively.  At 
first, the government preferred to use offshore markets because the requirements for 
qualification and disclosure in overseas markets are generally much more stringent than 
those in Chinese domestic markets.  It was expected that by listing on foreign stock 
markets Chinese banks would be forced to undertake the structural reforms the Chinese 
governments was hoping for (Okazaki, 2007).  However, the government soon 
recognised that listing bank securities on foreign stock markets limited domestic 
investor’s opportunities to invest in the country’s largest national banks.  Thus, BOC, 
ICBC, BOCOM and CCB also carried out IPOs on the Shanghai Stock Exchange.  In 
2007, several joint-stock commercial banks and city commercial banks also launched 
IPOs on Chinese stock exchanges (See Table 4.9 for further details).  Here it is 
important to note that shares listed on (both domestic and foreign) stock exchanges are 
not subject to the 25% restriction on foreign ownership alluded to earlier.    
                                                        
 
28 The Asian Development Bank was the first foreign financial institution to purchase an interest in a Chinese 
domestic bank when in 1996 it purchased a 3.29% stake in the China Everbright Bank for 1.9 million USD.    
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Table 4.8 Foreign Investments in Chinese Banks (up to 2007) 
Bank Name Invest time  
Foreign Investor Foreign Ownership 
Stake 
100 
million 
U.S.D. Name of Financial Institution Country 
State-owned Commercial banks 
Industrial & Commercial Bank of 
China 
 
2006.3 
 
 
Goldman Sachs Group USA 6.05% 25.822 
Allianz Group Germany 2.36% 10 
American Express USA 0.47% 2 
      
Bank of China 
 
 
 
 
2005.12 
 
 
 
 
Royal Bank of Scotland UK 10% 30.478 
Union Bank of Switzerland （UBS） Switzerland 1.61% 4.916 
Asian Development Bank （ADB） International Finance Organisation (IFO) 0.24% 0.737 
Asia Financial Holdings Pte. Ltd (AFH) Singapore 5% 15.239 
      
China Construction Bank 
Corporation 
2005.8 Bank of America USA 8.515% 30 
2005.8 Asia Financial Holdings. Ltd (AFH) Singapore 5.878% 24.66 
      
Joint Stock Commercial Banks  
Bank of Communications 
 
2004.8 
 
HSBC in HK 
 
Hong Kong 
 
19.90% 
 
17.47 
 
Hua Xia Bank 
 
 
2006.3 
 
 
Deutsche Bank Germany 7.02% 1.656 
Deutsche Bank  Luxembourg （DBL） Luxembourg 2.88% 0.679 
Sal. Oppenheim jr. & Cie. KGaA Germany 4.08% 0.961 
      
China Merchants Bank 
 
 
2004.11 Asia Financial Holdings Pte. Ltd (AFH) Singapore 4.55% 1.07 
2003.9 
 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
 
IFO 
 
1.22% 
 
0.235 
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Table 4.8.  Foreign Investments in Chinese Banks (up to 2006) (continued) 
Bank Name Invest time  
Foreign Investor Foreign Ownership 
Stake 
100 
million 
U.S.D. Name of Financial Institution            Country 
Industrial Bank 
 
 
 
2004.3 
 
 
 
Hang Seng Bank Hong Kong 15.98% 2.08 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) IFO 4% 0.52 
Government of Singapore Investment Co 
(GIC）（via Tetrad Investment Pte Ltd ） 
Singapore 
 
5% 
 
0.65 
 
      
Guangdong Development Bank 
 
2006.12 
 
Citibank USA 20% 7.2468 
IBM CREDIT LLC USA 4.74% 1.7175 
      
Shenzhen Development Bank 2004.9 Newbridge Asia AIV Ⅲ L.P. USA 17.89% 1.5 
      
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 2002.12 Citibank（via COIC） USA 5% 0.6753 
      
China Everbright Bank 1996.10 Asian Development Bank （ADB） IFO 3% 0.2 
      
Bohai Bank 2005.12 Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Hong Kong 19.99% 1.2346 
City Commercial Banks   
Bank of Shanghai 
 
 
 
1998.8 International Finance Corporation (IFC) IFO 5% 0.2561 
2001.12 
 
 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) IFO 7% 0.2467 
HSBC in HK Hong Kong 8% 0.6257 
Shanghai Commercial Bank (Hong Kong) Hong Kong 3% 0.2347 
      
Jinan City Commerical Bank 2004.11 Commonwealth Bank Australia 11% 0.1735 
      
Xi'an City Commerical Bank 
 
2004.6 
 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) IFO 2.50% 0.032 
Scotiabank Canada 2.50% 0.032 
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Table 4.8.  Foreign Investments in Chinese Banks (up to 2006) (continued) 
Bank Name Invest time  
Foreign Investor Foreign Ownership 
Stake 
100 
million 
U.S.D. Name of Financial Institution Country 
Bank of Beijing 
 
2005.3 ING BANK N.V. Netherlands 19.90% 2.352 
2005.5 International Finance Corporation (IFC) IFO 5% 0.59 
      
Bank of Nanjing 
 
2001.11 International Finance Corporation (IFC) IFO 5% 0.0882 
2005.12  BNP Paribas Finace 19.20% 0.8732 
      
Hangzhou City Commercial Bank 
 
2005.3 Commonwealth Bank Australia 19.92% 0.77 
2006.11 Asian Development Bank （ADB） IFO 4.99% 0.2760 
      
Nancong City Commercial Bank 
 
 
 
2005.7 
 
 
 
DEG finances investments of private 
enterprises （DEG） 
Germany 
 
10% 
 
0.036 
 
Sparkassen International Development Trust
（SIDT） Germany 
3.30% 
 
0.012 
 
      
Tianjing City Commercial Bank 2006.5 Australia & New Zealand Banking Group (ANZ) Australia 20% 1.10 
      
Bank of Ningbo 
 2006.5 
Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation 
Ltd.(OCBC) 
Singapore 
 
12.20% 
 
0.71 
 
      
21 Banks   29 Financial Institutions   190.15 
Source: CBRC
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Table 4.9 Publicly Listed Banks since 2005 
Bank 
 
Date of IPO 
 
Listed Place 
 
Selling Price 
per Share 
Total Capital 
before IPO  
(RMB billion) 
Share Capital 
Raised     
(RMB billion) 
ICBC 
 
Oct. 2006 
 
Hong Kong 
Shanghai 
HK$ 3.07 
RMB 3.12 
326.2 
(June 2006) 
126.6 
46.6 
      
BOC June 2006 July 2006 
Hong Kong 
Shanghai 
HK$ 2.95 
RMB 3.08 
233.8 
(Dec. 2005) 
90.0 
20.0 
      
CCB Oct. 2005 Sep. 2007 
Hong Kong 
Shanghai 
HK$ 2.35 
RMB 6.45 
200.9 
(June 2005) 
74.6 
58.1 
      
BOCOM June 2005 May 2007 
Hong Kong 
Shanghai 
HK$ 2.50 
RMB 7.90 
52.1 
(Dec. 2004) 
18.0 
25.2 
      
China 
Merchants 
Bank 
Sep. 2006 
 
Hong Kong 
 
HK$ 8.55 
 
26.0 
(Dec. 2005) 20.9 
      
CITIC Bank 
 
April 2007 
 
Hong Kong 
Shanghai 
HK$ 5.86 
RMB 5.8 
31.7 
(Dec. 2006) 
31.5 
13.34 
      
Industrial Bank 
 
Feb. 2007 
 
Shanghai 
 
RMB 15.98 
 
16.2 
(Dec. 2006) 
16.0 
 
      
Beijing Bank 
 
Sep. 2007 
 
Shanghai 
 
RMB 12.5 
 
9.84 
(Dec. 2006) 
15 
 
      
Nanjing Bank 
 
July 2007 
 
Shanghai 
 
RMB 11 
 
2.63 
(Dec. 2006) 
6.93 
 
      
Ningbo Bank 
 
July 2007 
 
Shenzhen 
 
RMB 9.2 
 
3.2 
(Dec. 2006) 
4.14 
 
Sources: Annual report of each bank, Okazaki (2007) 
 
4.4 Summary and Conclusion  
This chapter briefly outlines the structure of the Chinese banking sector.  Currently, the 
Chinese banking sector is comprised of two regulatory institutions (the Peoples’ Bank of 
China and China Banking Regulatory Commission), both of which are overseen by the 
State Council (the Cabinet), and four categories of banks, namely: commercial banks 
(state-owned commercial banks, joint-stock commercial banks, city commercial banks, 
and foreign banks), policy banks, credit cooperatives and non-banking financial 
institutions.  The most notable characteristic of the Chinese banking system is that it is 
dominated by the big four state-owned commercial banks (ICBC, BOC, CCB and 
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ABC). 
 
This chapter also reviews the banking reform process implemented by the Chinese 
government and which began in 1979.  Basically, the Chinese banking reform process 
can be subdivided into three phases.  In 1979 the Chinese government began 
implementing the first phase of its banking reforms and these continued until 1993.  
During this period the Chinese banking system moved from a Soviet style 
mono-banking system towards a two tiered banking system consisting of a central bank 
and various types of financial institutions (e.g. state-owned specialised banks, medium 
and small-sized commercial banks and credit cooperatives, etc.).  This phase prepared 
the environmental setting for future banking reforms (Cousin, 2007).  The second 
phase of banking reforms began in 1994 and lasted until 2001.  This entailed a 
progressive movement towards less administrative and more independent banking 
operations and emphasised the financial stability and systemic risk of the banking sector.  
Thus, in 1994 the Chinese government established three policy banks in order to 
separate policy lending from the four existing specialised state-owned commercial 
banks.  Moreover, the promulgation of the Central Bank Law and the Commercial 
Banking Law in 1995 enhanced the independence of both the PBC and the commercial 
banks.  During this second phase of the reform process, the Chinese government also 
injected substantial levels of additional equity capital into the state-owned banks.  
Furthermore, it encouraged all banks to implement the international classification of 
non-performing loans scheme and for the state-owned banks to transfer non-performing 
loans into asset management companies established in 1999 specifically for that 
purpose.  
 
The third and last phase of banking sector reforms occurred from 2002 until 2007 and 
entailed a progressive implementation of the WTO protocols.  The Chinese banking 
system became much more open subsequent to China’s entry into the WTO.  The 
major banking reforms during this period included the creation of the China Banking 
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Regulatory Commission which has the objective of achieving a more enhanced level of 
monitoring of the banking sector, the recapitalisation of the state-owned banks and the 
disposition of non-performing loans to rehabilitate the balance sheets of the major 
Chinese state-owned banks.  Moreover, the introduction of foreign strategic investors 
and the listing of bank securities on the stock exchange was designed to enhance the 
effectiveness banking management in China.  In the following chapter, we outline the 
modelling framework used to measure cost efficiency and scale economies of Chinese 
banks.   
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Chapter 5 Methodology 
 
5.1 Introduction  
The preceding chapter discussed the main structure of the Chinese banking sector and 
the banking reforms undertaken in China over the last three decades.  In recent years 
the Chinese banking sector has experienced significant institutional, structural and legal 
changes because of the deregulation and liberalisation programme implemented by the 
Chinese government.  The main objective of this chapter is to describe the modelling 
framework used to measure the cost efficiency and scale economies of Chinese banks.  
To the author’s knowledge, no previous study has employed both parametric (SFA) and 
nonparametric (DEA) methods to measure the efficiency of Chinese banks and assess 
the robustness of results obtained.  Thus, we endeavour to fill this gap by applying 
multiple frontier techniques and specifications on a large data set of Chinese banks.   
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows.  Section 5.2 discusses a number 
of SFA cost efficiency models that have been developed to measure the efficiency of 
Chinese banks and to account for sample heterogeneity.  Section 5.3 defines the 
variables used in our modelling procedures and presents in detail, the empirical 
specification of the SFA models.  Section 5.4 outlines the DEA methodology that is 
also employed to estimate the cost efficiency of Chinese banks.  The DEA models 
complement the SFA models employed in our empirical analysis and are valuable 
device for cross-checking purposes.  Section 5.5 proposes a set of consistency 
conditions in order to compare the efficiency estimates generated by the SFA and DEA 
models.  Section 5.6 provides summary data and descriptive statistics of the variables 
used in the empirical work.  Finally, the last section provides our concluding 
comments. 
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5.2 The Stochastic Cost Frontier Function  
It is well known that the cost (or profit) function approach for determining the optimal 
combination of factors of production is the dual of the production function approach29 
and allows for the treatment of multiple outputs, quasi-fixed inputs, behavioural 
objectives and the analysis of economic efficiency levels.  The duality condition 
between production and cost functions ensures that they contain essentially the same 
information about a firm’s production possibilities.  However, the cost function adds 
the economic dimension of determining the technically efficient combinations of factors 
of production which minimise the total cost of particular output levels.  This latter 
aspect of cost minimisation is referred to as allocative efficiency.  Here Shephard 
(1953, 1970) demonstrates how cost functions are derived from the production function 
and input prices of the factors of production.  A general version of the minimum cost 
function (also know as the cost frontier) can be written as:  
 
TCi ≥  TC* = f ( iQ , iW ; β ) ,         i = 1,…, I,                   (5.1) 
 
where TCi is the observed total cost of the individual bank i; iQ is a vector of the 
outputs of bank i; iW  is an input price vector of bank i, f ( iQ , iW ; β ) is the cost frontier 
common to all banks representing the minimum cost of producing outputs iQ when the 
banks face input prices iW , and β  is a vector of the technology parameters to be 
estimated.  The cost function should satisfy certain properties which are summarised 
by Coelli et al. (2005) as follows30:  
 
(i) Nonnegativity: f (Q, W) > 0 for Q > 0 and W > 0.  This states that it is not 
possible to produce a positive output without incurring any costs.    
(ii) Nondecreasing in output, Q: if Q0 > Q1 then f (Q0, W) > f (Q1, W).  This states 
that cost cannot decreases as output rises.  
                                                        
 
29 The production function summarises the technology of a bank; that is, the relationship between outputs 
and inputs under which it operates.  
30 For a more detailed discussion of these properties, see Chambers (1998). 
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(iii) Nondecreasing in input prices, W: if W0 > W1 then f (Q, W0) > f (Q, W1).  This 
implies that an increase in input prices will not lead to a decrease in costs.  
(iv) Homogeneity of degree one in input prices, W:  f (Q, kW) = kf(Q, W) for k > 0.  
This implies that a proportional increase or decrease of all input prices will 
cause the same proportional change in total costs.   
(v) Concavity in input prices, W: f (Q, θW0+(1-θ) W1) > θf (Q, W0)+ (1-θ) f(Q, W1) 
for all 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. 
 
Cost efficiency (CE) is measured relative to the efficient cost frontier, which is defined 
as the ratio of the minimum cost to the cost actually incurred.  Thus, if the cost 
incurred in producing a given output level turns out to be TC but that the technically 
efficient combination of factors of production which minimise costs for this output level 
is TC* then the cost efficiency of the firm will be CE = TC*/TC.  This in turn implies 
that it would be possible to produce the same output bundle under the same conditions 
with a saving in costs of (1-CE)%.  Failure to attain the cost frontier may be due to 
either technical or allocative inefficiency (or both).  Because the cost frontier is 
deterministic, such a formulation ignores measurement errors and other sources of 
statistical noise and all deviations from the frontier are attributed to inefficiency.   
 
To overcome this drawback, Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeuse and van 
den Broeck (1997) simultaneously proposed the stochastic frontier model (that is, SFA).  
Their model adds a symmetric error term to the deterministic frontier, which accounts 
for statistical noise.  The original models are defined as stochastic production frontiers, 
but the same framework can be used to define the stochastic cost frontier.  Considering 
the characteristics of our data set and the purposes of this study, we decided to apply 
this classical frontier model to the panel of China banking data on which our empirical 
analysis is based.  The single equation stochastic cost function for a panel data set can 
be written as: 
 
         lnTCit = f ( itQ , itW ;β ) + itit uv +   i = 1,…,I,  t =1,…T             (5.2) 
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where lnTCit is the logarithm of the total cost of bank i at time t; f ( itQ , itW ; β ) is the 
deterministic kernel of the cost frontier; Qit and Wit are a vector of outputs and of input 
prices in logarithmic form at time t; itv is a two-sided normal disturbance term with 
zero mean and variance 2vσ  representing the effects of noise, and itu  is a 
non-negative random disturbance term capturing the effects of cost inefficiency and is 
usually assumed as a half-normal distribution, ),0( 2uN σ+ .  Additionally, itv and 
itu are independently distributed from each other.  Because the cost frontier is specified 
as being stochastic, the appropriate measure of cost efficiency becomes: 
 
 itCE  = )exp()exp();,(
)exp();,(
it
itititit
ititit u
uvWQf
vWQf −=+β
β                     (5.3) 
 
Note that the value of uit cannot be observed directly from the above equation; only the 
composite error term ititit uv +=ε  can be observed.  A solution to this problem is 
obtained by using the distribution of the inefficiency term condition on the estimation of 
the composite error term.  For the half-normal case, Battese and Coelli (1988) 
proposed an appropriate point estimator for cost inefficiency which involves the 
conditional expectation of )exp( itu−  given the entire error term31.  This is given by: 
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where (.)Φ  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function and 
22
uv σσσ += , 222 /σσσσ uv=∗  and 22 /σσγ u= .  The value of γ must lie between 
zero and one.  A value of one indicates that the deviation from the frontier is due to 
                                                        
 
31 An alternative point estimator for efficiency is given by Jondrow et al.(1982) (JLMS).  Battese and 
Coelli (1988) and Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) point out that Battese and Coelli (1988)’s estimator is to 
be preferred, particularly when ui is not close to zero.  This is because the JLMS estimator includes only 
the first term in the power-series expansion of exp (-u). 
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cost inefficiency, while a value of zero indicates that the deviation is explained by pure 
noise.  The estimates of efficiency are unbiased but inconsistent, because the variation 
associated with the distribution of the estimator ( iiu ε ) is independent of i and remains 
non-zero (Greene, 1991)32.  The efficiency measure from equation (5.4) takes values 
over the interval [1,∞ ) and a value equal to one means fully efficient.  Given this, the 
cost efficiency score can be calculated as 1/ itCE .  In this study, we employ maximum 
likelihood techniques to obtain estimates of β and the parameters of the two error 
components (see equation 5.2).  Firstly, the likelihood function should be defined. 
Then the log likelihood function can be maximised with respect to the parameters in 
order to obtain maximum likelihood estimates of all parameters33.  
 
In Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977), the original model assumes efficiency follows a 
half-normal distribution with mean zero.  This specification implies that the likelihood 
of inefficient behaviour monotonically decreases for increasing levels of inefficiency 
and most units are likely to be concentrated close to the cost frontier causing artificially 
high efficiency levels.  But there is no theoretical reason to support the ex ante 
monotonicity assumption invoked by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977).  Given this, 
Stevenson (1980) argues that inefficiency is not likely to be distributed with such a 
monotonically declining density function.  He also argues that the half-normal 
distribution assumption used by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) is unnecessarily 
restrictive.  Instead Stevenson (1980) introduces a normal-truncated formulation that 
assumes u to be normally distributed with a nonzero (constant) mean truncated at zero 
from above.  Thus the truncated normal distribution introduced by Stevenson (1980) 
requires one more parameter μ (its mean) to be estimated and the point estimate of cost 
efficiency for each bank is given by the formula:  
 
 
 
                                                        
 
32 An estimator is consistent if its values approach the true parameter value and if its variances get 
smaller as the sample size increases indefinitely.  
33 See Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) for the derivation of the likelihood function and its partial 
derivatives with respect to the parameters of the model.  
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This model also can be estimated using maximum likelihood techniques.  We prefer 
the truncated specification to the half-normal model, because the former provides a 
somewhat more flexible representation of the pattern of efficiency in the data.  But 
both models face an important limitation which fails to account for heterogeneity across 
banks, an issue we now develop34.  
 
The Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Stevenson (1980) models both assume that 
banks operate in perfectly competitive input-output markets.  Thus, banks’ input prices 
are taken as exogenous.  However, this assumption may not be valid when banks are 
heterogeneous.  Some of the factors contributing to banks’ heterogeneity (e.g. output 
quality) could make their input prices partially endogenous and thus influence both their 
technical and allocative efficiencies.  Therefore, the potential endogeneity of input 
prices should be controlled for in the measurement of banks’ cost efficiency.  
Additionally, under the conventional frontier model, different banks are assumed to 
produce equivalent quality in terms of output.  However, there are likely to be 
differences across banks in the quality of outputs.  Because the traditional output 
variables do not fully capture heterogeneity in bank outputs differences in production 
quality may be incorrectly measured as differences in cost inefficiency (Berger and 
Mester, 1997).  Some banks might be incorrectly labelled as inefficient merely because 
they produce higher quality outputs than other banks.  Thus, failure to recognise this 
heterogeneity in bank outputs may bias estimates of cost efficiency.   
 
To overcome these problems, we try to incorporate these differences into the 
specification of the cost function.  Formally, it is appropriate to include control 
variables, Zit, along with the outputs and input prices in a stochastic cost frontier model, 
                                                        
 
34 These models absorb all unmeasured heterogeneity through the inefficiency term (uit). 
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which can be written as follows:  
 
 lnTCit = f ( itQ , itW , itZ ; β ) + itit uv +   i = 1,…,I,  t =1,…T            (5.6) 
 
Apart from including control variables in the deterministic kernel of the stochastic cost 
frontier, the model given by equation (5.6) is structurally indistinguishable from the 
conventional stochastic cost frontier model given by equation (5.2).  In this 
formulation, Zit, are assumed to directly influence the cost of production, and alter the 
shape of the cost frontier.  However, the model still estimates a common benchmark.  
Although, this model may be more precise in its estimates of the parameters and cost 
efficiency, it does not account for heterogeneity due to the exogenous variables which 
either change the position of the frontier or influence the inefficiency term.  
 
Up to now, all the models we have presented assume that all banks in an industry use 
the same production technology to convert inputs into outputs and that all banks face 
similar environmental conditions; that is, the shape of the cost frontier is the same 
across all banks. We know, however, that some heterogeneous environmental variables 
(or exogenous variables), which are neither inputs to the production process nor outputs 
of it, may influence the performance measures obtained.  For example, variations in 
market structure, regulation and ownership form, etc. may cause variations in bank 
performance.  Thus, the omission of such heterogeneity leads to biased estimates of the 
parameters describing the cost frontier and misstates cost inefficiency as a consequence.  
According to Kumhakar and Lovell (2000), three main approaches exist in the 
efficiency measurement literature regarding the way in which to incorporate 
environmental variables into efficiency measurement models.  The environmental 
variables may be considered as the observed factors that can explain differences in (cost) 
efficiency across firms.  
 
In the simplest case, if the environmental variables which are not under the control of 
management directly influence the structure of the production process itself, it is 
appropriate to incorporate these variables into the cost function as regressors (e.g., Good 
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et al., 1993).  In this case we write stochastic cost function as:   
 
 lnTCit = f ( itQ , itW , itZ , itE ; β ) + itit uv +   i = 1,…,I,  t =1,…T          (5.7) 
 
where Eit is a vector of exogenous variables in the deterministic kernel of the stochastic 
production frontier accounting for systematic differences across banks due to ownership 
structure, size and market structure etc..  By including the additional variables, the cost 
frontier incurs a parallel shift.  This is different from the influence of incorporating 
control variables, which changes the shape of frontier.  In other words, each bank faces 
a different cost frontier, but we still assume that the shape of the frontier is the same for 
all banks.  One limitation of this model is that the additional variables do not explicitly 
explain the variations in the efficiency levels of banks.   
 
Kalirajan (1981) and Pitt and Lee (1981) propose a two-stage approach, in their 
empirical papers, which seeks to explain the variation in estimated inefficiencies.  In 
the first stage, a cost frontier and banks’ efficiency levels are estimated, ignoring the 
exogenous variables.  In the second stage, the estimated efficiency scores are then 
regressed against the exogenous variables.  Thus the variation in estimated efficiency 
is explained by the exogenous variables.  Unfortunately a two-stage approach suffers 
from serious econometric problems.  The first of these emanates from the fact that in 
order to avoid biased ML estimates in the first-stage, it must be assumed that exogenous 
variables are uncorrelated with the cost model regressors (outputs and input price).  
However, in the second-stage our expectation would be that the exogenous variables 
will be correlated with the inefficiency term.  This relationship will cause parameter 
estimates and efficiency scores to be biased, due to the omitted variables problem.  In 
this circumstance, any inferences from the second-stage are problematic.  Second, it is 
assumed that the efficiency term is independent and identically distributed in the 
first-stage estimation.  But in the second-stage, it is assumed that the estimated 
efficiencies are normally distributed and dependent on the exogenous variables, and this 
conflicts with the assumption that the inefficiencies are independent and identically 
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distributed in the first stage35.  Thus, the two-stage approach seems inappropriate 
under the stochastic frontier framework and we do not use this approach in the empirical 
work on stochastic frontier analysis summarised in later sections of this thesis.   
 
Another way to account for heterogeneity and to achieve an explicit explanation of 
efficiency is to estimate the parameters of the stochastic frontier and inefficiency 
models simultaneously.  This approach assumes that the environmental variables 
influence the degree of cost inefficiency (the distribution of inefficiency) and hence that 
cost efficiencies are expressed as a function of these factors and are integrated into the 
stochastic frontier model.  By comparing this with the incorporation of exogenous 
variables into the cost function, this method allows the adjustment of the raw efficiency 
scores to reflect the nature of the operational environments which banks face 
(Kumhakar and Lovell, 2000).  This approach also avoids the omitted variables and 
independence problems which plague the two-stage estimation procedure.  Thus, we 
also employ the one-stage stochastic frontier model of Battese and Coelli (1995) to 
estimate bank efficiency.  The Battese and Coelli (1995) model extends the ideas of 
Kumbhakar et al (1991), Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991) and Huang and Liu (1994) 
to panel data.  The general Battese and Coelli (1995) model is specified in the same 
way as equation (5.6) with one exception; and that is that the inefficiency term itu is 
expressed as an explicit function of a vector of exogenous variables, Eit, and a random 
error term.  Thus, the Battese and Coelli (1995) model can be expressed as follows:  
 
 lnTCit = f ( itQ , itW , itZ ; β ) + )( ititit wEv ++ δ  i = 1,…,I,  t =1,…T         (5.8) 
 
where the random error term wit captures the effect of the ‘unobserved’ factors and is 
defined by a truncated normal distribution with zero mean and constant variance;  Eit  
captures the observed factors which explain differences in cost efficiency across banks 
and δ is a vector of parameters to be estimated.  Since the inefficiency term itu is 
nonnegative, the truncation point is -δEit.  
                                                        
 
35 See Kumhakar and Lovell (2000) and Wang and Schmidt (2002), for a more detailed discussion of this 
issue. 
Chapter 5 Methodology  
 129
In above model, the truncated inefficiency term itu is independently but not identically 
distributed and takes the form: itu ~ ( itEδ , uσ ).  The cost efficiency of the ith bank is 
then given by:  
 
itCE = )exp( itu− = )exp( itit wE −−δ                       (5.9) 
 
Here, we also use maximum likelihood estimation to determine values of the unknown 
parameters in the above model. The expressions for the likelihood function and 
efficiency point estimator are presented in Battese and Coelli (1993).  
 
Table 5.1 SFA Model Specifications  
Models  Specification Inefficiency u Heterogeneity  
Baseline (M1) f ( itQ , itW ;β ) itu ∼ ),0( 2uN σ+  • None. 
Truncated (M2) f ( itQ , itW ;β ) itu ∼ ),( 2uN σμ+  • None. 
Controlled (M3) f ( itQ , itW , itZ ; β ) itu ∼ ),( 2uN σμ+  
• Bank specific 
observed factors in 
cost function. 
Kernel (M4) f ( itQ , itW , itZ , itE ; β ) itu ∼ ),( 2uN σμ+  
• Bank specific 
observed factors in 
cost function. 
Error effects (M5) f ( itQ , itW , itZ ; β ) itu ∼ ),( 2uitEN σδμ ++  
• Bank specific 
observed factors in 
cost function. 
• Heterogeneity in the 
mean of inefficiency 
distribution.  
 
When considering the different models summarised above, we cannot find a convincing 
theoretical argument which suggests that one particular specification for assessing 
efficiency is better than another.  Hence, the choice of frontier models is “frequently a 
judgement call” (Kumhakar and Lovell, 2000, p266).  It thus turns out that the 
specification of inefficiency in frontier modelling is usually ad hoc and is based on 
tractability rather than on any optimal theoretical criteria for assessing efficiency 
(Kumhakar et al., 1997).  Given this, in this study, we employ the different stochastic 
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cost frontier models briefly summarised in Table 5.1.  These models use different 
assumptions for the distribution of (in)efficiency terms, and different ways to 
incorporate control and environmental variables.  Importantly, however, we also 
compare the results obtained from each model in order to assess the reliability and 
robustness of our results and in particular, to determine the most appropriate model with 
which to measure Chinese banking efficiency. 
 
5.3 Empirical Specification for SFA  
5.3.1 Inputs and Outputs Variables  
Following the discussion on the stochastic cost frontier models which will be utilised to 
estimate efficiency levels for the Chinese banking sector, this section defines the output 
and input (price) variables which are used in our modelling procedures.  Although the 
multiproduct nature of banking firms is widely recognised, there is still no consensus 
about how the “production process” characterising a bank’s outputs and inputs should 
be defined.  There are two main approaches in banking theory about the choice of how 
to measure the flow of services banks provide: the production approach and the 
intermediation approach.  These two approaches differ in their view of the role of 
banks and neither fully captures the dual roles of financial institutions.  Berger and 
Humphrey (1997) note that the production approach may be more appropriate for 
evaluating branch level efficiency while the intermediation approach is better for 
measuring the efficiency of banks as a whole.  
 
Under the production approach, banks are thought of as production units, which utilise 
physical inputs such as capital and labour to produce transactions and document 
processing services for their customers such as keeping customer deposits, issuing loans, 
and cashing cheques.  This approach generally employs the number of deposit 
accounts, loan transactions and documents processed as outputs.  The associated total 
costs are made up only of the costs of the physical inputs and exclude interest expenses.    
 
An alternative approach to classifying a bank’s inputs and outputs is the intermediation 
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approach, which was originally suggested by Sealey and Lindley (1977).  This 
approach treats a bank as an intermediary, which collects funds from savers and 
transforms those funds into profitable projects (loans and other earning assets).  This 
transformation activity originates from the different characteristics of deposits and 
loans36.  Sealey and Lindley (1977) argue that earning assets (loans, investments, etc.) 
make up bank outputs, in which case deposits are viewed as inputs, along with capital 
and labour.  Total banking costs include both operating expenses and financial costs.  
Bank outputs and inputs are treated as a stock, showing the given amount of output at 
one point in time, since service flows are not usually available.   
 
There is a continuing debate about the definition of the outputs and inputs to be used in 
cost efficiency studies.  We tend to follow the intermediation approach, due to the 
advantages of this approach (see below) and the easy availability of the data necessary 
to implement approach.  This approach treats deposits as an input, which is more 
convincing than the production approach (which treats deposits as an output) since they 
are paid for in part by interest payments and the funds raised provide the bank with its 
basic “raw material”; namely, investable funds.  Furthermore, the intermediation 
approach emphasises the overall costs of banks, and is appropriate for addressing 
questions related to cost minimisation by the affected banks (Ferrier and Lovell, 1990).  
Moreover, the intermediation approach uses money value as a measure output (for loans, 
other earning assets and non-interest income, etc.) and the necessary information is 
generally available from a bank’s financial statements or from other sources (e.g. 
Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking).  Against this, the production approach 
requires information such as the number of accounts, loans, etc., which is generally not 
publicly available.  Finally, the intermediation approach is also the most widely used 
in the empirical bank efficiency literature.  In this study, we suggest that operating 
expenses and interest payments comprise total costs; labour, total borrowed funds, and 
physical capital are the bank’s inputs; three outputs are total loans, other earning assets 
(e.g. investments, interbank assets), and non-interest income which acts as a proxy for 
nontraditional activities; that is, off-balance sheet items.  Although off-balance sheet 
                                                        
 
36 Deposits are typically divisible, liquid and riskless, whilst loans are indivisible, illiquid and risky. 
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items are technically non-earning assets, they increase the bank’s income and are an 
important component of banking business.  Therefore, it should be included when 
modelling a bank’s cost characteristics; otherwise, total output would be understated 
(Jagtiani and Khanthavit, 1996, Rogers, 1998 and Clark and Siems, 2002).  
 
5.3.2 Control Variables 
In addition to the above input and output variables, this study also incorporates several 
control variables which have the potential to influence a bank’s costs in a variety of 
ways.  The control variables enter into the stochastic frontier model in the same way as 
the output (or input price) variables and these variables are fully interactive with the 
other parameters of the model.  The control variables included in our model – namely, 
the level of equity, the amount of non-performing loans and the time trend – are used to 
help in addressing the omitted variables problem and the heterogeneity of our sample of 
banks.  Omitting these control variables may result in some efficient elements of 
banking operations being incorrectly measured as differences in cost inefficiency.   
 
The first control variable is the level of equity which is included as a quasi-fixed input 
in the banking cost function.  Here it needs to be emphasised that the level of equity is 
an important aspect of efficiency measurement.  For example, Berger and Mester 
(1997) argue that a bank’s insolvency risk depends on the level of its equity capital 
since it provides a cushion against portfolio losses and financial distress.  Insolvency 
risk (non-performing loans) influences the bank’s costs through the risk premium which 
the bank has to pay for its borrowings.  This issue is particularly important in the 
Chinese banking sector where the insolvency risk of a bank could be very high because 
of a large proportion of non-performing loans in its asset portfolio.  However, equity 
capital is more than just a cushion against insolvency.  The level of a bank’s equity 
capital also provides an alternative to deposits and other borrowed funds as a source of 
loanable funds.  Thus, the level of a bank’s equity capital may have a direct impact on 
the bank’s other borrowing costs and therefore, the level of equity capital should be 
considered as an input into the bank’s production process.  On theoretical grounds, 
many previous studies which omit the level of equity capital from the cost function, 
implicitly assume that equity capital is not used as a source of loanable funds; or that 
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the cost of equity capital is perfectly correlated with the costs of other inputs; or that the 
cost of equity capital is the same across all banks.  However none of these assumptions 
seems plausible.  Therefore, the level of equity capital will affect a bank’s cost 
structure and thus the level of equity capital should be included in a bank’s cost 
function.  
 
Incorporating the level of equity capital into the estimated cost function is also intended 
to control for a bank’s different risk preferences37.  Banks lever their equity capital 
with demandable debt to reflect their attitudes toward risk.  If some banks are more 
risk averse than others, they may choose a higher level of equity capital than other 
banks. Since a bank’s equity capital is typically more expensive than deposits, this 
could lead one to conclude that the risk averse bank is producing its outputs in an 
allocatively inefficient manner; that is, using the wrong input mix.  But an alternative 
explanation is that the relative levels of equity capital across banks are actually due to 
different risk preferences (Mester, 1996).  So failure to control for the level of equity 
capital could lead to biases in efficiency measurement.  Following Hughes and Mester 
(1993), this study includes the level of equity rather than the estimated cost of equity 
capital as a component of the cost function.  Here we need to emphasise that banks 
may not hold the optimal level of equity capital (which minimises its operating costs) if 
that implies a degree of risk which is unacceptable (banks might be risk averse) and/or 
regulations set minimum capital requirements.  
 
Following Hughes and Mester (1993) and Mester (1996, 1997), another important 
control variable included in the cost function is nonperforming loans.  This captures 
the quality of a bank’s assets as well as the probability of bank failure and this can 
influence a bank’s costs in a number of ways.  On the one hand, problem loans would 
be endogenous to the bank.  A large proportion of problem loans may due to “bad 
management”.  Inefficient banks do not practice adequate loan underwriting and 
monitoring and hence will have higher losses due to non-performing loans.  Problem 
loans may also be caused by short-run cost savings on the initial credit evaluation and 
                                                        
 
37 Hughes and Mester (1993), Hughes et al. (1995) and Hughes et al (1996) tested and rejected the 
assumption of risk neutrality for banks.  
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loan monitoring (“skimping”).  This would produce short term cost efficiencies 
artificially higher than a bank which spends adequate resources to ensure its loans are of 
higher quality.  On the other hand, problem loans are likely to be exogenous to the 
bank due to negative economic shocks (“bad luck”).  That is, exogenous events can 
increase problem loans.  As a consequence, the bank incurs extra administrative 
expenses and managerial efforts in order to alleviate the effects that these problem loans 
have on their operating activities.  These extra operating costs lead to a reduction in 
cost efficiency.  Controlling for non-performing loans in cost functions helps remove, 
by statistical means, the costs of dealing with problem loans.  Berger and DeYoung 
(1997) tested the bad management, skimping and bad luck hypotheses and found mixed 
evidence for the exogeneity of nonperforming loans (see Berger and DeYoung (1997) 
for further discussion).  
 
Finally the time trend variable is included in the stochastic cost function in order to 
control for the effects of technical progress over time.  The time trend is a “catch all” 
variable which captures the effect of technological factors, such as learning by doing 
and organisational changes allowing for the more efficient use of existing inputs.    
 
5.3.3 Environmental Variables  
In our study, the environmental variables are also incorporated in the model to account 
for heterogeneity and to investigate the determinants of the cost efficiency of banks.  
Environmental variables cannot generally be controlled by bank managers, or at least 
are partially exogenous.  These variables fall into five broad categories: bank 
ownership structure, bank size, market structure characteristics, banking deregulation 
and market discipline. 
 
The first category of environmental variables included in our analysis is the ownership 
structure of banks.  In particular, the ownership structure variable is designed to 
capture differences that may arise between state-owned, domestic private and foreign 
banks.  Foreign-owned banks may possess comparative advantages over domestic 
banks, especially in a developing country like China.  These potential advantages 
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include superior managerial skills, high quality human capital, lower cost of funds, 
adequate capital supply, etc. (McCauley and Seth, 1992, Terrell, 1993, Berger et al., 
2005) and might help foreign banks to reduce their costs in comparison to domestic 
banks.  As a result, it has often been argued that majority-owned of foreign banks are 
likely to be more efficient than their domestic counterparts (Hasan and Marton, 2003, 
Bonin et al., 2005a, Berger et al., 2009).  On the other hand, foreign ownership was 
also found to be negatively related to banking efficiency by DeYoung and Nolle (1996) 
and Chang et al., (1998) amongst others.  Some adverse factors, such as organisational 
operating diseconomies and monitoring banks from a distance, could prevent 
foreign-owned banks from achieving the same levels of efficiency as 
domestically-owned banks.  Moreover, the different types of banks in China may have 
different operating objectives and face different regulatory environments.  For example, 
state-owned banks are often obliged to conduct projects which assist in fulfilling social 
welfare objectives while private banks and foreign banks operate predominantly on a 
purely commercial basis and thereby have a primary focus of profit maximisation.  
Furthermore, majority foreign-owned banks have only a recent history of competing in 
the retail banking market in China because before 2006, they were not been permitted to 
collect Chinese currency (RMB) deposits from Chinese individuals.  Therefore, the 
constructional basis under which a bank operates in China can have a significant impact 
on its structure and performance and so failing to include ownership types in efficiency 
analysis can be problematic and lead to biases in efficiency scores.  
 
The second environmental variable included in our efficiency models is the size of 
banks.  We do this in order to control for potential scale biases in the estimating 
process.  Bank size may be an important determinant of net interest margins and 
spreads if there are economies of scale in the Chinese banking sector.  In other words, 
one bank may be more efficient than another as a result of the economies of scale that 
arise from size rather than because of better management.  Beck and Hesse (2006) 
argued that small banks may be less able to diversify risks, which results in a higher risk 
premium in the rates at which they can borrow.  Therefore, there is a potentially 
negative relationship between bank size and operating costs.  Hunter, Timme, and 
Yang (1990) and Casu and Girardone (2006) find that larger banks might reap 
efficiency benefits from economics of scale or/and scope.  Furthermore, larger banks 
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may have more professional management teams which are more effective in cost control, 
thereby resulting in higher profits. (Evanoff and Israilevich, 1991).  In contrast, Bauer, 
Berger, and Humphrey (1993) and DeYoung and Nolle (1996) found that efficiency was 
inversely related to bank size and that the smallest banks showed the greatest efficiency.  
However, Pi and Timme (1993), Mester (1996), Berger and Mester (1997) and Avkiran 
(1999) did not detect a significant relationship between size and efficiency.  
Consequently, we analyse the impact that size can have on banking efficiency, which in 
turn provides useful information for regulators and allows bank managers to assess the 
optimal scale at which to conduct their operations.  Instead of introducing bank size 
categories (big, medium and small) as dummy variables into our modelling procedures, 
we use the logarithm of total assets as a proxy for bank size.  The advantage of doing 
so is to capture the effects of scale on cost efficiency while avoiding potential 
misspecification by using inappropriate break points for dividing our range of banks 
into different size groups. 
 
The next variable characterises the competitive conditions of the market in which banks 
operate.  The degree of concentration, as an indicator of the characteristics of market 
structure, may influence a bank’s profitability and operational efficiency.  The degree 
of concentration of the banking industry is usually measured by the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) or n-bank concentration ratio (CRn) which proxies 
for the bank’s market power or the intensity of the competition between banks. The 
higher the value of the HHI or CRn, the more concentrated the banking system, and the 
lower the degree of competition.  Banks in higher concentrated (less competitive) 
markets exercise market power by charging higher spreads than is the case in less 
concentrated markets.  They may find less pressure to control their costs as a 
consequence of this and thus may be able to enjoy the “quiet life” hypothesized by 
Hicks (Berger and Mester, 1997).  It is thus suggested that high market concentration 
is negatively related to cost efficiency.  On the other hand, Demsetz (1973) argued that 
the relationship between efficiency and concentration could be positive.  High 
concentration may be the result of greater production efficiency by banks.  In other 
words, relatively efficient banks with lower costs can compete more aggressively, earn 
higher profits and ultimately gain bigger market shares.  The relative-market power 
hypothesis asserts that only banks with large market shares and well-differentiated 
Chapter 5 Methodology  
 137
products are able to exercise market power and earn supernormal profits (see Shepherd, 
1982 and Berger, 1995).  Thus, market share for each bank in each year proxies for 
relative market power and is considered as another measure of market structure.  In 
order to investigate the relationship between market structure and cost efficiency, we 
incorporate both the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) and market share into the 
estimating equation38.  The HHI is defined as the sum of the squared asset market 
shares of all banks.  The market share is calculated as the fraction of bank assets to 
total assets of all banks.  We include both HHI and market share in our estimating 
equations because the HHI is an aggregate measure that only changes over time whereas 
the market share variable differs from bank to bank and over time.  
 
We also include a dummy variable to capture the impact of bank deregulation on 
Chinese banking efficiency.  A key objective of deregulation and liberalisation of 
banking operations is to improve resource allocation and bank performance (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1997).  There have been two important banking reform time points in 
China during the last twenty years: 1994 and 2001.  Before 1994, Chinese banks 
operated within the confines of a central economic plan and remained subject to 
administrative controls and the process of deregulation was slow.  However, from 1994, 
the Chinese government implemented a series of regulatory reforms which strengthened 
the legal status of commercial banks, and stipulated that banks operate independently so 
that there would be increased competition between banks.  Since China’s entry into the 
WTO at the end of 2001, the Chinese government has accelerated banking reform in 
order to modernise the banking system.  Hence, after 2001 the government accelerated 
the process of bank privatisation, actively encouraged foreigners to purchase equity 
holdings in domestic Chinese banks, enhanced the corporate governance of the Chinese 
bank sector and so on.  Therefore, it is useful to divide the sample into two sub-periods; 
the first covering the reform period from 1994 until 2001, and the second the reform 
period from 2002 until 2007.   
 
                                                        
 
38 We prefer the Herfindahl-Hirschman index to the n-bank concentration ratio because the former takes 
into account both the number of banks and the inequality of market shares, while the latter does not take 
into account the number of banks in the industry.  
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Finally, we include a dummy variable indicating whether a bank’s shares are publicly 
traded on a stock exchange.  This environmental variable is included in order to 
capture the fact that listed banks may improve their efficiency because of the market 
discipline mechanism and better corporate governance imposed by listing on the stock 
exchange.  Once a bank goes public, it becomes subject to legal, regulatory, and 
disclosure requirements which usually lead to better corporate governance and which 
impose additional external monitoring procedures on the management of the bank.  
Therefore, it might be expected that banks with shares listed on the stock exchange 
might be more efficient, all else being equal.  Berger and Mester (1997), Laurenceson 
and Qin (2008), and Ray and Das (2009) find that publicly listed banks do indeed tend 
to be more efficient than banks whose shares are not listed on the stock exchange.  
 
5.3.4 Specification of Cost Function Models   
This section begins with the choice of a functional form for the cost function.  Then we 
present a number of specifications which have been developed to estimate cost 
efficiency.  Some models may be considered better than others because to some extent 
they take into account observed heterogeneity.  A preferred specification for estimating 
efficiency for our sample can be obtained by comparing the different efficiency models 
with respect to the results they generate in terms of the significance of statistical tests, 
estimated efficiency scores and estimated efficiency rankings.   
 
When parametric methods are used to estimate efficiency, we should first consider the 
choice of a functional form for the cost function.  The transcendental logarithmic 
(translog) cost function developed by Christensen et al. (1973) is the most commonly 
used cost function in the bank efficiency literature.  The translog cost function 
provides a second-order logarithmic approximation to an arbitrary continuous 
transformation surface.  It gives a better fit to the frontier than the Cobb-Douglass 
form (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000).  However, some recent studies argue that 
compared to the translog functional form, the Fourier Flexible (FF) functional form 
provides a better approximation for banking data located far from the mean scale and 
product mix of the given bank (McAllister and McManus, 1993, Mitchell and Onvural, 
1996 and Altunbas et al., 2001).  However, Berger and Mester (1997) find that the 
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results from both the translog and FF functional specifications are essentially the same 
and the improvement in goodness of fit from using the FF functional form appears to be 
negligible.  Furthermore, the FF specification needs to estimate additional parameters 
for the Fourier trigonometric terms on which it is based, and this requires more degrees 
of freedom than for the translog functional form.  Moreover, the FF specification is 
more difficult to apply in our empirical research because the number of observations in 
our sample is relatively small.  For the above reasons we employ the translog 
functional form to derive our efficiency estimates.   
In this study, the baseline model, model 1(M1), mimics the traditional approach which 
is given by equation (5.2) above.  Under the intermediation approach, we assume that 
banks have three output variables and three input prices.  The translog specification 
gives our empirical cost frontier model as follows:  
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where ln TC is the natural logarithm of total (operating and financial) costs; iQ are 
output quantities which are total loans, other earning assets and non-interest income, 
respectively; 1W is the price of labour, 2W is the price of deposits and 3W is the price of 
physical assets; ηιϕχβ ,,,,  are parameters to be estimated; and the inefficiency term 
and error term are as defined in equation (5.2).  The duality theorem requires that the 
cost function must be linearly homogeneous in input prices and continuity requires that 
the second order parameters must be symmetric.  Thus, the total costs and input price 
terms are normalised by the last input price 3W , in order to impose a linear 
homogeneity restriction on the model.  In addition, the standard symmetry restrictions 
jiij ϕϕ = and nmmn ηη = apply to the above cost function.  
 
The model 2 (M2) is a minor extension of the baseline model given above.  Following 
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Stevenson (1980), we relax the implicit assumption that the majority of banks are highly 
efficient and allow the inefficiency term ( itu ) to follow a truncated normal distribution 
(truncated below at zero).  
 
In the model 3 (M3), we seek to account for heterogeneity by including the control 
variables which may significantly affect the structure of the cost frontier.  The control 
variables consist of the level of equity capital (Z1), the level of non-performing loans 
(Z2) and a time trend (Z3 or T).  Under this framework, the control variables and their 
interactions with the outputs and prices of inputs are incorporated into the cost frontier 
function in the following specification: 
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The distribution of the inefficiency term in this model is identical with the distribution 
of the inefficiency term in model M2.  It is obtained by truncation (at zero) of the 
normal distribution.  However, one more restriction is imposed to ensure symmetry, 
that is, rsξ = srξ .  Furthermore, in order to investigate the impact of the level of equity 
capital, output quality and time trend on Chinese banks’ cost characteristics, in Chapter 
6 we summarise results from estimating a number of different specifications with a 
different combination of control variables; i.e. in Chapter 6 we propose a series of 
models which exclude one control variable and then two control variables from equation 
(5.11).  We then compare the results of these more parsimonious models with results 
obtained from M3 (that is, equation 5.11) to assess whether a more parsimonious 
specification can return a reasonable description of our data.    
 
To allow for the impact of exogenous (environmental) factors on banks’ performance, 
we include five broad environmental variables thereby giving a total of seven variables 
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in the model for estimating cost efficiency.  As we discussed earlier, there are two 
alternative ways to account for environmental influences.  The first way assumes that 
environmental factors affect costs directly through the cost frontier.  The second 
approach assumes that these variables influence the degree of cost inefficiency.  
 
Under Model 4 (M4), the environmental variables are included directly in the cost 
function as regressors.  Because this model does not include interaction terms for the 
environmental and other production variables, each group of banks faces a different 
(parallel) cost frontier.  Thus, in this case, we estimate the following cost function:    
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where M3 represents model 3;  itSTATE is a dummy variable that takes a value of one 
if bank i in year t is a state-owned bank and zero, otherwise.  The dummy variable 
itFOREIGN  is a dummy variable which has a value of one if bank i in year t is a 
foreign bank and zero otherwise.  The private domestic bank dummy is dropped from 
the model (used as a reference group) to avoid problems with multicollinearity.  itSIZE , 
representing the size of bank i in year t, is taken to be the natural logarithm of total bank 
assets. itLIST  is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if bank i was publicly 
listed in year t, zero otherwise.  A reform (deregulation) dummy variable, REFORM , 
is equal to one for banks in the post deregulatory period (the second reform stage) and 
zero for banks in the pre-deregulatory period (the first reform stage).  tHHI  is a proxy 
for market concentration in year t.  Finally, itMS is the market share of bank i in year 
t39. 
 
                                                        
 
39  We also modelled market share by taking the natural logarithm of MSit.  However, there were no 
significant differences in the results of our analysis from using the logged value of MSit or the raw value 
of MSit 
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A second way to account for the effects of environmental factors is suggested by Battese 
and Coelli’s (1995) inefficiency effects model, also called a one stage efficiency model.  
An important implication is that exogenous factors influence only the distance of each 
bank from the best practice cost function.  This model is suitable for estimating an 
unbalanced panel dataset and has the ability to model the determinants of inefficiency as 
well.  Following the Battese and Coelli (1995) model, model 5 (M5) is identical to 
model (M3) with the one exception that the inefficiency term is made an explicit 
function of a vector of environmental variables.  To derive cost efficiency, the cost 
function and the inefficiency effects equation are estimated simultaneously.  The cost 
inefficiency term is specified as:   
 
=itu  itititit LISTSIZEFOREIGNSTATE 43210 δδδδδ ++++  
itt MSHHIREFORM 765 δδδ +++                           (5.13) 
 
where the environmental variables are identical to model 4 (M4) defined earlier 
(equation 5.12).  The inefficiency term itu is obtained by truncation (at zero) of the 
normal distribution with mean, itEδ .  Here δ  is the vector containing the coefficients 
associated with the seven environmental variables in equation (5.13) and Eit is the 
vector containing the numerical values associated with the seven environmental 
variables. 
 
Using this model, we can proceed from general to specific by imposing one or more 
restrictions.  For example, if 0δ has a nonzero value and the coefficients of all other 
variables in equation (5.13) are zero, then it provides the truncated model (M3) 
(equation 5.11).  If all elements of theδ -vector and all coefficients related to control 
variables are equal to zero, then the baseline model (M1) (equation 5.10) would be 
obtained.   
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5.3.5 Estimation of Scale Economies  
Apart from estimating cost efficiency, the estimation of a cost function also enables us 
to investigate how changes in bank outputs affect cost; that is, it allows us to estimate 
scale economies (scale elasticities) for banks.  According Baumol et al. (1982), the 
overall scale economies (SCALE), also called ray scale economies, can be measured in 
terms of the relative changes in costs attributable to an increase in output; namely, the 
inverse of the elasticity of cost with respect to output.  It is defined as follows: 
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where iQTC ln/ln ∂∂ is the partial derivative of the logarithm of the cost function with 
respect to logarithm of output i.  The sum of individual cost elasticites measures the 
proportional change in total cost due to a small proportional change in all of a bank’s 
output when all other factors are held constant.  It is should be noted here that the 
change in output alters the scale of output but not the composition of output bundles.  
The bank operates at decreasing, constant or increasing returns to scale depending on 
whether the elasticity is greater than, equal to or less than the unity, respectively.  In 
other words, if SCALE >1, then an equal proportionate rise in all outputs leads to a less 
than proportionate rise total costs, implying economies of scale.  If SCALE < 1, then 
total costs increase more than proportionately with the increase in outputs, implying 
diseconomies of scale.  Hence, banks operating under decreasing, or increasing returns 
to scale imply scale inefficiency.  However,  if SCALE = 1, then the bank operates at 
the optimal production level in the sense that it exhibits constant returns to scale.   
 
In our empirical work economies of scale can be measured by differentiating a specific 
interpretation of the translog cost function with respect to outputs.  For example, in the 
case of model 3 (equation 5.11), the economies of scale is given by: 
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5.4 Utilising DEA to Measure Cost Efficiency  
The SFA approach is a useful and powerful tool for determining efficiency frontiers and 
thereby estimating efficiency levels.  But a serious drawback associated with this 
approach is that the specifications of the cost function and error term may not be 
capable of reflecting the real characteristics of the industry.  For example, the 
inefficiency factor may not be distributed in terms of the half normal or truncated 
normal distribution.  Here the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) (non-parametric) 
model represents a more flexible approach for estimating efficiency because it does not 
involve explicit estimation of a bank’s cost function and the error term associated with it 
and thereby avoids the risk of mis-specification.  However, against this DEA is a 
purely deterministic model of cost efficiency and as such takes no account of potential 
random errors in the data.  Thus, the DEA approach is superior in terms of the 
specification problem while the SFA approach is superior in terms of the noise (that is, 
random error) problem.  Moreover, the efficiency scores obtained from different 
techniques contain different information which is important for policy analysis and 
decision making (Eisenbeis et al, 1999).  Therefore, we also employ two DEA models 
(traditional cost DEA and new cost DEA) as a complement to the SFA model employed 
in our study.  The two DEA models applied in our empirical analysis use the same 
efficiency concept (cost efficiency), the same sample of banks, the same specification of 
variables and the same time interval as the SFA approach used in our empirical analysis.  
By comparing these two approaches, the robustness and accuracy of the results can thus 
be used for methodological cross checking purposes.  
 
5.4.1 Traditional Cost DEA 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) was first developed by Charnes et al. (1978) under 
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the constant return to scale (CRS) assumption.  It was later extended to consider 
alternative sets of assumptions, such as variable returns to scale (VRS), cost 
minimisation (Färe et al., 1985) and profit maximisation (Lovell, 1993).  DEA is a 
nonparametric technique for generating a piecewise linear convex frontier which is 
formed by enveloping the decision making units (DMUs).  Under the DEA approach, 
cost efficiency refers to a bank which minimises the cost of producing a given set of 
output quantities, given the input prices it faces.  Following Färe et al. (1985), a 
sequence of linear programmes is applied to construct efficient cost frontiers from 
which the measures of cost efficiency are calculated for this study.  The variable 
returns to scale cost minimisation DEA model is defined in the following terms:  
 
      
nj
mixx
sryy
tosubject
xw
j
n
j
j
i
n
j
iji
r
n
j
rii
iixi
,,2,1,0
1
,,2,1,0
,,2,1,0
min
1
0
1
0
1
00,
K
K
K
=≥
=
=≤−
=≥−
∑
∑
∑
=
∗
=
=
∗
λ
λ
λ
λ
λ
                             (5.16) 
 
where n is the number of the bank; ∗0jx is the cost minimising vector of input quantities 
for the evaluated firm, given the vector of input prices 0jw and output levels 0ry .  
This constrained optimal minimisation is obtained from a linear combination of banks 
that produces at least as much of each of the outputs using the same or less amount of 
inputs as calculated for each bank in the sample.  If the hypothetical bank had the same 
input price vector as evaluated bank j, it would have a cost ∗00 jj xw .  In the case of the 
DEA approach, the variables for outputs and input prices are identical with the SFA 
model.  As mentioned earlier, the cost efficiency of evaluated banks is defined by 
measuring the distance of its observed cost point from an idealised cost frontier.  In 
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other words, the cost efficiency of the evaluated bank is calculated as the ratio of the 
minimum cost to the actual cost, that is, 
ijij
ijij
i xw
xwCE
∗
= .  The measure of cost 
efficiency is bounded between zero and one.  A cost efficiency of one represents a 
fully cost efficient bank;  (1-CE) represents the amount by which the bank could 
reduce its costs and still produce at least the same amount of output. 
 
5.4.2 New Cost DEA 
In the traditional cost efficiency DEA models (e.g. Fare et al., 1985), it is assumed that 
input prices are the same across all Decision Making Units (DMUs).  However, actual 
markets do not necessarily function under perfect competition and unit input prices 
might not be identical across DMUs.  Thus, as pointed out by Tone (2002) the 
traditional DEA cost efficiency model (equation 5.16) does not take account of the fact 
that costs can obviously be reduced by reducing the input factor prices.   To cite an 
obvious example, if two banks have the same inputs and outputs while the unit input 
prices for one bank are twice those of the other bank, then the total costs of the bank 
with the higher unit input prices will be greater than those of the bank with the lower 
unit input prices.  Now under the traditional DEA model the cost function is 
homogenous of degree one in input prices and the scaling factor cancels out in the cost 
efficiency ratio.   Thus, the two banks will be assigned the same measure of cost 
efficiency irrespective of the fact that they have significantly different input prices.  
This represents a serious drawback for assessing relative efficiency levels under the 
traditional DEA model.  This strange outcome is caused by the peculiar structure of the 
traditional DEA model which is exclusively focused on the technical efficiency of the 
two banks and cannot take account of variations in unit input prices between the banks.  
In order to avoid this shortcoming Tone (2002) proposed the New DEA Model under 
which the production technology is homogeneous of degree one in the total costs as 
distinct from being homogeneous of degree one in the input prices under the traditional 
DEA model.  This means that under the New DEA model banks with different input 
prices will return different measures of cost efficiency.  In particular, under the Tone 
(2002) model efficiency levels are determined in terms of the following linear 
programming problem:    
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where mRe∈ a row vector with all elements is equal to 1 and ijx = ( Tijijjj xwxw ),...,11 .  
Tone (2002) also assumes that the elements of ijx are denominated in homogeneous 
units in monetary terms, so that the sum of the elements of the vector ijx have meaning.  
In the traditional model, keeping the unit cost of bank j fixed at 0iw , we search for the 
optimal input mix *0x  for producing 0y .  In the new model, the optimal input mix 
∗
0x that produces the output 0y  can be found independently of the bank’s current unit 
price 0w .  Then, the new cost efficiency (NCE) is defined as NCE = xexe /
*
0 .  
 
In order to identify the returns to scale under which Chinese banks operate, we also 
employ the non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS) DEA model which extends the 
variable returns to scale (VRS) model (as given in equations 5.16 and/or 5.17) by 
relaxing the convexity condition 1
1
=∑
=
n
j
jλ  so that it becomes 10
1
≤≤∑
=
n
j
jλ .  Then we 
compare the estimated efficiency scores generated by the VRS model with those 
generated by the NIRS model.  If the cost efficiency scores are the same under the two 
different constraint sets then the scale inefficient banks will be operating under 
decreasing returns to scale.  Alternatively, if the two resulting measures are different 
then the bank will be deemed to operating under increasing returns to scale.  
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5.4.3 Second Stage Regression  
The non-parametric DEA model, unlike the SFA model, may be inappropriate for 
including control and environmental variables directly into the linear programming 
analysis on which DEA is based.  The inclusion of environmental variables directly 
into the DEA model requires that those variables are treated as conventional inputs or 
outputs prior to analysis.  However, environmental factors are, by definition, beyond 
the control of the bank.  Hence such a prior classification assumption is untenable.  In 
addition, it is problematic whether the control and environmental variables are fixed or 
semi-fixed as inputs or outputs in the DEA model.  DEA provides the radial efficiency 
measure which assumes that the inputs are shrinkable or the outputs are expandable.  
So holding the control and environmental variables constant in the calculation of the 
radial efficiency makes little sense.  Therefore, following Isik and Hassan (2003),  
Ariff and Can (2008) and Pasiouras (2008) we employ a two stage procedure to further 
explore the effects of the environmental variables on DEA cost efficiency.   
 
In the first stage, we employ DEA models which include only the traditional input 
prices and outputs to compute cost efficiency (that is, the environmental variables are 
excluded from the analysis).  In the second stage, we regress the cost efficiency scores 
on the environmental and other factors which potentially affect the computed DEA 
efficiency scores.  Many studies have used a censored Tobit regression rather than 
OLS regression to investigate the key determinants of banking efficiency (e.g., Maudos 
et al., 2002, Casu and Molyneux, 2003, and Weill, 2003).  This is because the Tobit 
regression takes into account the censored nature of the dependent variable (that is, cost 
efficiency estimates are bounded between zero and one).  Hence, unlike OLS the Tobit 
regression procedure returns efficient estimates of all parameters.  Therefore, we also 
use the Tobit regression procedure with a left censored bound of zero and right censored 
bound of one to regress cost efficiency scores against the set of environmental factors 
(ownership structure, bank size, market structure, etc.) defined earlier.  The second 
stage regression is specified as follows: 
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where the dependent variable itCE is the cost efficiency of the 
thi  bank calculated in the 
first stage.  The definitions of the independent variables on the right hand side of this 
equation are the same as those given earlier in the SFA model and are summarised in the 
discussion surrounding equation (5.12).  The results from this second stage regression 
enable one to analyse the potential determinants of cost efficiency, and are 
complementary to the SFA model M5 (equation (5.13)).  
 
5.5 Comparison of SFA and DEA  
As one would expect, SFA and DEA both have advantages and disadvantages.  The 
efficiency scores derived from different techniques contain different information.  
Thus, it is not necessary to achieve consensus on a single best frontier approach for 
measuring efficiency.  Instead, following Bauer et al. (1998), this study compares the 
preferred SFA model and DEA model by checking five consistency conditions for the 
efficiency measures.  Specifically, (1) the cost efficiency estimates derived from the 
different approaches should have comparable distributional properties for the efficiency 
scores (e.g. means, standard deviations, etc.); (2) the different frontier approaches 
should provide similar rankings for the efficiency scores; (3) the different approaches 
should be consistent in identifying which are the most and least efficient banks; (4) the 
efficiency scores generated by the different methods should be relatively stable over 
time, and (5) the estimated efficiency scores should be consistent with traditional 
non-frontier performance measures (e.g. the return on equity, the ratio of total operating 
cost to total assets, etc.).  The first three consistency conditions may be thought of as 
measuring the degree to which the different approaches are mutually identical.  
Conditions (4) and (5) may be thought of as measuring the degree to which the 
efficiencies estimated by the different techniques are consistent with reality or are 
believable (Bauer et al., 1998).  In addition, we also examine whether the different 
frontier models identify the same key determinants of cost efficiency.  This is helpful 
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in identifying the significant environmental (and/or other) factors which impact on bank 
efficiency scores.  If all of the consistency conditions are met, the results from the 
efficiency frontier models will be much more useful and reliable to decision and/or 
policy makers.    
 
5.6 Data  
Our sample is an unbalanced panel which covers 41 Chinese banks over the period from 
1994 to 2007, and totals 397 observations.  The sample comprises the big four 
state-owned banks, three policy banks, twelve national and regional joint-stock banks, 
sixteen city commercial banks and six foreign banks.  At the end of 2007, these 41 
banks owned almost 80% of total assets of Chinese banking institutions.  The fourteen 
year period on which our study is based corresponds to the period over which the 
Chinese government implemented vigorous banking reforms and is also, post-WTO 
accession.  These changes are expected to have a significant impact on Chinese 
banking performance.  The data are mainly drawn from the Almanac of China’s 
Finance and Banking issued by the China Finance Society (1994-2007) and 
BankScope–Fitch’s International Bank Database.  Additional data and double checks 
were made from other data sources, such as individual banks’ statutory annual financial 
reports, the China Banking Regulatory Commission’s database, the China Economic 
Information Network (www.cei.gov.cn), the China Statistical Yearbook and the China 
Labour Statistical Yearbook.    
 
This study adopts the intermediation approach in defining the outputs and inputs (price) 
of banking services (see Sealey and Lindley, 1977).  More specifically, Chinese banks 
collect deposits and use labour and fixed capital to transform these inputs into loans, 
investments and non-interest income.  Under this treatment, the outputs are specified 
as total loans (Q1), which include short term customer loans, medium and long term 
customer loans, trade bills, bills discounted, entrusted loans and impaired loans, but 
excludes loan loss reserves.  The other earning assets (Q2) are comprised of balances 
due from the central bank and other depository institutions, inter-bank loans, short term 
investments, long-term investments, trading securities and securities held under Repo 
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agreements, but exclude investment loss reserves.  The non-interest income (Q3) is 
comprised of net fees and commissions, gains on foreign exchange transactions, gains 
on investment and other operating income.  The inputs are specified as the total 
deposits plus other borrowed funds (X1) which include short and long term deposits, 
short and long term saving deposits, deposits from the central bank, deposits from 
commercial banks and other depository institutions, inter-bank funds purchased, 
securities sold under agreement of repurchase, government deposits, and short and long 
term bonds.  Total physical capital (X2) is the book value of total fixed assets less the 
book value of accumulated depreciation and labour input (X3) is proxied by the total 
number of employees40.  Data for state-owned and nationwide banks are complete.  
But data on the number of employees are not available for some city commercial banks 
and foreign banks in some years.  Hence, in years where data on the number of 
employees is not available, we estimate the number of employees by assuming that the 
growth rate of the number of employees is the same as the growth rate of the total assets 
for the affected banks41.  
 
The methods for measuring cost efficiency also require the total costs and the market 
prices of inputs for all banks.  Total costs include the costs of borrowed funds, deposits 
and wages and salaries and other operating expenses.  A major problem concerning 
price data is that banks do not often record prices paid for purchased inputs.  Instead 
they normally record the total expenditure on each input category.  However, it is 
normally possible to derive estimates of unit prices by taking the average prices of a 
broadly-defined group of inputs (Coelli et al., 2005).  The input prices are defined as 
the following three variables.  First is the price of deposits plus other borrowed funds 
(W1) which is calculated by the ratio of total interest expenses on borrowed funds to 
total borrowed funds.  Total interest expenses consist of interest paid on total deposits 
and interest on interbank borrowing.  Second is the price of physical capital (W2), also 
called the user cost of capital, which is defined as the ratio of other operating expenses 
                                                        
 
40 The measurement of the quantity of physical capital (assets) is quite difficult, because, unlike labour 
input, capital assets are a durable input used in the production process throughout the life of the asset.  It 
is typically assumed that the net book value of productive capital stock at any given time reflects the 
quantity of capital services used in production. See Isik and Hassan, (2002), Kumbhakar and Wang, (2007) 
and Kyj and Isik, (2008).  
41 This assumption is widely used and accepted in banking efficiency studies; see Altunbas, et al, (2001), 
Vander Vennet (2002) and Rezvanian and Mehdian (2002) and Fu and Heffernan (2007). 
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to the book value of fixed assets (net of depreciation).  Other operating expenses are 
calculated as the operating expenses less expenses on employees (that is, wages, salaries 
and other benefits provided to employees).  Last is the price of labour (W3). It is 
measured by the ratio of personnel expenses (that is, wages, salaries and other benefits 
paid to employees) to the number of employees.  Many of the banks included in our 
sample prepare their statutory published financial statements using Chinese Accounting 
Standards (CAS).  The CAS have been developed only in recent years and are 
consistent with the accounting standards issued by the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB).  Under CAS and IASB standards statutory published 
financial statements must include details of the total remuneration paid to employees 
(that is, wages, salaries and other benefits paid to employees).  However, early in our 
sample period banks were not required to prepare their published statutory financial 
statements in accordance with CAS and IASB standards.  This often meant that 
personnel employee expense figures were not available in the early years of the sample 
period.  Hence, when the personnel employee expense figure is not available from a 
bank’s financial statements we assume that the growth rate in the unit price of labour 
matches the growth rate in the average wage rate for the Chinese finance sector42.  
Detailed information about average wages and salaries in the Chinese finance sector is 
published in the China Statistical Yearbook and the China Labour Statistical Yearbook.  
Hence, data from these two yearbooks was used to estimate the unit price of labour for 
all missing years.  All data are in real 1994 terms and they have been converted using 
the GDP implicit price deflator.  Data relating to input price and output variables are 
summarised in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2 shows the mean, standard deviation and other statistics of the total costs 
across the 41 banks at various points in time as well as the equivalent statistics for the 
period from 1994 until 2007.  Thus, the first element of the first row of Table 5.2 gives 
the average (mean) total cost across the sample banks for the year 1994 (RMB 75,985 
million).  The second element of the first row gives the standard deviation of the costs 
across the sample banks, also for the year 1994 (150,239 million).  The next four 
                                                        
 
42 Other studies such as Fu and Heffernan (2007), Ariff and Can (2007) adopt the average wage paid by 
financial institutions as a proxy for the price of labor.   
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elements of the first row give the equivalent statistics for the years 2001 and 2007.  
Thus, the average of total costs has decreased from RMB 75,985 million in 1994 to 
RMB 23,818 million in 2007 or by about 320% over our sample period.  Finally the 
last four elements of the first row summarise the average total cost (RMB 24,584 
million), the standard deviation of the total costs (RMB 65,577 million) the minimum 
total cost (RMB 13 million) and the maximum total cost (RMB 633,080 million) across 
all 41 banks for the entire from 1994 until 2007.  The other entries in this table are to 
be similarly interpreted.  
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Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics of Input Price and Output Variables  
Variables  1994   2001   2007   1994-2007    
  Mean St. Dev  Mean St. Dev  Mean St. Dev  Mean St. Dev Min Max 
Total Cost (TC)*  75985 150329  14111 28171  23818 45108  24584 65577 13 633080 
Total loans (Q1)*  339386 456490  249922 489596  358403 639552  296686 530281 182 2572235 
Total other earning assets (Q2)*  221020 334698  137504 286640  291550 622114  176090 377239 77 2887446 
Non-interest income (Q3)*  3192 5077  1387 2571  3675 8732  2270 4863 1 43680 
Price of funds (W1)  0.0767 0.0570  0.0252 0.0114  0.0238 0.0127  0.0331 0.0311 0.0052 0.2421 
Price of physical capital (W2)  0.6541 0.2899  0.3619 0.1347  0.7116 0.3213  0.5612 0.5084 0.0852 6.9304 
Price of labour (W3)*   0.0333 0.0189  0.0689 0.0336  0.1185 0.0533  0.0736 0.0441 0.0114 0.2611 
Total assets*  691863 931372  417161 821327  670886 1277010  513063 958968 291 5465969 
Notes all financial values are inflation-adjusted to the base year 1994 
* Unit: RMB one million  
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In addition to the above input price and output variables, this thesis also employs a 
variety of control and environmental variables to account for heterogeneity in the 
sample and to explain differences across the cost efficiency estimates.  The first of 
these is the total equity of the individual banks and this is used to control for different 
risk preferences across banks.  The quality of output is proxied by the gross monetary 
value of nonperforing loans (that is before any write-offs).  The time trend is defined 
as follows: T=1 for 1994, T=2 for 1995,……, T=14 for 2007.  This proxies for 
aggregate technical progress across time for the banks included in our sample.  
 
As previously noted we also employ several environmental variables in our empirical 
analysis.  Hence, we classify a bank as stated-owned when government agencies 
control at least 50% of its total capital.  Domestic private banks are defined as those 
banks whose private domestic ownership is greater than 50% of total capital.  Banks 
are classified as foreign banks if foreign institutions and/or shareholders control at least  
50% of the affected bank’s total capital.  Moreover, the domestic private bank dummy 
is dropped from the regression equations employed in our analysis in which case the 
constant term in the affected regressions captures any domestic private bank effects.  
Bank size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets.  The 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), the proxy for market concentration, is defined as 
the sum of the squared asset market shares of all banks.  The HHI is slightly greater 
than zero for a perfectly competitive market and assumes a unit value for a monopoly.  
Market share is defined as the ratio of an individual bank’s total assets to the total assets 
of all banks in a given year.  Moreover, we define the period from 1994 until 2001 as 
the pre-deregulatory period (the first reform stage) and the period from 2002 until 2007 
as the post-deregulatory period (the second reform stage).  Table 5.3 summarises 
descriptive statistics of all control and environmental variables across the 41 banks 
covering the period of our analysis from 1994 until 2007. 
 
The first and second elements of the first row in the control variables panel give the 
average (mean) of equity (RMB 24,592 million) and the standard deviation of equity 
(RMB 55,867 million) across the 41 banks over the period from 1994 until 2007.  The 
last two elements of the first row summarise the minimum and maximum values of 
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equity over the period from 1994 until 2007.  Thus equity value ranges from RMB 79 
to 571,795 million across all 41 banks for the period from 1994 until 2007. The 
environmental variables panel shows that the mean of the dummy variable for state 
owned banks is 0.5202 and the standard deviation is 0.5002 over the period from 1994 
until 2007.  As previously noted, our analysis is based on a total of 397 banks and so, 
the mean value for the state-owned bank dummy variable implies that our sample is 
comprised of 0.5202 × 397 = 206 sate-owned banks and 397 – 206 = 191 domestic 
private and foreign-owned banks.  The other entries in table 5.3 are to be similarly 
interpreted. 
 
Table 5.3 Descriptive Statistics of the Bank’s Control and Environmental Variables  
Variable Description   Mean St. Dev Min Max 
The control variables      
Z1 Equity  24592 55867 79 571795 
Z2 Nonperforming Loans  52723 128523 0 644503 
Z3(T) Time trend  8.751 3.758 1 14 
The environmental variables      
STATE Dummy variable for state-owned banks  0.5202 0.5002 0 1 
FOREIGN Dummy variable for foreign banks  0.4116 0.4931 0 1 
PRIVATE Dummy variable for foreign banks (as a reference group)  0.0682 0.2524 0 1 
SIZE Log of total bank assets  5.7102 5.9818 2.4634 6.7377 
REFORM Dummy variable for second stage reform (2002-2007)  0.5592 0.4971 0 1 
HHI 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
(the sum of the squared asset 
market shares of all banks) 
 0.1489 0.0307 0.1133 0.2405 
MS Asset market share   0.0353 0.0664 0.00002 0.3460 
LIST Dummy variable for listed banks  0.1607 0.3677 0 1 
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5.7 Summary and Conclusion  
This chapter summarises the methodological approaches that will be taken to estimate 
cost efficiency and scale economies in the Chinese banking sector over the period from 
1994 until 2007.  We employ both the SFA and DEA methodologies to estimate the 
cost efficiency of Chinese banks and then use methodological cross checking in order to 
assess the robustness of the results obtained.  We commenced this Chapter by outlining 
a baseline cost minimisation model, M1, which uses the SFA technique to determine the 
relative cost efficiency of firms (see equation (5.10)).  Then we discussed four 
alternative SFA cost models which can be used to capture heterogeneity across the 
sample banks on which our empirical analysis is based.  The translog functional form 
will be used to estimate cost functions for the Chinese banks comprising our sample.  
Scale economies will be estimated by differentiating the estimated cost function with 
respect to output.  With regard to the DEA methodology, we use both the traditional 
DEA cost and New DEA cost models to estimate the relative efficiency of banks in the 
Chinese banking sector.  Moreover, information on returns to scale for Chinese banks 
can be derived from the non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS) DEA models.  We also 
employ the Tobit regression model and efficiency scores computed using the DEA 
models, to further explore the possible drivers of Chinese banking efficiency.  
Furthermore, following Bauer et al. (1998), this chapter proposes five conditions 
through which to assess the potential consistency of the SFA and DEA models.  We 
argue that if all five consistency conditions are met, then the results from the different 
efficiency frontier models will be more useful and reliable to decision and/or policy 
makers.  
 
This chapter also describes the variables and the dataset used in our empirical analysis.  
We use the intermediation approach to define the outputs, inputs and their associated 
unit prices on which the estimation of the cost functions for Chinese banking 
institutions will be based.  Moreover, three control variables (equity, nonperforming 
loans and time trend) are included in some SFA models in order to control for such 
factors as the risk preferences of bank’s senior management, output quality and potential 
changes in technology.  Furthermore, five environmental variables are used in our 
regression models as potential drivers of banking efficiency: ownership structure, size, 
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market structure, banking deregulation and market discipline.  Our empirical analysis 
is based on a sample of 41 Chinese banks over the period from 1994 until 2007.  At the 
end of 2007 these 41 banks represent roughly 80% of the total assets of Chinese 
banking institutions.  The following two chapters will report the empirical results 
obtained from analysing the efficiency of these banks.  
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Chapter 6 Empirical Results: A Comparison of SFA 
and DEA 
 
6.1 Introduction  
In order to provide more accurate and useful information for regulatory policy purposes, 
it is important to have reliable methods for measuring banking efficiency.  The 
previous chapter outlines the stochastic frontier approach (SFA) and the data 
envelopment approach (DEA) methodologies used in this study to evaluate Chinese 
banking cost efficiency over the period from 1994 until 2007.  Because considerable 
systematic differences may exist across banks, a number of well-established SFA cost 
specifications are employed to estimate Chinese banks’ cost efficiency.  In addition, 
non-parametric methods (traditional DEA and New DEA models) will also be used to 
estimate banking efficiency.  This chapter provides part of the main empirical results 
of this thesis and aims to report and compare the results from the various efficiency 
methodologies summarised in the preceding chapter.  It is expected that accounting for 
heterogeneity across banks is important for the SFA methodology and methodological 
cross-checking will provide robust information on the efficiency of the Chinese banking 
sector.  
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.2 reports the maximum 
likelihood parameter estimates for the stochastic frontier cost functions discussed in the 
previous chapter.  Section 6.3 further analyses some other key estimation results for all 
five specifications of the cost frontier in order to highlight the effects of heterogeneity 
on the estimated parameters.  Section 6.4 explains the structural tests we employed to 
obtain the best-specified cost frontier model that estimates efficiency levels for the 
banks under study.  Subsequently, in Sections 6.5 and 6.6 we compare efficiency 
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levels and the ranks of efficiency scores across five alternative SFA specifications.  
This comparison helps shed light on the effects of sample heterogeneity on bank 
efficiency scores.  
 
Section 6.7 investigates the robustness of the cost efficiency scores derived from the 
preferred SFA, traditional DEA, and New DEA models.  The rationale for using 
different methods is well described by Berger and Humphrey (1997), who suggest that 
policy and research issues relying upon bank efficiency scores may be more 
convincingly addressed if more than one frontier technique is employed to demonstrate 
the robustness of the results obtained.  Hence, in the spirit of Bauer et al. (1998) we 
examine five consistency conditions.  Specifically, we deduce whether the efficiency 
estimates are consistent regarding the properties of the distribution of the efficiency 
scores, the rankings of efficiency scores, the identification of best and worst banks, 
stability over time and the relation to standard non-frontier performance measures.  
Finally, section 6.8 concludes this chapter. 
 
6.2 Cost Frontier Estimates  
The five SFA models discussed in the last chapter are used to estimate the cost 
stochastic frontier and cost efficiency of the 41 Chinese banks for which we have 
(unbalanced) data over the period form 1994 until 2007.  All the stochastic frontier 
models are estimated u          
sing maximum likelihood techniques, based on the computer program FRONTIER 4.1 
(Coelli, 1996).  The maximum likelihood estimates of parameters of the stochastic 
frontier cost functions are presented in Table 6.1.  Model 1 contains parameter 
estimates of the translog function (without control and environmental variables) and 
where efficiency follows a half-normal distribution.  In Model 2, efficiency is assumed 
to follow a truncated normal distribution.  Model 3 incorporates three control variables 
in the cost function (equity level, non-performing loans and time trend).  Model 4 
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allows banks’ production technology to be af fected by environmental factors by 
incorporating these environmental factors (e.g. ownership, bank size and market share) 
into the deterministic kernel of the banks’ cost frontiers.  Model 5 introduces 
environmental factors as explanatory variables of cost efficiency.  Before proceeding 
to analyse the parameter estimates of the various cost functions, it is worth noting that 
although the translog cost function is more flexible than other functional forms, 
multicollinearity may exist among the variables thereby leading to inconsistent 
parameter estimates43.  However, multicollinearity may not be a severe problem when 
efficiency scores are used purely for forecasting purposes.  
 
The estimated individual coefficients in the stochastic frontier given by the translog 
functional form are due to many interactions between output and input price variables 
but unfortunately, they are not directly interpretable unlike the Cobb-Douglas cost 
function where all parameters have a clearly specified meaning.  Moreover, in this 
study the total costs and all the continuous explanatory variables have been divided by 
their respective sample means before taking logarithms 44 . This normalisation of 
variables permits the first-order parameters of the translog function to be directly 
interpreted as estimates of cost elasticities evaluated at the point of approximation.  
Table 6.1 shows that the parameter estimates of output quantities and input price terms 
are positive and highly significantly different from zero across all five model 
specifications.  This suggests that the cost function is non-decreasing in outputs (Q) 
and in input prices (W) which are the theoretical requirements for a valid cost function.  
Therefore, the domain of applicability for the estimated parameters is at least congruent 
with the data points.  In addition, the empirical estimates of the translog cost functions 
                                                        
 
43  If the multicollinearity problem is mainly created by a strong positive correlation between the second 
order terms in the translog form of the cost function, maximum likelihood estimates are still unbiased and 
efficient.  But in such circumstances multicollinearity problems cause the estimated standard error of the 
coefficients to be large leading to small values for the t-ratios. This in turn biases results towards 
accepting the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal to zero (see Gujarati, 2003 for more details).   
44 Since the mean values of variables are considered as the Taylor series expansion point for the translog 
function, all variables should be divided by their mean in order to locate a correct evaluation point before 
estimating the translog function.  
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summarised in Table 6.1 are compatible with our intuition since the output and input 
price variables have the expected signs (both positive) and this also suggests that 
multicollinearity issues are not a problem with our empirical estimates of the cost 
functions.  
Table 6.1 Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates for Stochastic Frontier Cost 
Functions 
Variables Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant 0β  -.2289*** (0.0347) 
-0.1944*** 
(0.0177) 
-0.2515*** 
(0.0239) 
-3.6257*** 
(0.9652) 
-0.2173*** 
(0.0253) 
lnQ1 1β  0.6431*** (0.0218) 
0.6419*** 
(0.0216) 
0.5484*** 
(0.0261) 
0.3429*** 
(0.0582) 
0.5526*** 
(0.0264) 
lnQ2 2β  0.3101*** (0.0253) 
0.3117*** 
(0.0248) 
0.2693*** 
(0.0246) 
0.1600** 
(0.0371) 
0.2941*** 
(0.0250) 
lnQ3 3β  0.0524*** (0.0148) 
0.0536*** 
(0.0148) 
0.0385*** 
(0.0140) 
0.0316*** 
(0.0136) 
0.0314** 
(0.0140) 
ln(W1/W3) 1χ  0.7903*** (0.0156) 
0.7919*** 
(0.0155) 
0.7073*** 
(0.0207) 
0.7022*** 
(0.0214) 
0.7259*** 
()0.0211 
ln(W2/W3) 2χ  0.1074*** (0.0206) 
0.1075*** 
(0.0203) 
0.1298*** 
(0.0190) 
0.1413*** 
(0.0185) 
0.1246*** 
(0.0195) 
0.5 lnQ1lnQ1 11ϕ  0.1016*** (0.0241) 
0.1037*** 
(0.0238) 
0.1037 
(0.0639) 
0.1072* 
(0.0629) 
0.1013 
(0.0648) 
lnQ1lnQ2 12ϕ  -0.0615** (0.0276) 
-0.0640** 
(0.0267) 
-0.1043*** 
(0.0371) 
-0.0789** 
(0.0365) 
-0.1288*** 
(0.0368) 
lnQ1lnQ3 13ϕ  -0.0152 (0.0093) 
-0.0156* 
(0.0092) 
0.0067 
(0.0204) 
-0.0067 
(0.0197) 
0.0148 
(0.0207) 
0.5lnQ2lnQ2 22ϕ  0.0664* (0.0400) 
0.0689* 
(0.0385) 
0.1108*** 
(0.0381) 
0.0784** 
(0.0379) 
0.1067*** 
(0.0370) 
lnQ2lnQ3 23ϕ  -0.0021 (0.0176) 
-0.0022 
(0.0174) 
-0.0206 
(0.0160) 
-0.0145 
(0.0155) 
-0.0098 
(0.0154) 
0.5lnQ3lnQ3 33ϕ  0.0141 (0.0123) 
0.0145 
(0.0121) 
0.0112 
(0.0120) 
0.0074 
(0.0117) 
0.0070 
(0.0112) 
0.5ln(W1/W3)ln(W1/W3) 11η  0.0412 (0.0240) 
0.0403* 
(0.0237) 
0.0605* 
(0.0337) 
0.0410 
(0.0327) 
0.0656* 
(0.0345) 
ln(W1/W3) ln(W2/W3) 12η  -0.0359* (0.0309) 
-0.0363 
(0.0305) 
-0.0293 
(0.0334) 
0.0057 
(0.0324) 
-0.0253 
(0.0335) 
0.5ln(W2/W3)ln(W2/W3) 22η  -0.0077 (0.0377) 
-0.0071 
(0.0374) 
0.0184 
(0.0338) 
-0.0288 
(0.0337) 
0.0101 
(0.0343) 
lnQ1ln(W1/W3) 11ι  0.0223 (0.0208) 
0.0213 
(0.0201) 
0.0584* 
(0.0347) 
0.0468 
(0.0338) 
0.0480 
(0.0344) 
lnQ1ln(W2/W3) 12ι  -0.0034 (0.0216) 
-0.0027 
(0.0207) 
-0.0046 
(0.0304) 
0.0199 
(0.0294) 
0.0097 
(0.0313) 
lnQ2ln(W1/W3) 21ι  0.0118 (0.0282) 
0.0120 
(0.0272) 
0.0431 
(0.0345) 
0.0113 
(0.0326) 
0.0238 
(0.0323) 
lnQ2ln(W2/W3) 22ι  -0.0304 (0.0338) 
-0.0281 
(0.0326) 
-0.0684** 
(0.0329) 
-0.0442 
(0.0315) 
-0.0349 
(0.0323) 
lnQ3ln(W1/W3) 31ι  -0.0140 (0.0135) 
-0.0143 
(0.0134) 
-0.0282 
(0.0176) 
-0.0217 
(0.0165) 
-0.0223 
(0.0167) 
lnQ3ln(W2/W3) 32ι  0.0095 (0.0165) 
0.0100 
(0.0163) 
0.0221 
(0.0151) 
0.0221 
(0.0143) 
0.0155 
(0.0151) 
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Table 6.1  Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates for Stochastic Frontier Cost 
Functions (continued) 
Variables Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Control variables       
lnZ1 1ρ  - - 0.0343 (0.0213) 
0.0384* 
(0.0208) 
0.0361* 
(0.0211) 
lnZ2 2ρ  - - 0.0942*** (0.0120) 
0.0796*** 
(0.0117) 
0.0876*** 
(0.0121) 
T 3ρ  - - 0.0032 (0.0043) 
-0.0231*** 
(0.0117) 
-0.0024 
(0.0044) 
0.5lnZ1lnZ1 11ξ  - - 0.0083 (0.0192) 
0.0148 
(0.0189) 
0.0067 
(0.0199) 
lnZ1lnZ2 12ξ  - - 0.0002 (0.0115) 
-0.0030 
(0.0111) 
-0.0070 
(0.0118) 
lnZ1T 13ξ  - - -0.0252*** (0.0076) 
-0.0136* 
(0.0077) 
-0.0206*** 
(0.0078) 
0.5LnZ2lnZ2 22ξ  - - 0.0141*** (0.0025) 
0.0109*** 
(0.0026) 
0.0098*** 
(0.0028) 
lnZ2T 23ξ  - - 0.0068** (0.0031) 
0.0012 
(0.0032) 
0.0008 
(0.0035) 
0.5lnZ3T 33ξ  - - 0.0002 (0.0024) 
0.0010 
(0.0027) 
-0.0004 
(0.0024) 
lnZ1 lnQ1 11ψ  - - 0.0092 (0.0366) 
-0.0199 
(0.0375) 
0.0125 
(0.0373) 
lnZ1lnQ2 12ψ  - - 0.0309 (0.0324) 
0.0351 
(0.0323) 
0.0352 
(0.0327) 
lnZ1lnQ3 13ψ  - - -0.0114 (0.0200) 
0.0002 
(0.0194) 
-0.0226 
(0.0202) 
LnZ2lnQ1 21ψ  - - -0.0179 (0.0138) 
-0.0096 
(0.0134) 
-0.0086 
(0.0145) 
lnZ2lnQ2 22ψ  - - -0.0020 (0.0115) 
-0.0027 
(0.0112) 
0.0066 
(0.0120) 
lnZ2lnQ3 23ψ  - - 0.0027 (0.0065) 
0.0068 
(0.0061) 
0.0010 
(0.0066) 
T lnQ1 31ψ  - - 0.0073 (0.0084) 
0.0088 
(0.0081) 
0.0132 
(0.0088) 
TlnQ2 32ψ  - - 0.0077 (0.0078) 
0.0006 
(0.0074) 
0.0074 
(0.0079) 
TlnQ3 33ψ  - - -0.0017 (0.0053) 
0.0000 
(0.0049) 
-0.0012 
(0.0053) 
lnZ1ln(W1/W3) 11θ  - - -0.0784*** (0.0293) 
-0.0500* 
(0.0283) 
-0.0616** 
(0.0298) 
lnZ1ln(W2/W3) 12θ  - - 0.0390 (0.0301) 
0.0194 
(0.0293) 
0.0266 
(0.0305) 
lnZ2ln(W1/W3) 21θ  - - 0.0106 (0.0104) 
0.0098 
(0.0101) 
0.0099 
(0.0110) 
lnZ2ln(W2/W3) 22θ  - - 0.0014 (0.0092) 
-0.0134 
(0.0094) 
-0.0066 
(0.0097) 
Tln(W1/W3) 31θ  - - 0.0005 (0.0069) 
0.0020 
(0.0067) 
0.0032 
(0.0074) 
Tln(W2/W3) 32θ  - - 0.0030 (0.0063) 
0.0056 
(0.0063) 
0.0023 
(0.0066) 
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Table 6.1  Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates for Stochastic Frontier Cost 
Functions (continued) 
Variables Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Environmental 
variables 
      
state-owned banks '1δ  -  - - -0.0209 (0.0257) - 
foreign banks '2δ  - - - -0.2591*** (0.0732) - 
size '3δ  - - - 0.3156*** (0.0861) - 
listed banks '4δ  - - - -0.0116 (0.0299) - 
deregulation '5δ  - - - 0.1114*** (0.0340) - 
HHI '6δ  - - - -1.8682 (1.2535) - 
market share '7δ  - - - -3.6257 (0.9652) - 
intercept 0δ  - - - - 2.2074*** (0.5199) 
state-owned banks 1δ  - - - - -0.2516** (0.1065) 
foreign banks 2δ  - - - - -0.1061*** (0.2899) 
size 3δ  - - - - -0.3563*** (0.1031) 
listed banks 4δ  - - - - -0.0066 (0.0857) 
deregulation 5δ  - - -- - 1.2117** (0.5284) 
HHI 6δ  - - - - -1.5270 (1.2195) 
market share 7δ  - - - - -7.2047*** (2.4588) 
Notes: 1. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.  
2. Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.  
 
The coefficient estimate of the total loans (Q1) in Model 5 suggests that, on average, a 
1% increase in the amount of loans will increase costs by about 0.55%.  Similarly, the 
cost elasticity with respect to other earning assets (Q2) is 0.29 in Model 5, suggesting 
that a 1% increase in other earning assets will raise total costs by 0.29%.  Also, we 
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observe that the magnitude of the coefficient of non-interest income (Q3) is significantly 
smaller than the estimated coefficients for Q1 and Q2, implying that the amount of 
non-interest income does not have a significant impact on total costs.  This may be 
because off-balance activities (represented by non-interest income) accounts for only a 
small proportion of the output portfolio in the Chinese banking sector.  The estimated 
cost elasticity with respect to total borrowed funds (W1) is relatively high when 
compared to the other two input prices (W2 and W3), being in the range of 0.7022 to 
0.7919 across the five models.  The results indicate that total costs are very sensitive to 
the price of borrowed funds and suggest that, on average, a 1% increase in the price of 
borrowed funds will raise total costs by about 0.7% to 0.8%, depending on the model.  
The coefficient of the price of physical capital (W2) captures the share of costs 
attributed to physical capital, which ranges between 0.1% and 0.14% depending on the 
specification adopted 45 . Moreover, we also observe that the coefficient of 
non-performing loans (Z2) has a positive sign and is significantly different from zero in 
Models 3, 4 and 5, This implies that larger non-performing loans are related to higher 
costs.  However, the coefficient of equity (Z1) and time trend (T) are not significant in 
all models.  This result suggests that the level of equity and the rate of technological 
change may not directly affect banking costs.  Moreover, in Model 4, which includes 
all environmental factors in the deterministic kernel, most parameter estimates 
associated with the environmental factors are not statistically significant, implying that 
these variables have little influence on banking costs.  
 
6.3 Key Estimation Results  
Table 6.2 summarises some key information besides the parameters estimates for our 
five cost frontiers.  In particular, the parameters determining the shape and location of 
                                                        
 
45 Labour price coefficient (W3) can be recovered by using the linear homogeneity restriction, calculated 
by 1- 1χ - 2χ  and is similar in magnitude to the physical capital price.     
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the inefficiency distribution are shown in the first three columns of the table.  The 
inefficiency location parameter, µ, is significantly different from zero for environmental 
factors in error specification (M5).  This may be explained by the fact that we 
introduce heterogeneity into the efficiency distribution for this model.  However, 
estimates of µ in alternative models are not significantly different from zero at the 5% 
level.  The γ parameters corresponding to the estimated proportion of bank inefficiency 
in the composed total error term are significantly different from zero in both the 
baseline model (M1) and all alternative models.  This parameter shows high values 
(close to unity) in the models (M2, M3, M4 and M5) which account for heterogeneity, 
revealing that most of the variation in observed costs from the frontier are due to bank 
inefficiency.  The difference between the γ coefficients for Models 4 and 5 is most 
likely explained by the way in which the environmental factors are included in these 
two models.  In addition, the magnitude of the variance parameter σ2 in Models 2, 3, 4 
and 5 is larger when compared to the baseline specification (Model 1).  
 
Table 6.2 Key Estimation Results  
Model 
specification 
µ γ σ2 log likelihood 
LR test of one-sided 
error 
Baseline  (M1) 0 0.5115*** 0.0557*** 88.8902 2.4076 (3.841) 
Truncated (M2) -6.9109* 0.9637*** 0.7414* 91.6750 7.977 (5.991) 
Controlled (M3) -7.4554* 0.9821*** 0.8376* 164.3368 26.2449(5.991) 
Kernel (M4) -0.8215 0.9888*** 0.1001 185.0729 36.2558 (5.991) 
Error effects (M5) 2.2074*** 0.8639*** 0.1237*** 175.1729 47.9171(16.919) 
Notes: 1. 222
vu σσσ += ; )/( 222 vuu σσσγ += ; 
2. χ2 critical values for 5% significance level are in the parentheses; 
3. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
 
The logarithmic values of the likelihood function, a frequently used criterion of better 
statistical properties of an econometric model estimated though the maximum 
likelihood technique, are presented in the fourth column of Table 6.2.  We find that the 
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log-likelihood value for Models 3, 4 and 5 are higher than the baseline (M1) and 
truncated specifications (M2), suggesting that including a set of explanatory variables in 
the specification to account for heterogeneity improves the fit significantly.  The last 
column in Table 6.2 reports the results of one sided log-likelihood ratio (LR) tests of the 
standard response function (OLS) versus the full frontier model.  The null hypothesis 
in this test is γ = 0 versus the alternative of γ > 0.  If the null hypothesis is accepted, 
this could indicate that 2uσ  and δi are zero and hence that inefficiency effects in the 
cost function are not present, leaving a specification with parameters that can be 
appropriately estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) (Coeli, 1996).  If, however, 
the null hypothesis is rejected, this could suggest that a standard mean response function 
is not an adequate representation of the data.  In the case of the baseline model (M1), 
the null hypothesis is accepted at the 5% level of significance, suggesting that the 
stochastic frontier approach (SFA) provides an inappropriate specification for Chinese 
banking data.  However, in the case of alternative models, the null hypothesis is 
rejected in favour of the stochastic frontier cost function.  Therefore, the results of the 
baseline model should be viewed with caution or even perhaps discarded and the results 
of the alternative models (M2, M3, M4 and M5) which do account for heterogeneity 
appear to provide a more faithful fit to the data of the Chinese banks that is available to 
us.    
 
6.4 Model Specification Tests  
In order to reach the best-specified cost frontier model, we have conducted generalised 
likelihood ratio tests.  These tests provide a convenient way to check whether a 
reduced (restricted) model provides the same fit as a general (unrestricted) model (see 
Appendix 1 for further details).  Table 6.3 presents the steps and results of the 
log-likelihood tests which we conducted.  The first column of the table lists the 
specifications tested.  The second column presents the restriction imposed under the 
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null hypothesis.  The third column reports the value of the log likelihood function for 
the given specification.  The fourth column shows the calculated log-likelihood ratio 
test statistic.  The fifth column gives the critical value for the log-likelihood ratio test 
statistic.  The last column reports the test outcome, that is whether the null hypothesis 
is rejected or accepted or whether the imposed restriction is valid or not.  
 
In Table 6.3, the first step is to test the half-normal model (M1) against the truncated 
normal model (M2). The null hypothesis is that the model which assumes the 
inefficiency term follows a half-normal distribution is better than the model which 
assumes that the inefficiency term follows a truncated normal distribution.  This is 
equivalent to the restriction δ0 = 0.  When this restriction is imposed on the truncated 
normal model, the log-likelihood value reduces to 88.890 (M1) from 91.675 (M2).  
The generalized log likelihood ratio test statistic turns out to be 5.57, which is greater 
than the χ2 critical value at the 5% level with one degree of freedom.  Therefore, we 
reject the null hypothesis of δ0 = 0, suggesting that the truncated-normal distribution 
model is more compatible with the data than the half-normal distribution model.  
 
The second step is to compare the model specifications including different combinations 
of control variables to reach the most appropriate specification in this step.  The 
unrestricted model in this step includes all three control variables in the cost function 
(financial capital, asset quality and time trend).  Based on the first step decision, this 
model is estimated by assuming the inefficiency term follows a truncated normal 
distribution.  
 
First, we test the model specifications which drop only one control variable against the 
unrestricted model.  At this point, there are three null hypotheses to be tested.  The 
first is that the specification of the cost function without time parameters gives a better 
fit to the data than that of the cost function which includes all the control variables, that 
is setting all the coefficients associated with the time trend to be equal to zero.  The 
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second null hypothesis is that the cost function specification without the non-performing 
loans parameters is more compatible with the data than the unrestricted model.  The 
third null hypothesis states that the specification of the model without equity parameters 
is more compatible with the data than the unrestricted model.  As Table 6.3 shows, the 
value of the generalised log likelihood ratio statistics for all three cases is larger than the 
critical value.  Thus, all three null hypotheses are rejected at the 5% level of 
significance.  This means that the model which includes all three control variables is 
again the dominant specification when compared to the models which include only two 
of the control variables.  Second, the unrestricted model will be compared with some 
alternative models which include only one control variable.  Again, three null 
hypotheses are tested.  The first null hypothesis is that the model including only the 
equity level is more is more compatible with the data than the unrestricted model.  The 
next null hypothesis is that the model including only non-performing loans is more is 
more compatible with the data than the unrestricted model.  The third and final null 
hypothesis states that the model including only the time trend is more compatible with 
the data than the unrestricted model.  All three null hypotheses are rejected at the 5% 
level of significance according to the log-likelihood ratio statistics.  So the unrestricted 
model is a statistically more significant model than any of the restricted models.  Last, 
we compare the unrestricted model with the model excluding all three variables, which 
is the truncated normal distribution model (M2).  In this case, the null hypothesis states 
that the truncated model without any control variables is more compatible with the data 
than the unrestricted model, that is all the coefficients associated with the equity, 
non-performing loans and time trend data are equal to zero.  Again, the log-likelihood 
ratio test rejects the null hypothesis in favour of the unrestricted model.  Thus, based 
on the above results we find that the control variables have significant effects on total 
costs and should be included in the cost function.  Therefore, the most appropriately 
specified model up to this stage of our analysis is the truncated model including all three 
control variables (M3).    
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The third step is to examine whether including the environmental variables in the model 
specification has significant explanatory power.  The tests are made by comparing the 
model including the environmental variables in the deterministic kernel of the frontier 
(M4) and/or in the distribution of the inefficiency term (M5) with the truncated model 
including all control variables (M3).  Model 3 excludes the environmental factors from 
the analysis and thus becomes a special case of Model 4 or Model 5 in which all the 
coefficients associated with the environmental variables are equal to zero.  The null 
hypotheses are that the specified truncated model including the control variables but 
excluding the environmental variables is more compatible with the data than the models 
which include both the control and environmental variables.  In the above cases, the 
log-likelihood ratio test statistics are 41.472 and 27.67, respectively, which are both 
larger than the relevant critical values of χ2 at the 5% level of significance. Thus we 
reject both the null hypotheses and conclude that the environmental factors should not 
be ignored in the study of Chinese banking efficiency. 
 
The question of whether the environmental variables should be treated as explanatory 
variables in cost function (M4) or as determinants of cost inefficiency (M5) is not 
directly answered by the generalised log likelihood ratio test. These two model 
specifications are not nested and hence no set of restrictions can be imposed which 
allow a test of one specification against the other.  Therefore, it is difficult to provide 
an unequivocal assessment as to whether the stochastic cost function specification M4 
or the stochastic cost function specification M5 is more compatible with the Chinese 
banking data that is available to us.     
 
On the basis of the above empirical results, however, we do find that sample 
heterogeneity significantly influences stochastic cost frontier estimation.  Thus, any 
model of Chinese banking efficiency which is used for policy purposes should explicitly 
account for sample heterogeneity by introducing control variables and/or environmental 
variables as part of its arguments.  Otherwise it would be misspecified, leading to 
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inappropriate parameter and efficiency estimates and more importantly, potentially 
flawed policy decisions.  However, the selection between a model considering the 
environmental variables as a part of the deterministic kernel of the frontier and a model 
considering the environmental variables as determinants of cost efficiency is a difficult 
issue.  Here, we prefer the model that treats environmental variables as explanatory 
variables of cost efficiency.  The reasons for this are, first, the improved significance of 
the critical parameters μ γ and σ2 in Model 5 and the insignificance of coefficients for 
most of the environmental variables in Model 4. Second, we also believe that the 
estimated frontier represents the outer boundary of the cost possibility set, irrespective 
of environmental issues (Coelli et al., 1999).  Moreover, in our study, we are interested 
not only in the efficiency level but also wish to know the sources or determinants of the 
cost inefficiencies.  Thus, the Model 5 specification would appear to be the most useful 
of all the models we examine here. 
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Table 6.3 Hypothesis Testing of Cost Function46 
Model Description  Restriction (H0) Log likelihood  
LR test of 
one-side 
error  
Critical value =α 5% 
Decision 
H0: restricted 
model is better than 
unrestricted model  
Step 1: Half-normal vs 
Truncated  normal       
-Truncated normal 
distribution  (M2) Unrestricted  91.675    
-Normal distribution (M1) H0: 0δ = 0 88.890 5.57 3.841 (1) Reject H0 
Step 2: Model without 
control variables vs Model 
with control variables 
     
Truncated normal with all 
control variables  Unrestricted  164.337    
-without Time trend 
parameters   
H0: 033323132313332313 ========= ψψψθθξξξρ  151.230 26.214 15.507 (8) Reject H0 
-without NPL parameters  H0: 023222122212322212 ========= ψψψθθξξξρ  123.404 81.866  Reject H0 
-without Equity parameters H0: 023222122211312111 ========= ψψψθθξξξρ  148.219 32.236  Reject H0 
-Without NPL and Time 
trend parameters  
H0: 
03332312322213231
2221333231222132
========
=========
ψψψψψψθθ
θθξξξξξρρ
 103.762 121.15 27.59 (17) Reject H0 
                                                        
 
46 Log-likelihood test statistic= 2(unrestricted log - likelihood function (ULLF)-restricted log-likelihood function (RLLF)) 
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Table 6.3  Hypothesis Testing of Cost Function (continued) 
Model Description  Restriction (H0) Log likelihood  
LR test of 
one-side 
error  
Critical value =α 5% 
Decision 
H0: restricted 
model is better than 
unrestricted model  
-without Equity and Time 
trend parameters  
H0: 
03332311312113231
1211333231121131
========
=========
ψψψψψψθθ
θθξξξξξρρ  142.023 44.628  Reject H0 
-without Equity and NPL 
trend parameters 
H0: 
02322211312112221
1211232213121121
========
=========
ψψψψψψθθ
θθξξξξξρρ  107.994 112.686  Reject H0 
-without all control variable 
parameters  
H0: 
033323123222113
1211232221131211
332322131211321
========
========
========
ψψψψψψψ
ψψθθθθθθ
ξξξξξξρρρ
 91.675 145.324 36.415 (24) Reject H0 
Step 3: Models without 
environmental variables   
vs Models with 
environmental variables    
     
Including environmental 
variables in cost function  Unrestricted 185.073    
- not including 
environmental variables in 
cost function 
H0: '7
'
6
'
5
'
4
'
3
'
2
'
1 δδδδδδδ ======  164.337 41.472 14.067 (7) Reject H0 
Including environmental 
variables in error effects Unrestricted 175.172    
- not including 
environmental variables in 
error effects  
H0: 7654321 δδδδδδδ ======  164.337   27.67 14.067 (7) Reject H0 
Note: Degrees of freedom in parentheses.  
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6.5 Efficiency Level  
In this section, we will compare the cost efficiency levels derived from the five different 
models.  Table 6.4 provides a statistical summary of the estimated efficiency scores of 
all banks for the various models.  Thus, the mean, median and the lowest and highest 
levels of efficiency for the models are presented in the Table 6.4.  Regarding the 
overall mean values of cost efficiency scores for the entire period, we find a relatively 
small range, from 87.26 % to 91.14%, indicating that the average bank in the sample 
could reduce its costs by approximately 9% to 13%, in order to match its performance 
with the best possible bank practice.  Model 5 (heterogeneity in the inefficiency term) 
yields the highest mean and medium efficiency estimates, while the baseline 
(half-normal) model (M1) generates the lowest efficiency estimates.  This result 
indicates that neglecting heterogeneity across banks may create a downward bias in 
efficiency scores.  Moreover, explicitly accounting for heterogeneity in terms of 
ownerships, size, market structure, etc. in the distribution of the inefficiency component 
leads to a mean cost efficiency that is approximately 2% to 4% points higher than in the 
other specifications.  However, the mean efficiency scores in Models 2, 3 and 4 are 
similar, suggesting that accounting for the heterogeneity in the efficiency frontier did 
not influence efficiency estimates all that much for these models.  The maximum 
efficiency scores are quite high for Models 3, 4 and 5, suggesting that heterogeneity 
across banks is an important driver of cost differences.  In sum, it is clear that 
controlling for heterogeneity is important.  However, our results show that efficiency 
estimates may be sensitive to the way in which we account for sample heterogeneity.  
 
Table 6.4 Summary Statistics of the Mean Efficiency Estimates  
 Model 1 Baseline 
Model 2 
Truncated 
Model 3 
Controlled 
Model 4 
Kernel 
Model 5 
Error  
Mean  0.8726 0.9029 0.8983 0.8900 0.9114 
Median  0.8795 0.9149 0.9166 0.9139 0.9379 
Standard deviation  0.0480 0.0527 0.0668 0.0777 0.0789 
Maximum 0.9581 0.9685 0.9752 0.9755 0.9808 
Minimum  0.6179 0.5217 0.4802 0.4595 0.3625 
Note: Efficiencies are calculated by using 14 years of data for 44 banks (397 observations) and 
numbers in table are based on average efficiency for each bank over sample period.  
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The yearly mean cost efficiency of all banks for the five different models is plotted in 
Figure 6.1.  The trends or patterns of efficiency levels obtained from the five different 
specifications are broadly similar over time, especially for Models 3 and 4.  In general, 
most banks showed high relative efficiently early on (before 2002) but rather less 
efficiency later on (after 2002).  A significant decrease in efficiency levels appeared 
between 2001 and 2002 across all models.  These emerging patterns may provide 
evidence that the 2001-2002 calendar year appeared to be associated with a structural 
change in the trend of cost efficiency and that this is associated with China’s entry into 
the WTO which occurred around about this time. 
 
Figure 6.1 Average Efficiency Scores over Time  
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6.6 Spearman’s Correlation for Different SFA Models 
Another potentially interesting comparison is whether the ranks obtained for the 
efficiencies scores across the different specifications show any compatibility.  The 
ranking of banks according to the cost efficiency scores can provide important 
information about the impact of structural change on banking efficiency.  If different 
models rank banks completely differently, then it is problematic whether any 
generalised conclusions can be drawn.  The Spearman rank correlation coefficients of 
the efficiency estimates are summarised in Table 6.5.  These coefficients capture the 
similarity in the efficiency rankings across the various model specifications.  In 
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general, the rank correlations according to the efficiency scores among the first three 
models (M1, M2 and M3) is lower than the rank correlations between them and the last 
two models (that is M4 and M5).  The near perfect correlation of efficiency rankings 
between the half-normal (M1) and truncated (M2) models suggests that these models 
identify the same banks as best and worst performers.  This shift of the inefficiency 
distribution seems to influence all banks in the sample to a very similar degree.  The 
inclusion of control variables in efficiency estimation leads to a decline in the rank 
correlation coefficient to around 0.8, indicating that this inclusion not only absorbs 
some heterogeneity but also affects competitive rankings for some banks.  However, 
Models 3 and 4 show a very high correlation (0.94) in the estimated efficiency scores. 
This may suggest that introducing environmental factors into the kernel specification 
leads to only minor changes in the ranking order.  We also find that Model 5 shows 
relative low correlation with other alternative models with rank order correlation 
coefficients ranging from 56% to 63%.  These results suggest that Model 5 which 
includes environmental factors in the inefficiency term specification ranks bank 
efficiency in a markedly different way when compared to the other four models.    
 
In sum, these results further improve our understanding of the effect of heterogeneity on 
efficiency estimates.  It seems that accounting for heterogeneity is an important issue 
which if not taken into account, may lead to biased estimates of bank efficiency.  
 
Table 6.5 Spearman Rank Correlation between Efficiency Estimates  
 Model 1 Baseline 
Model 2 
Truncated 
Model 3 
Controlled 
Model 4 
Kernel 
Model 5 
Error  
Half-normal (M1) 1.0000      
Truncated (M2) 0.9994 1.0000     
Controlled (M3) 0.8148 0.8150 1.0000    
Kernel (M4) 0.7623 0.7626 0.9433 1.0000   
Error (M5) 0.5778 0.5901 0.6360 0.5664 1.0000 
Note: All correlations significant at 1% level  
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6.7 Comparison between SFA and DEA  
As discussed earlier, the primary advantage of SFA is that it attempts to account for the 
effects of noise in the data.  Here it is important to note that this methodology specifies 
the functional form for the cost relationship that links the decision making unit’s (DMU) 
output and input factors and relies on distributional assumptions to separate the random 
errors and the efficiency terms.  However, if these assumptions are misspecified, the 
efficiency estimates may be significantly biased.  DEA methodology can avoid these 
types of specification error because it envelops the observed data points rather than 
relies on a priori assumptions to structure the efficiency frontier.  However, DEA does 
not allow for random errors.  If any noise exists in the data, then inefficiency may well 
be overestimated as a consequence.  Here it is also important to note that DEA is very 
sensitive to outliers.  Because of the deterministic nature of DEA, outliers will result in 
remaining DMUs having very high measured inefficiency.  Since both parametric and 
non-parametric techniques have their own advantages and disadvantages, this studies 
also employs two nonparametric methods (traditional DEA and New DEA) as 
complementary models to the preferred SFA model utilised in previous sections.   
 
In this study, two DEA models are used to derive cost efficiency estimates under the 
assumption of variable returns to scale (VRS).  However, here it is important to note 
that factors such as imperfect competition and constraints on finance may prevent 
Chinese banks from operating at the optimal scale.  Hence, the VRS assumption is 
more appropriate for our study.  In addition, we estimate single year efficiency 
frontiers rather than one common frontier for all years47.  The software DEA-Solver is 
used to solve for the DEA models (See Cooper et al., 2007).  
 
Following Bauer et al. (1998), we are not attempting to achieve the best method for 
measuring efficiency in this section but we seek to provide evidence about the 
consistency or otherwise of the various efficiency frontier estimation methods for 
                                                        
 
47 Both alternatives have been chosen in literature.  Common frontier assumes similar technologies in all years, 
while single year frontiers do not need to assume the same technology for each year.  Chinese authorities have 
embarked on a series of reforms of its banking sector over our study period, and these reforms are expected to have a 
significant impact on banking technology.  Therefore, we prefer to apply single year frontiers to estimate banking 
efficiency.  
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Chinese banks.  We test the robustness of the efficiency scores from the preferred SFA, 
DEA and New DEA models based on the properties of the distributions (that is, mean, 
maximum, skewness etc.) of the efficiency scores, the correlations of rankings of 
efficiency scores, identification of best and worst banks, stability over time and their 
relation to standard non-frontier performance measures. 
 
6.7.1 Comparison of Efficiency Distributions  
A number of standard distributional properties of the estimated efficiency measures 
based on the three dominant methodologies, SFA, traditional cost DEA (DEA) and new 
cost DEA (New DEA), are presented in Table 6.6.  The SFA mean efficiency estimate 
is higher than that of DEA, in particular when we use the New DEA model.  The mean 
efficiency from the SFA method is 91.14%, while from DEA and New DEA the mean 
efficiencies are 88.77% and 86.83%, respectively.  It is not surprising that SFA 
efficiency scores are higher than the DEA efficiency scores because the former 
approach allows banks to depart from the cost frontier due to random shocks (or 
statistical noise) as well as inefficiency, whereas DEA measures any departure from the 
frontier as an inefficiency.  The standard deviation of efficiency estimates for SFA 
(0.0789) is also less than the standard deviation from the DEA models (0.1242 and 
0.1641, respectively).  The inconsistency between parametric and nonparametric 
efficiency measures is further illustrated by the standardised skewness and excess 
standardized kurtosis measures for the SFA and DEA techniques.  These results are 
consistent with the results of Bauer et al. (1998) and Delis et al. (2009).  However, it is 
interesting to note that there is a smaller difference between distributional 
characteristics of efficiency scores estimated by DEA and New DEA than that between 
any DEA and SFA.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 Empirical Results: A Comparison of SFA and DEA 
 179
Table 6.6 Descriptive Statistics of Cost Efficiency Scores by Different Techniques 
 SFA DEA New DEA 
Mean 0.9114 0.8853 0.8683 
Median 0.9379 0.9248 0.9335 
Minimum 0.3625 0.5370 0.2969 
Maximum 0.9808 1 1 
Standard Deviation 0.0789 0.1239 0.1653 
Skewness -25.0601 -6.5806 -10.8926 
Kurtosis 38.4520 -7.2879 -7.3449 
Notes: Skewness refers to the extent to which a distribution is not symmetrical. For a normal distribution 
the sample skewness score is asymptotically distributed with a mean of zero and a variance of 6/n where 
n is the sample size. Hence, the standardized skewness score reported in the above table is 
(sample skewness score× n) / 6. Likewise the standardised kurtosis score reported in the above table is 
(sample kurtosis score×3× n) / 24. 
    
Figure 6.2 Average Efficiency Over Time for Different Models  
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We now pay particular attention to the temporal evaluation of average efficiency under 
the different approaches.  The year-by-year average efficiency scores over the 14-year 
period are displayed in Figure 6.2 which further illustrates the differences which arise 
between the different models.  As shown, SFA generally yields higher average cost 
efficiency scores than either of the DEA and New DEA models.  The mean efficiency 
estimates from SFA do not show significant variation in the sample period and do not 
vary too much for each sub-period when the sample is divided into two separate periods 
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- before and after 2002.  However, the evolution of the efficiency scores for DEA and 
New DEA are not always monotonic and often display erratic behaviour. 
 
In summary, we observed some differences in the distributional properties of the 
efficiency scores provided by the three principal models employed in our study.  The 
differences may result from the various assumptions on which the methods are based 
(Weill, 2006).  However, these differences are not necessarily a problem for the use of 
the efficiency scores.  If the different frontier techniques can generate a similar rank 
order of efficiency, then the regulatory authorities can draw some reasonable policy 
conclusions from the analysis of the efficiency scores.  Thus next, it is of interest to 
know whether these approaches generate consistent ranking of banking efficiency over 
the period of our study. 
 
6.7.2 Rank Order Correlation of Efficiency Scores  
Although the distributional characteristics of the efficiency scores differ between 
approaches, it is still possible that these methods generate similar rankings of banks in 
terms of their efficiency scores.  Indeed, Bauer et al. (1998) note that the rank order 
structure of efficiency scores has an important role to play in regulatory policy and/or 
managerial decision making.  Table 6.7 summarises the pairwise Spearman rank order 
correlation coefficients between efficiency scores obtained for each method using the 
full sample of banks.  In general terms, we observe moderate positive rank order 
correlations between efficiency scores that are all significant at the 1% level.  The 
results show that the highest rank order correlation is 0.4793 based on traditional DEA 
and New DEA scores, but it is lower than what one might have expected48. This is 
mainly due to the New DEA model’s taking into account the heterogeneity of input 
prices and identifying efficient banks in different ways.  When comparing parametric 
techniques with non-parametric techniques, the data suggest that SFA and traditional 
DEA are moderately consistent in their rankings, with a rank order correlation 
coefficient of 0.4226.  However, the rank order correlation between SFA and New 
DEA is relatively low, at only 0.2848.  Therefore, the three parametric and 
                                                        
 
48 Many previous studies find that efficiency ranking tends to be highly correlated within the family of benchmarking 
techniques (e.g.Bauer et al., 1998; Huang and Wang, 2002).  
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nonparametric comprehensive evaluation models cannot be relied upon to rank banks 
generally in the same order and so may give problematic or even conflicting policy 
conclusions when evaluating important regulatory questions. 
 
Table 6.7 Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation by Various Methods 
 SFA DEA New DEA 
SFA 1 0.4226 0.2848 
DEA  1 0.4793 
New DEA   1 
Note: All correlation coefficients are significant at the 1% level.  
 
6.7.3 Identification of Best Practice and Worst Practice Banks  
Even if the consistency in rank order correlations might be limited, different methods 
for assessing cost efficiencies may still be useful for regulatory purposes if they are 
consistent in identifying which are the best and worst practice banks (Bauer et al., 1998).  
This coherency measure is the degree to which the methods identify the same banks as 
being in the highest and lowest efficiency groups.  We implement this idea by 
examining the overlap of the proportion of banks that appear in the top 25% and lowest 
25% of banks by efficiency score for each of the three methods (that is SFA, DEA and 
NEW DEA).  The results are presented in Table 6.8 and show that parametric (SFA) 
and the nonparametric (DEA and New DEA) models are moderately consistent in 
identifying the most efficient banks, with pairwise agreement statistics of 46% and 45%, 
respectively.  These figures describe the overlap of the proportion of banks that appear 
in the top 25% of banks by efficiency score for SFA in comparison to the DEA and New 
DEA techniques.  For example, of the banks identified as in the most efficient quarter 
by the SFA technique, 46% and 45% of these banks are also identified as being in the 
top 25% of efficient banks by the DEA and New DEA techniques.  The traditional 
DEA model has somewhat more consistency with New DEA (59%) in identifying the 
most efficient banks.  Similarly, regarding SFA and DEA, the correspondence of the 
worst practice 25% of banks is 0.47.  This value indicates that 47% of the worst 25% 
of banks as identified by SFA are also in the bottom 25% as identified by DEA.  The 
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correspondences of the worst-practice banks between the New DEA and the SFA and 
the DEA techniques are 0.35 and 0.33, respectively.  These results suggest that the 
methods are somewhat less consistent in identifying the least efficient banks than they 
are in identifying the most efficient banks.  In sum, there is moderate consistency 
between parametric and non-parametric methods in identifying best and worst practice 
banks.  Within the DEA methodologies, they identify the best performers more 
consistently than the worst.  Thus, regulatory policies targeted at either efficient or 
inefficient banks would hit different targets, depending upon which frontier techniques 
have been employed to determine the policy.  
 
Table 6.8 Correspondence of Best-practice and Worst-practice Banks across 
Techniques 
 Most efficient quartile  Least efficient quartile 
 SFA DEA New DEA  SFA DEA New DEA 
SFA 1 0.46 0.45  1 0.47 0.35 
DEA  1 0.59   1 0.33 
New DEA   1    1 
Notes: Each number in the most efficient quartile is the proportion of banks identified by one model as 
having efficiency scores in the most efficient 25% of banks also in the most efficient 25% by other 
model.   
Each number in the least efficient quartile is the proportion of banks identified by one model as having 
efficiency scores in the most efficient 25% of banks also in the least efficient 25% by other model. 
 
6.7.4 Stability of Measured Efficiency Over Time 
From a regulatory perspective, it is much more useful that the efficiency measures 
display relative stability over time.  It is usually expected that the efficiency rankings 
of banks do not change dramatically from one year to the next (or over moderately short 
periods of time).  Even if some banks may improve or worsen in their overall 
performance in the short run, it is unlikely that a very efficient bank in one year would 
become very inefficient in the next year; that is, it is more likely that an efficient bank 
will maintain its efficiency in following year (Bauer et al., 1998)49.  Thus, we compute 
the Spearman rank order correlation coefficient for each of the three efficiency 
measures between each pair of years to examine the year to year stability of the 
                                                        
 
49 Only in exceptional cases would efficiencies be likely to fluctuate dramatically over short periods of time.  
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efficiency measures over time.  For the full sample, 91 correlations of k-year-apart 
efficiencies, where k = 1, 2, … , 13, are computed in each case.  Table 6.9 reports the 
average correlations for the different intervals of time.  In general, the one and two 
year-apart average correlations are relatively high among the three methods, suggesting 
that a bank’s efficiency ranking does not bounce up and down dramatically within one 
or two year period.  After this, however, most of the correlation coefficients decline, as 
expected, as the number of years between the efficiency scores grows.  In some cases, 
for example 9 to 12 years apart for SFA and DEA, a substantial proportion of 
insignificant correlations arise, leading to the average correlation being very close to 
zero.  This result suggests that these two methods seem to be unstable through time.  
Moreover, the results show that there is little difference in the stability of the efficiency 
scores between the SFA and DEA methods.  It is important to note that New DEA 
efficiencies, from 5 years-apart to 11 years-apart, still have statistically significant 
correlations, in the range of 23.8% to 39.5%.  This indicates that for New DEA many 
of the best and worst practice banks tend to remain efficient or inefficient, respectively, 
over relatively longer periods of time.  In summary, all models’ efficiency measures 
are relatively stable over short periods of time but apart from the New DEA efficiency 
scores exhibit instability over longer periods time.  In other words, New DEA methods 
generally show slightly more stability than the SFA and DEA methods in the long run.  
 
Table 6.9 Persistence of Efficiency – the Correlations of k-year-apart Efficiencies  
Years 
apart  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 - 11 -  12 -  13 - 
SFA  0.662 0.618 0.518 0.463 0.393 0.370 0.311 0.211 0.055 0.094 0.116 -0.01 0.355
DEA 0.697 0.572 0.495 0.448 0.404 0.371 0.270 0.051 -0.07 -0.01 -0.03 0.003 0.297
New 
DEA 0.636 0.427 0.414 0.383 0.255 0.238 0.297 0.395 0.358 0.293 0.341 0.157 0.136
Notes: Following Bauer et al. (1998), each entry is mean of correlations of k-year apart efficiencies for 
single efficiency technique within 14-year time span. So for each k, figure reported is average of (14-k) 
correlations between efficiencies. For example, there are 8 different correlations for 6-years apart 
correlations that is 1994 with 2000, 1995 with2001,…, 2000-2006 and 2001-2007 
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6.7.5 Efficiency and Accounting-based Performance Measures  
Non-frontier measures of performance are also widely used by regulators, bank 
managers and industry consultants. Thus, if the frontier efficiency scores are correlated 
with some standard financial ratio measures of performance, then policy makers could 
be more confident that the measured efficiencies are accurate indicators of performance 
and not simply artificial measures resulting from the specific assumptions on which the 
efficiency measures are based (Bauer et al., 1998).  We analyse here the correlations 
between efficiency scores and standard performance measures in order to evaluate their 
consistency.  The chosen conventional measures of performance are the return on 
average assets (ROAA), the return of average equity (ROAE), the cost to assets ratio 
(TC/TA, defined as total costs as a fraction of total assets) and the efficiency ratio (ER, 
defined as the ratio of non-interest expense to interest income plus non-interest income).  
The first two ratios are generally used to assess the profitability of banks and higher 
values are taken to imply more efficient use of bank assets or equity.  The relationship 
between these two ratios and cost efficiency scores are expected to be positive.  The 
cost to assets ratio measures costs in relation to the size of banks and considers it as an 
indicator of economic optimisation in terms of banks’ costs.  Last is the efficiency ratio 
(ER), which is what it costs the bank to generate its revenue.  This ratio is often 
considered as a most popular non-frontier bank productivity (efficiency) measure, in 
part because it reflects operations both on and off the balance sheet (Forster and Shaffer, 
2005).  Smaller values of these two cost-related performance ratios denote better cost 
management and are more desirable.  Thus they are expected to be negatively 
correlated to our cost efficiency scores.   
 
Table 6.10 Correlations between Frontier Efficiencies and Non-frontier 
Performance Measures  
 SFA DEA New DEA 
ROAA 0.1407* 0.0573 0.0835 
ROAE 0.1642* 0.0688 0.0718 
TC/TA -0.2300* -0.1384* -0.2267* 
ER -0.1868* -0.1683* -0.1234* 
 Notes: * denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at 5% level. 
 ROAA = return on average assets; ROAE = return on average equity; TC/TA = total costs/ total assets; 
 ER= efficiency ratio.  
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Table 6.10 reports the correlations between the efficiency scores generated by the three 
frontier models and the four non-frontier measures of performance.  The results show 
that both parametric and non-parametric-based efficiency scores have low correlations 
with the standard performance measures.  The low magnitude of the correlation 
coefficients, ranging from -23% to 16%, may arise because the traditional financial 
performance ratios do not consider the effects of differences in input prices and output 
mix and also ignore the market value of bank equity (Berger and Humphrey, 1991). The 
most positive outcome, however, is that the correlations between the SFA efficiency 
measures and the four traditional performance measures are all statistically significant 
and importantly, with the expected signs.  For the non-parametric measure results, 
however, we observe that the cost efficiency scores are only significantly correlated 
with the cost-related performance ratios (TC/TA and ER), and not with the profit-related 
performance indicators (ROAA and ROAE).  This result may indicate that cost 
efficiency models (DEA and New DEA) cannot fully capture the characteristics of bank 
profit performance.  Overall, however, the SFA, DEA and New DEA efficiency 
measures are marginally consistent with the standard non-frontier measures of 
performance, and especially with the cost-related performance measures.  This gives 
some confidence that the frontier models are useful measures of actual accomplishment 
and not simply artificial products of the assumptions of the efficiency approaches.   
 
6.8 Summary and Conclusion  
This chapter reports and compares the empirical results from the methodologies 
summarised in the previous chapter.  We first focus on finding a preferred SFA 
specification for measuring Chinese banking efficiency and then proceed to the 
methodological cross-checking of three frontier methods in order to assess the 
robustness of our results.  
 
We followed the recent efficiency methodologies that proceed by applying various SFA 
model specifications to take into account the heterogeneity in the sample of Chinese 
banks.  We find that the sample heterogeneity significantly influences some key 
stochastic cost frontier estimates.  In order to reach the best-specified stochastic cost 
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frontier model, we conducted a step-wise specification testing procedure.  The results 
suggest that the appropriate model fit should incorporate both control variables and 
environmental variables in order to control for systematic differences across banks.  
We subsequently discussed the effects of applying different SFA specifications to banks’ 
efficiency scores and rank orders.  Our results indicate that it is important to control for 
heterogeneity across banks.  As a final result, we found a preferred SFA model 
specification for our sample, that is the translog cost function form includes the 
traditional outputs and input prices and the control variables (the level of equity, the 
non-performing loans and the time trend) in the cost function, and the environmental 
variables in the inefficiency term.   
    
Since efficiency evaluation plays a very important role in regulatory analysis as well as 
management decision making, it is strongly recommended great care be exercised when 
choosing evaluation techniques from among the parametric and nonparametric frontier 
efficiency methods.  We used two other nonparametric DEA and New DEA methods as 
complementary models to the preferred parametric SFA model to measure Chinese 
banking efficiency.  Following Bauer et al. (1998), we then conduct multilevel 
consistency tests to compare the outcomes of different methods to determine whether 
serious inconsistencies arise.  Consistent with the previous empirical literature, the 
findings, in most cases, indicate only moderate compatibility across the different 
methods.  The differences between efficiency scores obtained from the different 
approaches are attributed mainly to the inherent advantages and disadvantages, detailed 
earlier, of each methodology.  With regard to our five consistency checks, the first 
consistency condition check shows that the average of the SFA efficiency scores are 
slightly higher than those of DEA and New DEA, and some differences also emerge in  
other distributional properties of the efficiency scores derived from these methods.  
The rank order correlations of the efficiency estimates between the SFA and DEA 
models range from 28% to 48%.  This result means that there are important differences 
in the order structure of efficiency scores across the different measurement approaches.  
The third consistency condition involves analysis of the tails of the distributions of the 
efficiency scores by identifying the overlap of the best and the worst quartile of banks 
for each method.  The correspondence of the best and worst practice 25% of banks 
ranges from 33% to 59% across the different methods.  Thus, the three methods tend to 
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be moderately consistent in identifying extreme performers.  
    
In the context of the stability of the efficiency scores over time, we find that efficiency 
measures are relatively stable over short periods of time but exhibit instability over 
longer periods.  This result indicates that the Chinese banking industry was subject to 
important technology and regulatory changes during the relatively long period of our 
analysis.  Finally, with regard to the relation of efficiency and conventional accounting 
based performance measures, the frontier efficiency measures were significantly 
correlated with cost-related traditional performance measures, and weakly related with 
profit-related performance indicators, especially in the case of the DEA methodologies.  
The low but significant magnitude of the correlation coefficients indicates that frontier 
efficiency measures contain additional information compared to accounting-based 
performance measures.   
 
Our results are generally compatible with previous studies.  However, our results show 
that there is only moderate consistency between the results of the three dominant 
methods (SFA, DEA and New DEA).  Therefore, our most important but by no means 
only conclusion is that policy conclusions resulting from cost efficiency estimates seem 
to be sensitive to the methodological selection of the frontier efficiency estimation 
methods used, and the use of multiple frontier approaches for robustness checking is 
strongly recommended.  
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Chapter 7 Chinese Banking Efficiency and Analysis 
 
7.1 Introduction  
In this chapter the cost efficiency of the Chinese banking sector is analysed and 
discussed for the period from 1994 until 2007.  The empirical evidence on bank 
efficiency aims to highlight the features associated with the role of economic 
development and banking reforms that have taken place in China over the past thirty 
years.  It is expected that the institutional and structural changes in the Chinese 
banking sector as a result of deregulation and liberalisation have significantly affected 
the efficiency and performance of Chinese banks. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows.  Section 7.2 analyses the cost 
efficiency levels of Chinese banks derived from the preferred stochastic frontier model 
developed in the preceding chapter.  Beside the analysis of overall Chinese banking 
efficiency, particular emphasis is also placed on investigating the diversity of efficiency 
levels between different types of bank (that is big four state-owned banks, state-owned 
policy banks, joint stock commercial banks and city commercial banks) and size classes 
(that is very big, big, medium, small and very small).  Section 7.3 reports and 
discusses the results of the cost efficiency measures obtained from the DEA 
methodologies (traditional cost efficiency and new cost efficiency measures).  Section 
7.4 investigates the degree of scale economies for the Chinese banking sector based on 
both the SFA model and the DEA models (DEA and New DEA).  The scale economies 
measures are summarised according to bank size categories.  Section 7.5 explores the 
impact of certain factors on banks’ cost efficiencies, and this in turn provides valuable 
information for regulatory authorities and management to trace the sources of 
(in)efficiency.  Finally, section 7.6 summarises the findings of this chapter.  
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7.2 Cost Efficiency Based on SFA  
Cost efficiency estimates are derived from the preferred stochastic frontier model which 
includes all three control variables in the cost function (equity, non-performing loans 
and time trend) and allows for environmental variables (ownership structure, bank size, 
stock exchange listing, deregulation, market structure) to affect the distribution of the 
inefficiency term.  Summary statistics relating to the estimated efficiency scores are 
reported in Table 7.1 below.  
 
Table 7.1 Average Efficiency Scores for Chinese Banks on Basis of SFA  
 Mean SD Min Max Observation 
1994 0.9601 0.0070 0.9501 0.9728 11 
1995 0.9425 0.0286 0.8579 0.9735 18 
1996 0.9467 0.0271 0.8610 0.9729 19 
1997 0.9477 0.0254 0.8881 0.9741 20 
1998 0.9482 0.0317 0.8388 0.9747 20 
1999 0.9374 0.0361 0.8333 0.9767 26 
2000 0.9432 0.0198 0.8997 0.9741 29 
2001 0.9445 0.0288 0.8519 0.9808 32 
2002 0.8741 0.1128 0.3625 0.9543 34 
2003 0.8765 0.1155 0.4697 0.9686 35 
2004 0.8653 0.0933 0.6095 0.95867 36 
2005 0.8812 0.0841 0.6158 0.9751 38 
2006 0.8881 0.1005 0.5150 0.9663 39 
2007 0.9200 0.0477 0.7620 0.9689 40 
Overall 0.9114 0.0790 0.3625 0.9808 397 
 
Generally, the results in Table 7.1 show relatively high average cost efficiency for 
Chinese banks, with efficiency scores that range between 86.5% in 2004 and 96% in 
1994.  This result is consistent with results reported in the previous literature; for 
example Berger et al. (2009).  The average cost efficiency for the sample period is 
91.14%, meaning that on average the sampled banks could potentially reduce input 
costs by approximately 9% by using its inputs more efficiently and without changing 
the level of output.  We find that average cost efficiency is significantly higher (about 
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7%) in 2001 (before China’s WTO entry) than that in 2002 (after China’s WTO entry).  
This decline in efficiency could be a consequence of the deregulation and liberalisation 
reforms implemented by the Chinese government in response to China’s entry into the 
WTO.  It is also worth noting that the standard deviations of the average efficiency 
prior to WTO accession (1994-2001) are quite low, thereby implying that before WTO 
accession the cost efficiency levels of the sampled banks are very close to each other.  
But interestingly, the variance of the cost efficiency scores rises significantly after 
China’s admission to the WTO (2002-2007).  There are two possible explanations for 
this change in the dispersion of efficiency scores after China’s admission into the WTO.  
First, the sample data before 2002 mainly include the nationwide banks which have 
similar characteristics in terms of inputs and outputs while the later period data also 
include many other types of banks, such as city commercial banks.  Hence, it is this 
which may cause the low variation of cost efficiency across different banks in the early 
period but which rises in later periods.  Second, the significant external environmental 
changes due to WTO entry may have created winners and losers amongst Chinese 
banks.  
 
Figure 7.1 Average SFA Cost Efficiency Scores for Chinese Banks (1994-2007)  
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The temporal performance (efficiency) pattern for the Chinese banking sector is also of 
interest.  Figure 7.1 illustrates the trend of average cost efficiency changes over the 
sample period.  Note how the Chinese banking sector shows an overall decreasing 
trend in cost efficiency over the study period.  The mean cost efficiency remains at a 
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relatively high level and varies very little during the period from 1994 until 2001.  This 
may indicate the reforms implemented by the Chinese government may have enhanced 
the performance of Chinese banks over this period.  Moreover, banking competition 
was relatively weak throughout this period.  Banks enjoyed large interest margins - 
probably because of this.  It is worth noting however, that average efficiency declined 
sharply after China’s admission to the WTO, particularly in 2002.  This may suggest 
that the external environmental changes introduced in 2002 may have had a negative 
impact on Chinese banking efficiency.  Banks may have had to incur additional costs 
in order to prepare for the intensive competition and other environmental changes which 
arose from China’s admission to the WTO.  Moreover, the new loan classification 
system was formally applied to all banks from 2002.  Along with this new system, 
banks are allowed to carry out more aggressive provisioning against non-performing 
loans resulting in a significant decline in the book value of bank loans.  This will thus 
be reflected in declining efficiency because of the output reduction caused by loan 
write-offs without any changes in the input usage.  However, we find that the negative 
impact on efficiency disappeared in 2005 and that the mean efficiency increased 
significantly between 2005 and 2007.  This finding implies that banking reforms which 
were implemented in this period may have improved Chinese banking efficiency.   
 
Having examined the efficiency of the aggregate Chinese banking sector over time, we 
now further analyse cost efficiency levels in more detail by different banking categories.  
Table 7.2 and Figure 7.2 display the mean value of the cost efficiency scores according 
to their origin and ownership, specifically the big four state-owned commercial banks 
(Big Four), state-owned policy banks (policy banks), nationwide joint stock commercial 
banks (JSCBs), city commercial banks (CCBs) and foreign banks.  Although these 
groups of banks operate in the same market, each group faces a different set of 
regulations.  In the light of this uneven and changing regulatory environment, we 
expect to find performance variation, both across groups of banks and over time.  We 
seek to quantify and also to explain this anticipated performance variation. 
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Table 7.2 Average SFA Cost Efficiency Scores by Bank Types  
 Big Four Policy banks JSCBs CCBs Foreign banks 
1994 0.9621 - 0.959 - - 
1995 0.9536 0.9559 0.9344 0.9384 - 
1996 0.9537 0.9578 0.9398 0.9598 - 
1997 0.9659 0.9586 0.9387 0.9444 - 
1998 0.9694 0.9561 0.9377 0.952 - 
1999 0.9698 0.9634 0.9332 0.9255 0.892 
2000 0.9662 0.9378 0.9443 0.9324 0.947 
2001 0.964 0.9611 0.9549 0.9227 0.954 
2002 0.9411 0.946 0.9163 0.7987 0.8847 
2003 0.9401 0.9543 0.9275 0.8196 0.7919 
2004 0.9288 0.9504 0.8856 0.8234 0.809 
2005 0.948 0.9543 0.9003 0.8236 0.9181 
2006 0.9449 0.9489 0.9322 0.8282 0.8929 
2007 0.9522 0.938 0.9472 0.896 0.8947 
Average 0.9543 0.9525 0.9322 0.8896 0.8872 
 
Table 7.2 shows that the Big Four and the policy banks, on average, are the most 
efficient (95.43% and 95.25%, respectively).  These are followed by the JSCBs with 
an average efficiency of 93.22%.  The CCBs and foreign banks are the least efficient 
(88.96% and 88.72%, respectively).  Figure 7.2 indicates that, during the period from 
1994 until 2001, all bank subcategories show a relatively low variation in efficiency 
scores and also remain at a relatively high level of efficiency.  However, they exhibit 
greater variability in mean efficiency over the period from 2002 until 2007.  All bank 
groups show a significant average efficiency decline in 2002.  A comparison of the 
five groups shows that the Big Four and the policy banks have tended to exhibit higher 
average cost efficiency over time than other subcategories.  It is also observed that 
amongst the rest of the subcategories, no bank group gets a clearly dominant position 
over the sample period.  These findings contradict a common perception in the 
literature and the results of some previous studies.  For example, Ariff and Can (2008) 
found that the JSCBs are more cost efficient than the state-owned banks over the period 
from 1995 until 2004 and Berger et al. (2009) showed that foreign banks were more 
efficient than other bank types over the similar period.  Differences in such findings 
may be due to different methodologies, model specifications and the sample periods 
being analysed.  
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Figure 7.2 Average SFA Cost Efficiency by Different Bank Types  
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Big four state-owned commercial banks  
Overall, the Big Four exhibit quite good performance in cost efficiency relative to other 
bank types.  The results can possibly be explained by the Big Four having an extensive 
branch network which assures a stable retail banking business.  It may also reflect in 
part continual government subsidies on the cost side.  The Big Four show an 
improving trend in efficiency during the period from 1997 to 1999, indicating that they 
took advantage of the early reforms which the Chinese government focused almost 
exclusively on them.  For example, the Chinese government recapitalised the Big Four 
with RMB 270 billion in 1998.  Then in 1999 the government established four asset 
management corporations (AMCs) to buy RMB 1.4 trillion of non-performing loans 
from the Big Four.  From 1998, the Big Four also started to improve organisational 
management efficiency by reducing the number of redundant branches and employees.  
Up to 2002, they reduced the number of branches by nearly 30% and employees by 
10%.  Following China’s admission to the WTO at the end of 2001, we observe 
however that the cost efficiency of the Big Four deteriorated.  This may have occurred 
because of the under capitalisation of the Big Four and a large amount of 
non-performing loans on the Big Four’s balance sheets.  But beginning in 2005, the 
Big Four’s cost efficiency began to improve again.  After a few years of intense debate, 
the Chinese government also launched a new series of reforms for the Big Four.  The 
government injected RMB 499.6 billion into state-owned banks at the end of 2003 and 
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allowed the four banks to transfer their non-performing loans to AMCs in 2004 and 
2005.  More recently, the government has encouraged the big state-owned banks to 
introduce foreign capital and to list on one or more of the Chinese stock exchanges.  
All these measures appear to have enhanced the banks’ performance and could provide 
an explanation for the improvement in the cost efficiency which has occurred in the Big 
Four in the period beginning in 2005.      
 
State-owned policy banks  
The state-owned policy banks tend to show relatively little variation in their efficiency 
scores over time, and unexpectedly, exhibit high cost efficiency levels.  There are 
several possible explanations for these results.  First, the policy banks are mainly 
engaged in the government policy-oriented finance business and as a result, could be 
receiving favourable treatment from the government that improves their cost efficiency.  
Second, the policy banks only focus on policy lending and they may possess more 
experienced and specialised teams that enable them to evaluate and monitor their 
lending in an efficient way.  Third, the policy banks, compared with commercial banks, 
do not necessarily have a strong network of branches and the higher staff levels 
associated with this and other factors result in considerable savings in their operating 
expenses.    
 
Joint stock commercial banks  
Our study is based on twelve joint stock commercial banks (JSCBs)50.  Each of these 
banks operates on a nation wide basis.  Referring to Figure 7.2, we find that JSCBs 
show less efficiency when compared with their counterparts – the Big Four.  This 
result is similar to that reported by Chen (2005).  However, the efficiency levels for the 
JSCBs and the Big Four have tended to converge over the last a few years.  There are 
several possible explanations for these results.  First, the JSCBs’ branch networks are 
much more limited than those of the Big Four.  This constrains their competitiveness 
and leads to relatively small market shares.  Another possible explanation is that 
                                                        
 
50 They are Bank of Communications, CITIC Bank, China Everbright Bank, China Merchants Bank, Huaxia Bank, 
China Mingsheng Bank, Shenzhen Development Bank, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, Guangdong 
Development Bank, Industrial Bank, Evergrowing Bank, China Zheshang Bank 
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JSCBs do not enjoy an implicit government guarantee of their debts and they also do 
not receive the subsidies from government that are received by the state-owned banks.  
This may increase the cost of their borrowed funds and this in turn influences their cost 
efficiency levels.  However, JSCBs have shown a considerable improvement in 
average cost efficiency in the last three years (2005-2007).  This trend may indicate 
that JSCBs have gained efficiency benefits from foreign strategic investments which are 
expected to result in new management systems and techniques and better corporate 
governance.   
 
City commercial banks  
Generally, city commercial banks (CCBs) show a relatively low level of cost efficiency 
when compared to the efficiency scores of the other types of bank.  The most likely 
reason for this is that city commercial banks are restricted to opening branches within 
their own city boundaries.  This regulation may impact on their cost efficiency scores 
relative to nationwide banks, particularly for those located in smaller, less prosperous 
cities, because they are less able to achieve economies of scale and spread risk 
(Laurenceson and Qin, 2008).  It is noteworthy that the mean efficiency levels of 
CCBs shows a significant difference between the period before and after 2001.  This 
may be due in part to our sample choice.  Before 2001 the sample data are only 
available for several big CCBs and most of these have characteristics which are similar 
to JSCBs.  However, in the later sample period, we include more varied CCBs having 
different sizes and which are located widely across China.  The changing nature of the 
CCBs over our sample period may be one of the reasons for the decline in cost 
efficiency in the later period.  
 
Foreign banks  
Figure 7.2 shows that foreign banks exhibit less average cost efficiency than do 
nationwide domestic banks.  This finding may be interpreted as evidence that foreign 
banks are managed less efficiently, but this is not necessarily the case.  It can also 
reflect less familiarity with the regulatory system and a greater restriction on business 
scope and geographic range.  The foreign banks’ efficiency estimates are available 
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only after 1999 and do not indicate a consistent trend over the study period.  In the 
initial three years, they show an increasing trend in efficiency.  In the first two years 
after China's admission to the WTO, we observe a significant decline in efficiency in 
foreign banks.  However, this decline may simply reflect the costs of setting up 
business and branch expansion in order to facilitate competition with China’s domestic 
banks.  This is reflected in the fact that the cost efficiency of foreign banks improves 
significantly after 2003.  The greater variability in the efficiency of foreign banks may 
be due to their dependence on less stable wholesale or corporate resources, interbank 
market borrowings and the refinancing of assets. 
 
Size effect  
In order to investigate the influence of size on efficiency, we divide banks into different 
categories on the basis of the size of their total assets, that is a very big bank if its total 
assets are greater than 1000 billion RMB (GDP deflator adjusted to the base year 1994), 
a big bank if 250 - 1000 billion RMB, a medium bank if 100 - 250 billion RMB, a small 
bank if 20 - 100 billion RMB, and a very small bank if its assets are less than 20 billion 
RMB.  The average cost efficiency scores for the five asset size groupings of Chinese 
banks are shown in Table 7.3. 
 
Table 7.3 Average Cost Efficiency by Size Groups 
 Very big banks Big banks Medium banks Small banks Very small banks 
1994 0.9621 0.9562 - 0.9622 0.9581 
1995 0.9536 0.9526 0.9606 0.9464 0.9212 
1996 0.9537 0.9649 0.9698 0.9495 0.9189 
1997 0.9659 0.9644 0.9427 0.9378 0.9380 
1998 0.9694 0.9625 0.9629 0.9313 0.9354 
1999 0.9698 0.9683 0.9534 0.9313 0.8988 
2000 0.9662 0.9522 0.9506 0.9391 0.9296 
2001 0.9640 0.9664 0.9578 0.9527 0.9206 
2002 0.9411 0.9392 0.9208 0.9134 0.7764 
2003 0.9401 0.9320 0.9374 0.8667 0.785 
2004 0.9348 0.9356 0.8753 0.8461 0.7930 
2005 0.9509 0.9143 0.9054 0.8502 0.8294 
2006 0.9444 0.9412 0.8598 0.8629 0.8273 
2007 0.9546 0.9534 0.9320 0.8865 0.9118 
All 0.9550 0.9502 0.9329 0.9126 0.8817 
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Both the very big and big banks exhibit similar average cost efficiencies for each 
individual year and the lowest efficiency scores are generally found for very small 
banks.  The mean efficiency score for very big and big banks over the sample period is  
95.5% and 95.02%, respectively.  The corresponding figures for medium, small and 
very small banks are 93.29%, 91.26% and 88.17%, respectively.  Generally speaking, 
the mean cost efficiency scores of banks decreased as their size decreased.  This 
suggests that, on average, larger banks appear to be more cost efficient than smaller 
banks.  This may be because larger banks enjoy several advantages over smaller banks 
resulting in cost saving and/or efficiency gains.  These advantages include the ability 
of large banks to use more advanced technology, employ more specialised staff and 
implement a more extensive network of branches (Hunter and Timme, 1986).  Chen et 
al. (2005) found similar results for the relationship between size and the cost efficiency 
of Chinese banks.    
 
7.3 Cost Efficiency Based on DEA  
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a non-parametric technique which aims to 
evaluate the efficiency of decision making units (DMUs).  For this section we applied 
DEA techniques to identify the level of cost efficiency for each bank on an annual basis 
during the period from 1994 until 2007.  As indicated earlier, the traditional cost 
efficiency model returns deficient efficiency scores when the unit prices of inputs are 
not identical across banks.  Given this, we here use a new cost efficiency DEA model 
(New DEA model) developed by Tone (2002) as a complementary model to the 
traditional DEA model.  Efficiency levels for Chinese banks are calculated by using 
the software DEA-solver.  These efficiency scores represent the actual cost of a given 
bank compared to the optimal cost that could have been achieved.  Table 7.4 provides 
the basic cross-sectional efficiency scores over the period from 1994 until 2007 under 
both the traditional and new cost efficiency measures.   
 
In the case of the traditional DEA model, the average cost efficiency scores vary from 
86.17% in 2002 to 92.42% in 1994.  This result suggests that the average bank in the 
sample could have reduced its costs by approximately 8% to 14%, thereby achieving 
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‘best-practice’ performance.  Similarly, the minimal cost efficiency scores range from 
53.7% in 2001 to 77.41% in 1994.  With respect to the new cost efficiency model, the 
yearly average cost efficiency scores for Chinese banks over the period from 1994 until 
2007 range from 78.4% in 2004 to 90.86% in 1999.  The average cost efficiency over 
the sample period under the traditional cost and new cost models is 88.5% and 86.4%, 
respectively. 
 
Table 7.4 Average Cost Efficiency Scores for Chinese Banks on Basis of DEA  
 Traditional cost efficiency  New cost efficiency 
 mean SD max min  mean SD max min 
1994 0.9242 0.0837 1 0.7741  0.8413 0.1940 1 0.5042 
1995 0.9084 0.1187 1 0.6757  0.8317 0.1873 1 0.3873 
1996 0.9032 0.1224 1 0.6536  0.8606 0.1499 1 0.4582 
1997 0.9065 0.1042 1 0.6655  0.8904 0.1693 1 0.4704 
1998 0.8731 0.1344 1 0.6284  0.8927 0.1544 1 0.5829 
1999 0.8663 0.1255 1 0.6097  0.9068 0.1301 1 0.5153 
2000 0.8840 0.1300 1 0.6035  0.9066 0.1536 1 0.4435 
2001 0.8650 0.1445 1 0.5370  0.8622 0.1673 1 0.4492 
2002 0.8617 0.1486 1 0.5464  0.8777 0.1472 1 0.3926 
2003 0.8937 0.1108 1 0.6345  0.8633 0.1616 1 0.4169 
2004 0.8965 0.1169 1 0.5929  0.7840 0.2033 1 0.3348 
2005 0.8845 0.1093 1 0.6856  0.8629 0.1645 1 0.3094 
2006 0.9064 0.1041 1 0.6257  0.8742 0.1538 1 0.3009 
2007 0.8632 0.1287 1 0.6146  0.8548 0.1471 1 0.2969 
Total 0.8853 0.1239 1 0.5370  0.8642 0.1653 1 0.2969 
 
The differences in mean cost efficiency score for most years in the two models are 
somewhat modest - approximately 1% to 5%.  The yearly average cost efficiency 
scores under the two different models are plotted in Figure 7.3 for comparative 
purposes.  
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Figure 7.3 Average Traditional and New Cost Efficiency Measures over Time  
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In Figure 7.3, with the exception of 1994, 1995 and 2004, the mean cost efficiencies for 
the two different DEA models varied little over the sample period.  Generally, over 
time the cost efficiency scores show a rather flat pattern and fluctuate around 87%. 
Somewhat unexpectedly, the traditional and the New DEA models seem to yield slightly 
different temporal patterns in cost efficiency.  To take one of the more obvious 
examples, Chinese banks showed an average cost efficiency score of 88% in 2004 
according to the conventional DEA cost measure.  With the New DEA model, however, 
the average cost efficiency score is only 78%.  Thus, this indicates that some banks 
deemed to be (relatively) efficient using the traditional cost DEA measure may be found 
to have much lower cost efficiency using the New DEA model.  This result is also 
confirmed by the low rank correlation between the efficiency scores under the two 
models (see previous chapter for further details).  Generally, the average of the 
traditional cost efficiency scores shows a decreasing trend over the period from 1994 
until 2002, but begins to increase after the year 2002.  With respect to the new cost 
efficiency measures, the average efficiency gradually improves over the period from 
1995 until 2000, then decreases to a low of about 78% in the year 2004 but then 
recovers in the later years.  In sum, regardless of whether the traditional or new cost 
measure is used, our results reveal that Chinese banks, on average, exhibited a 
somewhat modest degree of inefficiency of around 12%.  Moreover, the results from 
the two models show only modest differences in general.     
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We now further analyse the cost efficiency levels of Chinese banks in more detail with 
particular emphasis on the categories of banks described previously.  The average cost 
efficiencies from the DEA and the New DEA models for the five different categories of 
banks are presented in Table 7.5 and in time profile in Figures 7.4 and 7.5.  On 
traditional cost efficiencies, as shown in the left-hand part of Table 7.5, the policy banks 
and the Big Four, on average, are the most efficient (96.8% and 94.6%, respectively), 
followed by foreign banks (94.12%), JSCBs (88.19%) and CCBs (86.29%).  With 
regard to the new cost efficiency scores, the right-hand part of Table 6.5 shows that the 
Big Four are the most efficient banks, with a mean efficiency score of 96.68%, followed 
by the policy banks (92.09%), foreign banks (91.93%) and JSCBs (86.17%).  The 
CCBs return the lowest new efficiency scores with an average of 79.56%. 
 
Table 7.5 Average DEA Cost Efficiency Scores by Different Bank Types  
 Traditional cost efficiency  New cost efficiency 
 Big Four 
Policy 
banks JSCBs CCBs 
Foreign 
banks  
Big 
Four 
Policy 
banks JSCBs CCBs 
Foreign 
banks 
1994 0.9293  0.9212  -  0.876 - 0.8215 - - 
1995 0.9023 1 0.8743 1 -  0.865 0.7958 0.8254 0.8852 - 
1996 0.8629 0.9714 0.8904 1 -  0.9498 0.7683 0.8598 0.7898 - 
1997 0.934 0.9891 0.8811 0.8675 -  0.984 0.9693 0.8631 0.7352 - 
1998 0.9154 0.9568 0.8118 1 -  0.9711 0.8609 0.8792 0.8576 - 
1999 0.9434 0.9215 0.8269 0.8263 0.9651  0.9858 0.9312 0.9231 0.8199 0.8834 
2000 0.9488 1 0.8856 0.7887 1  1 0.9880 0.9491 0.7989 0.8495 
2001 0.9148 0.981 0.8982 0.7665 1  0.9995 0.9974 0.8865 0.757 0.8823 
2002 0.9343 0.9650 0.8858 0.7631 1  0.9887 0.9989 0.9023 0.771 0.9803 
2003 0.9583 0.9296 0.9059 0.8437 0.9600  0.9963 0.9581 0.8657 0.7738 1 
2004 1 0.943 0.9160 0.8341 0.9250  0.9766 0.9461 0.7837 0.668 0.9071 
2005 1 0.9523 0.8487 0.8664 0.8934  0.9937 0.9866 0.8509 0.8081 0.8807 
2006 1 0.9743 0.9067 0.8789 0.8706  0.9923 0.8693 0.8514 0.8504 0.9228 
2007 1 1 0.8937 0.7824 0.8568  0.9559 0.9016 0.8015 0.8257 0.9669 
Mean 0.946 0.968 0.8819 0.8629 0.9412  0.9668 0.9209 0.8617 0.7954 0.9193 
 
Note also that the evolution of DEA and New DEA cost efficiency scores for different 
bank types often display erratic trajectories.  Relatively speaking, however, we find 
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that the Big Four and the policy banks have tended to exhibit the greatest efficiency and 
the CCBs have perform with least efficiency in most years.  These results are 
consistent with our previous SFA findings.  Moreover, except for the period from 1994 
until 1996, the DEA cost efficiency levels of the Big Four have significantly improved 
over the period of our analysis.  Similarly, the new cost efficiency level of the Big Four 
also has improved over the period of our analysis.  These results suggest that the 
reforms focused on the Big Four have enhanced their cost efficiency over this period.   
 
Figure 7.4 Average Traditional DEA Cost Efficiency by Bank Types 
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Figure 7.5 Average New DEA Cost Efficiency by Bank Types  
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Table 7.6 reports the average cost efficiency scores from the DEA and New DEA 
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models across the previously defined five different size groups.  Although the results 
do not show a consistent pattern among different size groups across each year, the less 
efficient banks appear to be the small and very small banks.  These results also 
reinforce the observation previously obtained from our SFA analysis that larger banks, 
in general, are more efficient than smaller banks in the Chinese banking sector.   
 
Table 7.6 Average DEA Cost Efficiency Scores by Size Classes  
 Traditional cost efficiency  New cost efficiency 
 
Very 
big 
banks 
Big 
banks 
Medium 
banks 
Small 
banks 
Very 
small 
banks 
 
Very 
big 
banks 
Big 
banks 
Medium
banks 
Small 
banks 
Very 
Small 
banks 
1994 0.9293 1 - 0.9241 0.8921  0.876 1 - 0.8417 0.7547 
1995 0.9023 1 1 0.8700 0.9071  0.9246 0.6934 1 0.7949 0.8613 
1996 0.8629 1 1 0.8726 0.932  0.9498 0.7291 1 0.7988 0.926 
1997 0.934 1 1 0.8376 0.9519  0.984 1 1 0.8087 0.8648 
1998 0.9154 0.9568 0.7750 0.8415 1  0.9711 0.861 1 0.8827 0.8106 
1999 0.9434 0.9216 0.8317 0.8402 0.8493  0.9858 0.9312 0.9393 0.8859 0.8516 
2000 0.9489 1 0.8671 0.9012 0.8106  1 0.988 0.9208 0.9719 0.7722 
2001 0.9148 0.9810 0.8901 0.8977 0.7884  0.9994 0.9974 0.8679 0.9394 0.7407 
2002 0.9343 0.9029 0.9183 0.9291 0.7554  0.9887 0.9616 0.8972 0.8789 0.7907 
2003 0.9583 0.9042 0.9306 0.907 0.8352  0.9963 0.9388 0.7975 0.8665 0.7943 
2004 1 0.9452 0.9286 0.8170 0.8413  0.9813 0.8268 0.8032 0.5998 0.7552 
2005 1 0.8554 0.9285 0.8251 0.899  0.995 0.8983 0.9536 0.712 0.8775 
2006 0.9861 0.9288 0.8982 0.875 0.8909  0.9852 0.8443 0.9315 0.8295 0.9587 
2007 0.9751 0.9117 0.88 0.7925 0.8479  0.9563 0.8282 0.8845 0.7982 0.9516 
All 0.9432 0.9505 0.9113 0.8664 0.8713  0.9709 0.8927 0.9227 0.8283 0.8373 
Note: Very big banks = total assets > 1000 billion RMB, big banks = 250-1000 billion RMB, medium 
banks = 100-250 billion RMB, small banks = 20-100 billion RMB, very small banks=<20 billion RMB. 
 
7.4 Economies of Scale  
Cost (or productive) efficiency arises from optimising behaviour which relates to both 
outputs and inputs.  Regarding outputs, the banks’ optimal behaviour is to choose the 
output levels corresponding to the minimum cost of a unit of output.  This issue is 
closely related to economies of scale (that is, returns to scale).  Moreover, industry 
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economies of scale also have implications for regulatory policy regarding industry 
consolidation and for antitrust enforcement.  In this section, we first analyse 
economies of scale in the Chinese banking industry on the basis of the SFA 
methodology, and then we proceed to perform the scale economies’ analysis using the 
traditional DEA and New DEA methodologies.    
 
As discussed in the methodology chapter, the level of scale economies can be derived 
from the estimated stochastic cost frontier and indicates whether a bank that had 
minimised the cost of producing a particular output bundle could lower its costs yet 
further by producing an alternative level of output (Mester, 1996).  In this section, the 
scale economies’ measures refer to the inverse value of point estimates of the scale 
elasticities, which are computed using the average value of output, input price, financial 
capital level and non-performing loan variables along with parameter estimates from the 
preferred cost function specification (as in Mester, 1996 and Altunbas et al., 2001).  A 
scale efficient bank will produce where there are constant returns to scale (the value of 
overall economies of scale is equal to one).  Banks operating at decreasing or 
increasing returns to scale (value of overall economies is less or greater than one) imply 
scale inefficiency51. 
 
In order to further investigate the relationship between returns to scale and bank size, 
banks are sub-divided into 8 classifications in terms of their total asset size.  Overall 
economies of scale for all banks and for the different classifications of banks over the 
years from 1994 until 2007 are shown in Table 7.7.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
 
51 Scale elasticity and scale efficiency are two distinct concepts because they measure different things. 
Scale elasticity is measured in terms of the proportionate change in cost associated with a small 
proportionate change in all outputs.  Scale efficiency, on the other hand, measures the average 
production cost at the observed operation scale compared to what is attainable at the optimal scale size.  
Thus, it should be emphasised, here, that a scale elasticity measure near one on does not necessarily imply 
small scale inefficiency; nor does a large difference imply substantial scale inefficiency (Evanoff and 
Israilevich, 1995). 
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Table 7.7 Overall Economies of Scale for Chinese Banks on Basis of SFA 
Notes: The scale economies measure is 1/∑
=
∂∂
n
i
iQTC
1
ln/ln and the estimates are evaluated at the mean 
of the data rather than mean estimate of scale economies calculated at each observation.  
Number of observations: 397 total sample; 55 in the subsample <RMB 10 billion; 63 in subsample RMB 
10-25 billion; 53 in subsample RMB 25-50 billion; 39 in subsample RMB 50-100 billion; 59 in 
subsample RMB 100-250 billion; 37 in subsample RMB 250-500 billion; 29 in subsample RMB 500-100 
billion; 62 in subsample > RMB 1000 billion. 
* Scale economise estimates are statistically different from one at 5% level for a 2-tailed test.  
 
Generally, overall scale economies estimates for all banks over the years from 1994 
until 2007 are significantly greater than one, suggesting that economies of scale are 
present in the Chinese banking system considered as a whole.  However, it should be 
noted that the scale economies estimates over time exhibit a downward trend (declining 
economies of scale), especially for the later years of the sample.  This tendency may 
indicate that most Chinese banks tend to achieve optimal operating efficiency (constant 
returns of scale) by gradually changing their scale of production.  Based on the scale 
economies estimates for each of the eight size classifications, we find that high and 
significant scale economies exist in small banks (banks with asset size RMB 0-100 
billion), implying that small banks can potentially save operating costs through 
extending their production scale.  For the large size category (banks with assets over 
RMB 500 billion), the values of scale economies are significantly less than one.  This 
Bank Size 
(RMB 
billion) 
Sample 
Means 0-10 10-25 25-50 50-100 100-250 250-500 500-1000 1000+ 
1994 1.2614* - 1.6823* 1.4023* - - 1.1000* - 0.8611* 
1995 1.2981* 1.7267* 1.6362* 1.5108* 1.3502* 1.0467 0.9573 - 0.8590* 
1996 1.2686* 2.2592* 1.4556* 1.4606* 1.2931* 0.9058* 1.0233 0.9161* 0.8353* 
1997 1.2418* 1.8307* 1.4995* 1.4001* 1.2715* 1.2690* 0.9345* 0.9112* 0.8181* 
1998 1.2332* 1.8665* 1.5948* 1.3282* 1.2767* 1.1881* 0.9139* 0.8965* 0.8010* 
1999 1.3165* 2.4012* 1.6599* 1.3493* 1.3161* 1.1671* 0.9537 0.8828* 0.8020* 
2000 1.3393* 2.2421* 1.6228* 1.4016* 1.2644* 1.1554* - 0.8889* 0.8002* 
2001 1.2978* 2.1709* 1.5965* 1.3348* 1.1825* 1.1281* - 0.8764* 0.7957* 
2002 1.2540* 2.3798* 1.5061* 1.4477* 0.8828* 1.1204* 1.0375 0.8692* 0.7881* 
2003 1.2124* 2.1779* 1.3972* 1.3324* 1.0415* 1.0835* 1.0111 0.8797* 0.7760* 
2004 1.2128* 2.1250* 1.4097* 1.2944* - 1.0518 0.9759 0.8575* 0.7755* 
2005 1.1447* 1.8127* 1.3630 1.2793* 1.0955* 1.0141 0.9594 0.8711* 0.7625* 
2006 1.1224* 1.7167* 1.3191* 1.2062* 1.1807* 1.0155 0.9561 0.8138* 0.7715* 
2007 1.0787* 1.5712* 1.2535* 1.1776* 1.1104* 0.9721 0.9286* 0.8727* 0.7438* 
ALL - 2.0216* 1.4997* 1.3518* 1.1888* 1.0859* 0.9792 0.8780* 0.7993* 
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result suggests that big banks experience diseconomies of scale and could reduce their 
average cost and gain efficiency by decreasing their scale of operations.  Interestingly, 
there is no consistent evidence of statistically significant scale economies or 
diseconomies in banks with RMB 100 - 500 billion total assets.  The value of scale 
economies for banks with assets of RMB 250-500 billion is very close to one and scale 
advantages do not appear to arise for banks beyond this size.  This result indicates that 
the optimal bank size is in the range of RMB 250-500 billion, because banks in this 
classification exhibit constant returns to scale.  Overall, as asset size increases, returns 
to scale pass from increasing, to constant, and to decreasing.  The average cost curve 
shows a U-shape, with medium-sized banks being more scale efficient than either very 
large or very small banks.  This finding is in accordance with previous studies of the 
Japanese banking system and European banking system (see Altunbas et al., 2000 and 
Altunbas et al., 2001).  
 
The characterisation of Chinese banks in relation to returns to scale under the DEA and 
New DEA models are shown in Table 7.8.  The figures are expressed as the number 
and percentage of banks exhibiting different returns to scale within the same size 
classification.  Looking at the full sample, the majority of Chinese banks are scale 
inefficient over the period from 1994 until 2007 (that is experiencing DRS and IRS).  
Specifically, 52.9% and 65.5% of all banks, for the DEA and New DEA models 
respectively, exhibit DRS.  This result indicates that an investment in input factors for 
these banks will generally lead to a less than proportionate increase in outputs and so a 
further consolidation of large banks on scale economy grounds should be viewed with 
some skepticism.  A relatively small proportion of banks operate under IRS, at 27.7% 
and 16.4% for the DEA and New DEA models respectively.  Moreover, only 19.4% 
and 15.6% of all banks are scale efficient in the industry, based on the DEA and New 
DEA models respectively, suggesting that it is not easy to attain constant returns to scale 
in the Chinese banking industry.  
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Table 7.8 Returns to Scale of Chinese Banks on the Basis of DEA 
 Traditional Cost Efficiency  New Cost Efficiency  
Bank Size 
(RMB 
billion) 
DRS CRS IRS  DRS CRS IRS Total banks 
0-10 3(5.4%) 10(18.2%) 42(76.4%)  9(16.4%) 12(21.8%) 34(61.8%) 55 
10-25 27(42.9%) 10(15.8%) 26(41.3%)  33(52.4%) 13(20.6%) 17(27%) 63 
25-50 21(39.6%) 11(20.8%) 21(39.6%)  33(62.3%) 6(11.3%) 14(26.4%) 53 
50-100 17(43.6%) 12(30.8%) 10(25.6%)  19(48.7%) 14(35.9%) 6(15.4%) 39 
100-250 38(64.4%) 13(22%) 8(13.6%)  52(88.1%) 7(11.9%) 0 (0%) 59 
250-500 29(78.4%) 8(21.6%) 0(0%)  32(86.4%) 5(13.5%) 0(0%) 37 
500-1000 17(58.6%) 9(31%) 3(10.4%)  24(82.8%) 1(3.4%) 4(13.8%) 29 
1000+ 58(93.5%) 4(6.5%) 0(0%)  58(93.5%) 4(6.5%) 0(0%) 62 
All 210(52.9%) 77(19.4%) 110(27.7%)  260(65.5%) 62(15.6%) 75(16.4%) 397 
Notes: DRS = decreasing returns to scale, CRS = constant returns to scale, and IRS = increasing returns to 
scale; Percentage of banks operating under DRS, CRS or IRS in the parentheses.  
 
The relationship between returns to scale and bank size is also of interest.  In general, 
the four largest asset size groups are dominated by instances of decreasing returns to 
scale.  A large proportion of banks in the three smallest asset size groups operate under 
IRS and the percentage of banks with IRS increases monotonically with the size of the 
banks.  It is also worth noting that a significant number of banks (over 30%) are 
operating under CRS in the asset size RMB 50 - 100 billion group.  This pattern is 
generally consistent with our previous SFA findings that as asset size increases, returns 
to scale of banks pass from increasing, to constant, and to decreasing.  
 
7.5 Determinants of Cost Efficiency  
In the previous sections, we presented and analysed the cost efficiency of the Chinese 
banking sector obtained from the preferred SFA, traditional DEA and New DEA models.  
In this section, we examine the effects of other factors on cost efficiency levels in order 
to provide some explanations for variations in efficiency scores and also to offer 
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insights for the improvement of bank management and regulatory policies.  In 
accordance with the theoretical and empirical literature, we hypothesize that the 
determinants of bank efficiency stem from the nature of bank ownership, size, market 
discipline, deregulation and market structure and that these factors are at least partially 
exogenous.  Moreover, we also investigate whether the impact of these environmental 
variables are the same for each of the SFA, DEA and New DEA models.  If the three 
models provide the same information content, then the policy implications and other 
decisions which are based on this information will be more reliable and valuable.  
 
Our preferred SFA model is the one-step estimation procedure, proposed by Battese and 
Coelli (1995), which assumes that cost (in)efficiency can be expressed as a function of a 
number of environmental (at least, partially exogenous) variables.  Results for the SFA 
cost efficiency model are summarised in Table 7.9 and explicitly identify the 
relationships between the environmental variables and cost efficiency52.  Table 7.9 also 
summarises results from applying a Tobit regression to the banks’ DEA and New DEA 
efficiency scores (dependant variable) and the eight environmental variables previously 
referred to (independent variables).  As mentioned earlier, due to the limited nature of 
the efficiency scores, which range in value between 0 and 1, it is necessary that we 
employ the Tobit regression model.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
 
52 Because the original results from the preferred SFA model provide the relationship between the environmental 
variables and an inefficiency score we must reverse all signs of the estimated parameters associated with the 
environmental variables to identify effects of these variables on bank efficiency.    
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Table 7.9 Determinants of Cost Efficiency  
Determinants of efficiency  SFA DEA New DEA 
Ownership indicators 
State-owned banks 0.2516** (0.1065) 
0.0458*** 
(0.0167) 
0.0566*** 
(0.0215) 
Foreign banks 0.1061*** (0.2899) 
0.1297*** 
(0.0289) 
0.1748*** 
(0.0373) 
Size indicator Log (total assets) 0.3563*** (0.1031) 
0.0149*** 
(0.0058) 
0.0203*** 
(0.0075) 
Market discipline indicator Listed banks 0.0066 (0.0857) 
-0.0095 
(0.0188) 
0.0267 
(0.0242) 
Deregulation  indicator WTO accession -1.2117** (0.5284) 
0.0246 
(0.0188) 
-0.0422* 
(0.0242) 
Market structure indicators 
HHI 1.5270 (1.2195) 
0.3335 
(0.325) 
-0.3037 
(0.419) 
Market share 7.2047*** (2.4588) 
0.0725 
(0.143) 
0.1604 
(0.1844) 
 Intercept -2.2074*** (0.5199) 
0.6182*** 
(0.09) 
0.6531*** 
(0.116) 
 Log-likelihood 175.1729 298.625 197.716 
Notes: 1. SFA changes the sign to interpret as efficiency  
2. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.  
3. Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses 
 
7.5.1 Effect of Ownership on Efficiency  
First, it is important to investigate the observed variation in cost efficiency as 
determined by banks’ ownership structure.  The role of ownership in determining cost 
efficiency is provided by group dummies.  Thus we divide Chinese banks into three 
categories, namely state-owned banks, domestic private banks and foreign banks. The 
domestic private banks are omitted in the regression to avoid problems with collinearity 
our regression equations. Thus, other ownership banks’ efficiencies are measured 
relative to the domestic private banks’ efficiency.  We observe that the coefficients of 
the state-owned and foreign banks are statistically significant in both the SFA and DEA 
models.  These results indicate that ownership is indeed a significant determinant of 
bank cost efficiency.  
 
In our analysis, we find that the sign of the coefficient on state-owned banks is positive 
and statistically significant in all three regressions summarised in Table 7.9.  This 
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result suggests that state-owned banks are more efficient than domestic private banks, 
the omitted category of bank.  This is consistent with previous studies dealing with the 
Chinese banking sector (Berger et al., 2009), the Indian banking sector (Bhattachary et 
al, 1997; Shanmugam and Das, 2004) and the Turkish banking sector (Isik and Hassan, 
2003).  It might be that the commonly expressed idea that state-owned banks have less 
incentives to minimise costs and suffer more serious agency problems than private 
banks is debatable for the Chinese banking sector or that there are some additional 
factors involved.  Chinese state-owned banks benefited more than any other category 
of bank from generous government subsidies and the banking reforms which were 
mainly focused on them.  These factors might therefore be responsible for the apparent 
greater efficiency of the state owned Chinese banks over the private banks.  Moreover, 
state-owned banks are often perceived as protected by implicit government guarantees, 
due not only to their size and systemic impact, but also because of their role as vehicles 
for political lending.  Hence, state-owned banks have low default and bankruptcy risk 
and would be likely to attract funds by paying lower rates of interest on borrowing than 
private banks.  This in turn can save the state owned banks considerable sums of 
money and improve their cost efficiency as a consequence.  Another possible 
explanation is ‘skimping’ behaviour under which banks might economise loan 
underwriting and monitoring costs to achieve higher cost efficiency in the short run - 
behaviour which is likely to lead to poor loan revenues in the longer term (Berger and 
DeYong, 1997)53.  Moreover, the loan approvals and extensions of state-owned banks 
are generally less prudential because of government intervention.  This loose lending 
policy boosts loan production and other bank outputs per unit of input in the 
state-owned banks (Isik and Hassan, 2003).  This may also be one of the reasons for 
the perceived higher cost efficiency of the state owned banks.  
 
As expected, looking across the three regressions, the foreign bank variable displays a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient.  It suggests that foreign banks exhibit 
higher cost efficiency than domestic private banks under both the SFA and DEA 
efficiency measures.  This result may indicate that foreign banks in the Chinese market 
                                                        
 
53 Further examination may confirm this explanation.  State-owned banks, particularly the Big Four, 
have much higher rates of non-performing loans than other banks.    
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have succeeded in using their superior technology and managerial expertise and 
experience, and this in turn has offset potential cross-border disadvantages, e.g. lack of 
knowledge about the local market, barriers of culture and regulations, etc.  Our 
findings are in line with other studies on emerging markets (Havrylchyk, 2006; 
Shanmugam and Das, 2004; Isik and Hassan, 2002).  
 
One can also see from Table 7.9 that the coefficient associated with the ownership 
dummy for state-owned banks in the SFA model is generally much larger than the 
coefficient associated with the ownership dummy for foreign banks.  This indicates 
that under the SFA model state-owned banks are more cost efficient than foreign banks.  
The reasons for this could be that foreign banks incurred large costs in attempting to 
provide a superior quality of service with the expectation of higher revenues and they 
also hired highly skilled workers which led to higher salary expenditures.  But our 
efficiency measure does not take these factors into account, and thus foreign banks may 
be wrongly considered as being less cost efficient.  In contrast, this relationship 
between the coefficients of the two ownership dummy variables reverses for the DEA 
and New DEA models.  Thus, under the two DEA specifications foreign banks 
outperformance both types of domestic banks (state-owned and domestic private banks) 
in terms of cost efficiency.  The results do support the global advantage hypothesis, 
proposed by Berger et al. (2000), which states that foreign banks may possess 
comparative advantages when compared to their domestically owned counterparts and 
as a result, they are able to operate more efficiently than domestically owned banks.  
However, there can be no firm conclusions about this matter given the SFA results 
reported earlier for the two ownership dummy variables. 
 
7.5.2 Effect of Bank Size on Efficiency  
From the prior banking literature, we expect bank size to be highly correlated with bank 
performance.  We thus use the log of a bank’s total assets as a proxy for its size.  We 
then use this size proxy in our SFA, DEA and New DEA regression equations.  Table 
7.9 shows that the coefficient associated with the size variable is positive and 
significantly different from zero for all three regressions.  These results indicate that 
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bank size is an important factor that drives the variation in efficiency scores across 
banks and the larger banks tend to be relatively more efficient than the smaller banks.  
Our finding is consistent with many previous efficiency studies in both developed and 
developing countries, e.g., Berger et al., 1993 b; Miller and Noulas, 1996; Hasan and 
Marton, 2003; Ali and Hang, 2006; Laurenceson and Qin, 2008.   
 
There may be a number of reasons for the positive relationship between bank size and 
efficiency.  First, larger banks may have experienced economies of scale and scope 
from growth and joint production and these lead to higher efficiency.  Second, larger 
banks may have a more professional or specialised management team which has greater 
ability to control costs and increase revenues.  Third, larger banks can be assumed to 
possess more flexibility in financial markets and be better able to diversify credit risk in 
an uncertain environment (Cole and Gunther, 1995).  Fourth, large and small banks 
might concentrate on different markets, which could affect their performance (Isik and 
Hassan, 2002).  Large banks are typically operating in the large metropolitan areas or 
nationwide and may face more competitive pressures than small banks which often 
operate within a relatively small area.  This could be valid in the Chinese banking 
sector since small banks operating in China are typically city commercial banks which 
cannot extend their business beyond their own immediate area due to government 
restrictions.  Hence, these geographical restrictions may make it difficult for small 
banks to control costs and be efficient.  Finally, if bank size is positively related to 
market power, larger banks may pay less for their inputs than their smaller counterparts.  
 
7.5.3 Effect of Market Discipline on Efficiency  
As we discussed in our review of the literature, market discipline may impose strong 
incentives on banks to conduct their business in a safe and sound way.  If this is so 
then market discipline will be an effective mechanism for improving bank efficiency by 
pressuring relatively inefficient banks to become more efficient.  The listed bank 
dummy, as a proxy for market discipline, is incorporated into our regression analysis in 
order to capture the impact of market discipline on banks’ cost efficiency scores.  
Moreover, this variable may also relate to banks’ corporate governance.  Once a bank 
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goes public, it becomes subject to legal, regulatory and disclosure requirements which 
usually lead to better corporate governance.  In our study, the market discipline 
hypothesis implies that bank stockowners have a disciplinary effect on bank 
management.  It might be expected that banks whose shares are publicly traded would 
exhibit higher cost efficiency, that is  the listed bank variable will be positively related 
to the banks’ cost efficiency measures.   
 
From Table 7.9, we find that in all three regressions the coefficient associated with the 
listed bank dummy variable is positive but not statistically significant from zero at the 
usual levels of significance.  This result indicates that intense public scrutiny exerts 
only weak market discipline over bank management and listed banks are not necessarily 
more efficient than those not listed on the stock exchange.  Thus, our findings do not 
support the market discipline hypothesis and are in line with a study done for the Polish 
banking sector by Havrylchyk (2006).  The reason for this could be that stock markets 
respond more strongly to profit measures than to cost efficiency measures (Chu and Lim, 
1998).  Moreover, even if some Chinese banks are publicly listed, the government still 
maintains more than 50% ownership.  This in turn may undermine the effectiveness of 
market discipline (stockholders’ monitoring). 
 
7.5.4 Effect of Deregulation on Efficiency  
The principal aim of deregulation is to improve resource allocation and the efficiency of 
the banking sector by creating a competitive environment (Berger and Humphrey, 1997).  
Begining in 1994 the Chinese government began a continuous programme of 
deregulation of the banking industry as well as introducing a number of major banking 
reforms.  However, China’s entry into the WTO at the end of 2001 was an important 
milestone in the banking deregulation process and marked the beginning of a new era.  
The main consequences of China’s entry into the WTO are that the Chinese government 
now allows the entry of foreign-controlled banks into the local market (both corporate 
and retail) and promotes foreign strategic investments in domestic banks (up to a 25% 
ownership stake).  In this study, we attempt to examine the impact of WTO accession 
on Chinese banking in terms of cost efficiency.  It is hypothesised that after China was 
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admitted to the WTO in 2001 banking competitiveness improved, which in turn 
disciplined banks in their resource management and forced them to be more efficient.  
Thus, a dummy variable is included in our regression equations in order to capture the 
impact of the deregulation measures adopted in China after its admission to the WTO54.  
 
Table 7.9 shows that the coefficient associated with the deregulation dummy variable is 
negative in both the SFA and New DEA regressions and statistically significant at the 
5% and 10% levels, respectively.  However, although the reported coefficient of the 
deregulation dummy is positive in the DEA regression, it is not statistically significantly 
different from zero at conventional levels.  On the whole these results indicate that 
China’s entry into the WTO has not fulfilled its expectation in terms of cost efficiency 
gains.  This result, however, is not unique to China.  In some other countries, 
deregulation also appears to have lead to a deterioration or at least, no significant 
improvement in measures of efficiency; for example, Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell (1996) for 
Spain, Humprey and Pulley (1997) for the U.S. and Denizer et al. (2000) for Turkey.  
There are a number of factors which probably explain these results.  First, the 
discouraging impact of deregulation may be due to a lag effect.  Competition in the 
Chinese banking sector may not have significantly increased during the transition period 
(2002-2006) because some regulatory obstacles were still in place for foreign banks.  
For example, the CBRC imposed new rules that foreign banks must be locally 
incorporated as legal entities before they can conduct local currency business for 
Chinese citizens.  Otherwise, foreign banks will not be allowed to issue bank cards and 
their “threshold” for RMB fixed deposits will be 1 million.  As a consequence, 
domestic banks may have had less of a motivation to improve their performance 
immediately.  In addition, after China’s WTO entry, Chinese domestic banks expected 
that they would face increasing competition from their foreign rivals.  Hence, domestic 
banks may have devoted considerable resources towards preparing for the 
environmental changes associated with WTO membership and this could have resulted 
in a fall in their cost efficiency.  Although China’s WTO accession did not show a 
positive impact on banking cost efficiency in the short run, there is evidence that it has 
                                                        
 
54  This dummy variable separates the sample into the pre-deregulation (1994-2001) and post- 
deregulation (2002-2007) periods. 
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improved Chinese banking efficiency in the longer term.  In order to reduce possible 
negative impacts after WTO entry, the Chinese government also launched a variety of 
reform measures on its banking sector which mainly took effect after 2003.  Our 
earlier analysis also shows that banking cost efficiency improved in the later years of 
the sample period - see Figures 7.1 and 7.3.  These figures support our optimistic view 
of the impact of China’s entry into the WTO in the long run.  
 
7.5.5 Effect of Market Structure on Efficiency  
Extensive theory and empirical research reveal that market structure conditions can 
affect bank performance and efficiency.  Thus, this study also examines the 
relationship between cost efficiency and market structure by incorporating a market 
concentration measure (the Herfindahl-Hirschman index) and market share (in terms of 
the proportion of total assets) as determinants of efficiency in our regression equations.  
Higher concentration may be associated with higher costs (lower cost efficiency).  
Banks in a less competitive market (high levels of market concentration) could charge 
prices in excess of competitive levels and eventually earn supernormal profits.  Under 
this relatively relaxed environment, bank mangers might not work as hard to control 
bank costs and this could result in lower cost efficiency (quiet life hypothesis).  
However, higher market concentration may also be associated with lower costs (higher 
cost efficiency).  As suggested by the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm, 
banks in markets with higher concentration can benefit from market power, such as 
paying lower deposit rates and this directly or indirectly, could lead to higher cost 
efficiency. Our results show that the coefficient associated with the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) variable is positive in the SFA and the DEA 
regressions and negative in the New DEA regression.  However, none of coefficients 
are statistically significantly different from zero at reasonable levels, indicating that 
market concentration is not a significant factor in determining cost efficiency for the 
Chinese banking sector.  Therefore, our results seem to support neither of the above 
hypotheses – the quiet life hypothesis nor the SCP hypothesis (on the cost side).  
 
Regarding the relationship between market share and cost efficiency, the coefficient 
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associated with the market share variable (proportion of total assets) is positive in all 
three models, but it is only statistically significant in the SFA regression55.  The results, 
based on SFA efficiency measures, indicate that banks with a dominant share of banking 
assets could be associated with lower average total costs and thereby have higher cost 
efficiency.  This evidence seems to support the relative-market power hypothesis under 
which banks with large market shares and well-differentiated products exert more 
market power and eventually achieve more profits or better performance (Shepherd, 
1982).  However, this result may suffer from an identification problem because the 
causality might run both ways.  The bigger market share may be the result of either 
superior management and/or greater efficiency in the production process.  Such a 
reverse causation occurs under the efficient-structure hypothesis of Demsetz (1973).  
However, we cannot find any significant relationship between market share and cost 
efficiency in the two DEA regressions, both of which indicate that market share is not 
particularly important in determining efficiency differences amongst banks. 
 
Overall, our results show that the relationship between market structure and cost 
efficiency does not seem to be strong for the Chinese banking sector.  The most likely 
explanation for this finding is that the prices banks charge for their services and other 
activities are mainly controlled by the state.  Banks have only limited capacity to 
exercise market power by paying lower deposit rates and/or charging higher loan rates. 
Thus, they do not have much opportunity to enjoy the benefits which flow from a 
concentrated market structure (Fu and Heffernan, 2009). 
 
7.6 Summary and Conclusion   
This chapter investigates the cost efficiency levels of Chinese banks during the reform 
period from 1994 until 2007.  The efficiency scores are obtained from the SFA, DEA 
and New DEA models.  Our results show that when the SFA model is applied to our 
                                                        
 
55 Market share as proxied by the proportion of total deposits and total loans has also been used in 
empirical work in the literature, e.g. Berger and Mester, 1997; Fu and Heffernan 2009. However, when 
we used this proxy in our regression equations we obtained results that are not materially different from 
those using the alternative market share proxy (proportion of total assets) on which the empirical analysis 
summarised in the text is based. 
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data, the mean cost efficiency scores range from 86.5% in 2004 up to 96% in 1994. We 
find that the average cost efficiency sharply declined after China’s admission to the 
WTO.  This result indicates that the external environmental changes due to WTO entry 
have significantly affected banks’ cost efficiency levels.  In contrast, the other banking 
reforms implemented between 1995 and 2004 appear to have enhanced the cost 
efficiency of Chinese banks. When categorising sample banks into the Big Four, 
state-owned policy banks, nationwide joint stock commercial banks, city commercial 
banks and foreign banks, the Big Four and policy banks show a relatively higher mean 
level of efficiency and amongst the rest of the subcategories, no one bank group gains a 
clearly dominant position over the sample period.  Moreover, large banks, on average, 
seem to be relatively more cost efficient than small banks.  This result indicates that 
large banks may enjoy some advantages when compared with the smaller banks.  
 
Based on the results of the DEA and New DEA models, the overall cost efficiency of 
Chinese banks averaged 89% and 86.5% respectively over the period from 1994 until 
2007.  Although the DEA and New DEA efficiency measures are similar over the 
sample period, they seem to be some different temporal patterns in their respective cost 
efficiency estimates.  Specifically, the evolution of DEA and new DEA cost efficiency 
scores for different bank types often display erratic trajectories.  Generally, the Big 
Four, policy banks and foreign banks seems to be relatively more cost efficient than the 
JSCBs and CCBs.  Moreover, the cost efficiency of the Big Four has significantly 
improved over the sample period.  This result suggests that the Big Four could be 
benefiting from government subsidies and bank reforms which have focused mainly on 
these Big Four banks.  Our findings based on the DEA models, also indicate that small 
and very small banks seem to be less efficient than the lager banks.   
 
This chapter also explores whether economies of scale exist for the Chinese banking 
sector using both the SFA and DEA models.  The results show that scale inefficiency is 
present in the Chinese banking sector.  Generally, small banks face economies of scale 
and large banks, diseconomies of scale.  The medium-sized banks seem to be most 
scale efficient.  
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Finally, this chapter investigates whether ownership structure, size, market discipline, 
deregulation and market structure significantly affect the cost efficiency levels of 
Chinese banks.  In order to provide robust information, this analysis is conducted using 
SFA, DEA and New DEA cost efficiency measures.  Our results show that both 
state-owned and foreign banks are more efficient than domestic private banks.  
Moreover, based on the results of two the DEA regressions, foreign banks exhibit more 
cost efficiency than their domestic counterparts (state-owned and domestic private 
banks).  Thus our results show that differences in ownership structure significantly 
affect Chinese banks’ performance in terms of cost efficiency.  With respect to bank 
size, we find that larger banks tend to be relatively more efficient than smaller banks.  
This indicates that larger banks may have some advantages, such as economies of scale 
and scope and more specialised management teams, and these appear to have a 
favourable impact on their cost efficiency.  Our results also show that a bank’s listing 
on the stock exchange does not have a significant impact on its cost efficiency, implying 
that listed and non-listed banks might be equally efficient.  We also conclude that 
market discipline may not be an important factor in determining the variation in 
efficiency scores across banks.  Regarding deregulation, we find no evidence to 
support the view that deregulation (China’s WTO entry) improved bank efficiency 
significantly.  Based on the SFA and the New DEA regression results, the 
post-deregulation period (2002-2007) shows banks to be less efficient than in the 
pre-deregulation period (1994-2001); however, this relationship is not significant in the 
traditional DEA regression model.  These results may have arisen because competition 
in the Chinese banking sector did not become more intense immediately after China’s 
WTO entry and also, banks were forced to spend additional resources in order to deal 
with the environmental changes associated with WTO entry.  Finally, our results reveal 
that the relationship between market structure (market concentration and market share) 
and cost efficiency seems not to be very strong, except for the case of the SFA 
regression in which market share is significantly positively related to cost efficiency.  
There is no evidence to support the quiet life hypothesis.  Overall, the SFA, DEA and 
New DEA efficiency measures provide similar information about the determinants of 
Chinese bank cost efficiency. The results for the determinate of cost efficiency do not 
seem to be very sensitive to methodological choices for the application of the frontier 
efficiency techniques. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion and Limitations 
 
8.1 Introduction and Summary of Findings  
The Chinese banking sector has experienced significant changes over the last thirty 
years.  Under the reform process implemented by the Chinese government, 
liberalisation, deregulation and financial innovation have been major forces impacting 
on the performance of the Chinese banking sector.  In such a context, regulators and 
bank management are now more concerned with analysing banking costs and the 
efficiency levels of the banking sector.  Therefore, this study seeks to investigate the 
cost efficiency levels of the Chinese banking sector during the reform period from 1994 
until 2007.  
 
Since the late 1970’s the Chinese government has implemented a series of banking 
reforms in order to build a safe and sound banking system.  Prior to 1979, the Chinese 
banking sector was a Soviet-style mono-banking system, entirely dominated by the 
People’s Bank of China (PBC).  However, during the period from 1979 until 1992 the 
Chinese government implemented the first round of its banking reforms.  The 
mono-banking system was broken up and a two-tier banking system consisting of a 
central bank (the PBC) and various kinds of other banking institutions was formally 
established.  Moreover, starting in 1993 the government initiated a second round of 
banking reforms which aimed to reduce excessive government intervention in banks’ 
operations and also, to maintain the financial stability of the banking sector.  Before 
1993, major Chinese (state-owned) banks were under the direct control of the 
government, and were granted very little in the way of decision-marking powers, 
especially in relation to credit and lending decisions.  Because of excessive 
government intervention in banks’ operations (in particular in relation to lending 
policies) state-owned banks accumulated enormous volumes of non-performing loans 
and bad debts.  In order to mitigate this problem, the reforms implemented by the 
government employed measures designed to transform the policy-driven banking 
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system which had been in existence since the formation of the Peoples’ Republic of 
China into a market-oriented banking system.  The measures mainly included 
establishing policy banks to separate policy lending from commercial lending and 
commercialising the state-owned banks by giving them more autonomy in their decision 
making.  However, after the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the Chinese government 
recognised the importance of confidence and stability in the operations of the Chinese 
financial sector.  Thus, since this time the reforms implemented by the government 
have been mainly concerned with reducing the financial difficulties inherited by the 
state-owned banks through the provision of substantial injections of equity capital and 
the removal of nonperforming loans from the affected banks’ balance sheets. 
 
After being admitted to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in December 2001, China 
launched a third round of banking reforms designed to modernise its banking sector and 
to fulfil its WTO commitments.  The major reforms during this phase of the reforms 
process include the establishment of a new regulatory organisation, the rehabilitation of 
the state-owned commercial banks, the elimination of restrictions on the entry and 
operations of foreign banks, the introduction of foreign strategic investors and the 
public listing of bank securities on the stock exchange.  Currently, the Chinese banking 
system consists of a variety of institutions such as state-owned commercial banks, 
policy banks, joint-stock commercial banks, rural credit cooperatives, etc.  However, 
the state-owned commercial banks dominate the Chinese banking system.  For 
example, in 2007 the big four state-owned commercial banks held over 50% of total 
banking assets.  
 
Bearing the aforementioned developments in mind, a primary aim of this study is to 
provide an empirical analysis of the cost efficiency of the Chinese banking system over 
the period from 1994 until 2007.  To this end and following the empirical literature on 
banking efficiency, we employ both stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) techniques to estimate the cost efficiency of Chinese 
banks.  Moreover, we also investigate the main determinants of Chinese banking 
efficiency under both the SFA and DEA frameworks.  For the present study the sample 
is an unbalanced panel which covers 41 Chinese banks and totals 397 observations.   
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The main inferences that can be drawn from the results of our empirical study can be 
summarised as follows.  In order to reach the best-specified stochastic cost frontier 
model for measuring Chinese banking efficiency, we compare five different stochastic 
frontier model specifications.  We conducted a step-wise specification testing 
procedure.  The results show that the specification which incorporates both control and 
environmental variables (thereby accounting for heterogeneity across banks) provides a 
better fit to the data of Chinese banks than any of the other alternative specifications.  
We also discuss the effect of accounting for bank heterogeneity on key parameter 
estimates, on efficiency levels and on efficiency ranks.  Our empirical results show that 
accounting for heterogeneity across banks is crucial.  If heterogeneity is not taken into 
account, the estimates obtained for banking cost efficiency may be biased.  The 
preferred model specification for our sample is the one stage SFA model that includes 
the traditional input prices, the outputs and the control variables (that is, the level of 
equity, the amount of non-performing loans and the time trend) in the cost frontier and 
the environmental variables (that is, the ownership structure, size, deregulation, market 
structure and market discipline) in the inefficiency term. 
 
This study also employs two cost DEA models (traditional DEA and New DEA) as a 
complement to the preferred cost SFA model for methodological cross-checking 
purposes.  As far as we are aware this is the only empirical study that compares 
different efficiency frontier techniques using a common set of Chinese banking data.  
We check five consistency conditions through which to assess the compatibility of the 
SFA, the DEA and the New DEA models.  The results show that there is only moderate 
consistency between the results of these three dominant models.  This is perhaps 
because the DEA models do not disentangle the statistical noise term from the 
inefficiency term.  This in turn means that the DEA models may underestimate the cost 
efficiency scores.  Against this, the SFA method is implemented using a specific 
functional form to estimate the efficiency frontier, and it is entirely possible that the 
functional form which is used may be mis-specified.  More specifically, the first 
consistency condition check shows that some differences emerge in the distributional 
characteristics of the estimated efficiency measures based on the three different frontier 
models.  The rank correlations of cost efficiency are around 0.45 between the SFA and 
DEA models; similar for the DEA and New DEA models.  But the correlations 
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between the SFA and New DEA models tend to be lower (only 0.28).  This evidence 
suggests that these three models may rank the sample banks in different orders thereby 
leading to different assessments of relative banking efficiency (consistency condition 2).  
With respect to consistency condition 3, the results suggest that the SFA, DEA and New 
DEA models tend to have moderate consistency in identifying the best and the worst 
quartile banks.  Moreover, under consistency condition 4 the efficiency scores obtained 
from all models exhibit relatively stability over short periods of time but show 
considerable instability over longer periods (more than five years).  This result 
indicates that the Chinese banking sector may be subject to important technological and 
regulatory changes over relatively long periods.  In the context of the relation between 
the frontier efficiency measures and conventional performance measures, the parametric 
efficiency (that is, SFA) measures are significantly correlated with conventional 
performance measures.  Against this, the non-parametric efficiency (that is, DEA) 
measures are only significantly correlated with the conventional cost-related 
performance measures but not with the conventional profit-related performance 
indicators (consistency condition 5).   
 
This study finds that Chinese banks, on average, exhibit a somewhat modest degree of 
cost inefficiency.  In the case of the SFA model, the average cost efficiency of Chinese 
banks over the period from 1994 until 2007 is around 91% (that is, an inefficiency level 
of 9%).  Based on the results of the DEA and New DEA models, the average cost 
efficiency for Chinese banks over the sample period is about 89% and 87%, respectively.  
We also find that Chinese banking efficiency has deteriorated after China’s admission to 
the WTO (at the end of 2001).  This result suggests that the significant external 
environmental changes which arose from China’s admission to the WTO may have had 
a negative impact on Chinese banking efficiency.  However, we note that the negative 
impact arising from WTO entry seems to disappear in the later stages of our sample 
period (2004-2007); that is, the average of the cost efficiency scores shows an 
increasing trend during this later stage of our sample period.  This efficiency 
improvement could be due to the banking reforms implemented by the Chinese 
government in response to China’s WTO entry (e.g. capital injection, non-performing 
loan write-offs, introduction of foreign strategic investors, etc.).  However, the SFA, 
DEA and New DEA efficiency estimates do not always show similar temporal patterns 
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over the sample period.  For example, the average of cost efficiency scores obtained 
under the SFA and DEA models show an increasing trend over the period from 1995 
until 1998.  Against this, under the New DEA model, average cost efficiency shows a 
decreasing trend over the same period.   
 
When our sample banks are categorised by bank type (that is, big four state-owned 
banks, state-owned policy banks, joint stock commercial banks and city commercial 
banks) and size class (that is, very big, big, medium, small and very small)  we find 
that the Big Four and the policy banks have tended to exhibit greater efficiency than 
other bank types.  This result may suggest that the Big Four and policy banks have 
benefited more significantly from the reform process than other banks - something 
which might be expected given that government policy had a particular focus on these 
two categories of banks.  Similarly, the results show that banks from the very big and 
big bank categories, in general, are more efficient than banks from the other size 
categories.  This suggests that big banks have advantages over small banks, such as an 
extensive network of branches, more specialised management teams, more advanced 
technology, etc. – all of which have the potential to enhance their relative efficiency.    
 
Based on the SFA model’s results, we find that economies of scale are prevalent across 
the Chinese banking sector.  This finding is mainly a result of widespread scale 
economies arising in small banks (banks with assets size between 0 to 250 billion RMB).  
This suggests that small-sized Chinese banks can obtain cost savings by increasing the 
scale of their operations.  In contrast, medium-sized and large-size banks (banks with 
assets size over 250 billion RMB) exhibit constant or diseconomies of scale.  Overall, 
the results obtained from the DEA models show that the majority of Chinese banks 
exhibit diseconomies of scale.  In contrast, the results obtained from the SFA model 
shows that in general, Chinese banks tend to exhibit increasing returns to scale.  
However, the results for different size categories of banks are similar to those found for 
the SFA model.  The smallest banks exhibit economies of scale and the largest banks 
exhibit diseconomies of scale.  Overall, both the SFA and DEA models generally show 
that scale inefficiency is present in the Chinese banking sector (that is, most banks 
exhibit either decreasing or increasing returns to scale).  In particular, as asset size 
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increases, Chinese banks tend to pass from increasing, to constant, and then to 
decreasing returns to scale.   
 
The empirical analysis carried out in this thesis also investigates the main determinants 
of Chinese banking efficiency because this could provide important insights for the 
potential improvement of bank management and regulatory policies.  In particular, we 
examine the impact of environmental factors (that is, ownership structure, size, 
deregulation, market structure and market discipline) on the cost efficiency levels of 
banks.  Our results show that both state-owned banks and foreign banks are more 
efficient than domestic private banks for all three regression models (based on the 
efficiency scores obtained from the SFA, DEA and New DEA models).  In addition, 
the results of our DEA regressions confirm the global advantage hypothesis which states 
that foreign banks may possess comparative advantages over their domestically owned 
counterparts and as a result, they are able to operate more efficiently than domestic 
banks.  Another important result is that larger banks tend to be relatively more efficient 
than smaller banks for all three regressions.  Moreover, we find no evidence to support 
the view that deregulation (China’s WTO accession) has had a positive impact on 
Chinese banking efficiency.  In particular, the post-WTO accession period (2002-2007) 
shows banks to be less efficient than in the pre-WTO accession period (1994-2001) for 
both the SFA and the New DEA models.  Furthermore, except for the case of the SFA 
regressions in which market share is significantly positively related to cost efficiency, 
the market structure factors do not have a significant impact on Chinese banking 
efficiency.  Similarly, our results do not support the hypothesis that listing on the stock 
market exerts much in the way of market discipline over Chinese banks or indeed, that 
it improves banking efficiency.  Overall, however, the SFA, DEA and New DEA cost 
efficiency estimates provide robust information regarding the main determinants of 
Chinese banking efficiency.   
 
8.2 Policy Implications  
The empirical findings from this study shed light on the potential direction of future 
banking reforms in China and also, on the issue of how banks might go about increasing 
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the efficiency of their operations.  The policy implications from this study are 
summarised as follows. 
 
First, our empirical findings indicate that small-sized banks (asset size less than 50 
billion RMB) exhibit economies of scale.  Thus, from a scale efficiency perspective, 
small-sized banks, which our empirical analysis indicates are generally operating under 
increasing returns to scale, could improve their scale efficiency by growing in size.  
Moreover, our analysis also demonstrates that larger banks are more cost efficient than 
smaller banks.  This finding suggests that in general, Chinese banks could improve 
their cost efficiency by increasing their size; perhaps by using mergers and acquisitions.  
In addition, the government should consider removing regulations that confine city 
commercial banks to operating within their own city boundaries.  This geographical 
constraint is likely to be damaging to city commercial banks’ efficiency because it 
prevents them from effectively spreading risk and achieving economies of scale. 
   
Secondly, private ownership by itself may not be sufficient to insure that Chinese banks 
operate efficiently due to the fact that our empirical procedures find statistically 
significant evidence that state-owned banks are more cost efficient than domestic 
private-owned banks.  Moreover, we find that foreign banks are significantly more 
efficient than (private) domestic banks and so the competitive pressures induced by the 
relaxation of foreign bank entry into the Chinese banking sector ought to make an 
important contribution towards improving overall banking efficiency.  It is also the 
case that foreign banks may have advantages over domestic banks such as superior risk 
management skills, advanced technology, international operating experience, etc.  
Competitive pressures mean that these advantages ought to be transferred to their 
domestic counterparts and thereby result in an improvement in overall Chinese banking 
efficiency.  Thus, the opening up of the Chinese banking sector to the entry of foreign 
banks is important in the ongoing process of efficiency improvement and innovation in 
the banking system.  
 
Thirdly, the findings from this study suggest that the deregulation programme 
consequent upon China’s admission to the WTO did not provide the anticipated banking 
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efficiency gains.  The Chinese banking sector shows only marginally lower cost 
efficiency in the post-WTO accession period (that is, after 2001).   However, industry 
conditions prior to deregulation are crucial for the success of the deregulation measures 
implemented by the government.   Chinese banks faced a number of challenges, such 
as large amounts of non-performing loans, insufficient capital, extensive government 
intervention and poor corporate governance standards before China’s entry into the 
WTO.  Thus, deregulation without accompanying reforms which address these 
underlying problems of the Chinese banking sector, will be insufficient to boost 
productivity and efficiency in the Chinese banking system.   In particular, the Chinese 
government should continually introduce reform measures to reduce political 
intervention and improve risk management, transparency and corporate governance in 
Chinese banks.  
 
Finally, we do not find a significant relationship between a bank’s stock exchange 
listing status and the level of its operating efficiency.  Hence, there is no evidence that 
merely listing on the stock market enhances bank governance procedures or their 
operating efficiency  Moreover, Chinese banking regulators should continue to 
liberalise interest rates in order to enhance the role of market forces in resource 
allocation and so that credit can be allocated more efficiently.  Furthermore, stock 
market reform may also be necessary so that banking fundamentals are more adequately 
reflected in stock market valuations.  One might then expect that the Chinese stock 
market will then exert more effective discipline over bank management and this in turn 
will improve overall banking efficiency.   
 
8.3 Limitations of the Study and Future Research  
Our study has some limitations and these suggest potential directions for future work.  
The first shortcoming of the present study is that we only investigate the cost efficiency 
of Chinese banks.  Cost efficiency gives a measure of how close a bank’s costs are to 
those of the best banking practice after controlling for comparative output levels.  As 
indicated by Berger and Mester (1997), a bank that is relatively cost efficient at its 
current output levels may not be cost efficient at optimal output levels, since this 
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typically involves a different scale and mix of outputs.  However, profit efficiency 
which is based on the economic goal of profit maximisation, could capture 
inefficiencies on the output side as well as those on the input side.  Thus, further 
research into investigating the profit efficiency of Chinese banks would be a valuable 
addition to the literature.   
 
Although this study employs both the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) methodologies in the field of efficiency analysis, not all 
the different efficiency frontier techniques which are available are used in this study.  
For example, we do not apply the distribution free approach, the thick frontier approach 
or the free disposal hull approach to our sample data.  Thus, an interesting direction for 
further research would be to employ all these frontier techniques to estimate the relative 
efficiency of Chinese banks.  This would also enhance the methodological 
cross-checking procedures which have been so valuable to researchers and policy 
makers for assessing the robustness of empirically estimated efficiency levels in this 
area of the literature.     
 
In addition, this study is also subject to limitations related to the number of observations 
included in the data sample, because of the relatively small number and short history of 
Chinese banks.  Some advanced models, such as the Fourier-flexible functional form, 
are not appropriate for estimating the efficiency levels of Chinese banks because of the 
limited size of our sample.  Fortunately, a more exhaustive data set for Chinese banks 
is gradually becoming available. Therefore, future research can use this emerging and 
larger sample to provide a more comprehensive study of Chinese banking efficiency.  
As was discussed in Chapter 4, the Chinese deregulation programme is a continuous 
process and some of the reforms have only been gradually implemented since 2004.  
Thus, the Chinese banking sector may not have had sufficient time to effectively 
implement the cost savings and revenue enhancing possibilities permitted by these 
reforms at the time we undertook our empirical analysis of banking efficiency.  
Evidence of this is provided by the fact that Chinese banking efficiency levels display a 
significant increase in the latter years of our study period.  Thus, future research that 
extends the study period beyond 2007 will also provide a better understanding of the 
impact of the deregulation policies that have recently been implemented by the Chinese 
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government.   
 
Finally, this study models heterogeneity in the stochastic frontier model framework by 
incorporating bank specific heterogeneity variables either in the cost function itself or as 
explanatory variables in a simultaneous regression model where cost inefficiency is the 
dependant variable.  It is entirely possible, however, that the heterogeneity variables 
employed in our regression procedures are not complete and that our empirical analysis 
is therefore afflicted by an omitted variables problem.  This, in turn, may create 
potential biases in the estimates of our inefficiency scores.  A potential way to address 
this problem is to use “true effects model” proposed by Greene (2005).  Greene’s 
model integrates an additional stochastic term in the traditional SFA model in order to 
distinguish all time invariant unobserved heterogeneities from the inefficiency term.  
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Appendix 1 
Log-likelihood Ratio test  
The likelihood ratio (LR) test is a very powerful and widely used method for choosing 
models or verifying/validating assumptions.  The LR test examines whether a reduced 
model (with restrictions on the number of parameters) provides as good a fit to the data 
as a completely specified model (without any restrictions on the parameters).  If the 
reduced model is valid, then it should not lead to a large reduction in the value of the 
likelihood function (Green, 2008).  Thus, the LR test is based on the ratio of the 
maximum value of the likelihood function under the restricted model to the 
corresponding maximum value of the likelihood function under the unrestricted model.  
The likelihood ratio is defied by λ = LR /LU, where LR is the maximum of the likelihood 
function when the restrictions are imposed; LU is the maximum of the likelihood 
function when the restrictions are not imposed. Because a restricted specification is 
never superior to an unrestricted specification the log-likelihood ratio will always be 
non-negative; that is, the likelihood ratio, λ, always lies between 0 and 1.  The 
likelihood ratio test is normally based on minus two times log-likelihood ratio and is 
give by:  
 
LR = -2 ln λ = -2(ln LR –ln LU)  
 
If the sample size is sufficiently large, the log-likelihood test statistic is asymptotically 
distributed as a Chi-square (χ2) variate with the degrees of freedom equal to the number 
of restrictions imposed by the null hypothesis.  Thus, we can find out whether the 
difference between the restricted and unrestricted log-likelihood functions is statistically 
significant at any given level of significance.  If the log-likelihood test statistic exceeds 
the appropriate critical value from the Chi-Square (χ2) tables, then the null hypothesis is 
rejected; that is, the imposed restrictions are invalid.  The null hypothesis is accepted if 
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the log-likelihood test statistic is less than the Chi-square critical value, meaning that 
the imposed restrictions are valid.    
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Appendix 2 
Appendix 2a:  SFA Cost Efficiency Scores for Chinese Banks 1994-2007 -Individual Bank Estimates 
Bank name  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Bank Average 
Industrial & Commercial Bank of China 0.9728 0.9568 0.9729 0.9663 0.9711 0.9712 0.9741  0.9696 0.9524 0.9456 0.9471 0.9259 0.9473 0.9577 0.9593  
China Construction Bank Corporation 0.9501 0.9436 0.9429 0.9645 0.9665 0.9704 0.9515  0.9611 0.9217 0.9441 0.9373 0.9505 0.9547 0.9547 0.9510  
Agricultural Bank of China 0.9575 0.9538 0.9291 0.9584 0.9653 0.9637 0.9680  0.9557 0.9366 0.9322 0.9535 0.9662 0.9616 0.9402 0.9530  
Bank of China 0.9679 0.9602 0.9700 0.9741 0.9747 0.9738 0.9710  0.9696 0.9537 0.9388 0.8776 0.9494 0.9159 0.9562 0.9538  
China Development Bank  0.9606 0.9698 0.9643 0.9519 0.9663 0.9362  0.9631 0.9543 0.9593 0.9587 0.9624 0.9663 0.9689 0.9602  
Agricultural Development Bank of China  0.9556 0.9673 0.9630 0.9611 0.9620 0.9467  0.9669 0.9398 0.9537 0.9577 0.9607 0.9358 0.9338 0.9542  
Export-Import Bank of China   0.9516 0.9366 0.9484 0.9553 0.9618 0.9305  0.9532 0.9440 0.9499 0.9348 0.9398 0.9446 0.9113 0.9432  
Bank of Communications 0.9562 0.9497 0.9625 0.9660 0.9745 0.9767 0.9738  0.9692 0.9525 0.8438 0.8938 0.8813 0.9205 0.9500 0.9407  
China Merchants Bank  0.9540 0.9651 0.9626 0.9618 0.9491 0.9323  0.9808 0.9062 0.9461 0.9479 0.7811 0.9419 0.9498 0.9368  
China Minsheng Banking Corporation   0.8611 0.9045 0.8388 0.8949 0.9418  0.9495 0.9340 0.9418 0.9456 0.9219 0.9313 0.9591 0.9187  
China CITIC Bank  0.9663 0.9735 0.9492 0.9427 0.9639 0.9624 0.9680  0.9622 0.9394 0.9380 0.9415 0.9434 0.9519 0.9586 0.9544  
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 0.9528 0.9344 0.9671 0.9584 0.9713 0.9479 0.9423  0.9512 0.9171 0.9253 0.9206 0.8548 0.9266 0.9384 0.9363  
Industrial Bank 0.9578 0.8579 0.9098 0.8923 0.9240 0.9059 0.9309  0.9436 0.9169 0.9319 0.9480 0.9493 0.9457 0.9629 0.9269  
Hua Xia Bank  0.9616 0.9502 0.9301 0.9327 0.9487 0.9328  0.9355 0.9050 0.9243 0.6392 0.9405 0.9328 0.9499 0.9141  
Guangdong Development Bank 0.9582 0.9518 0.9541 0.9463 0.9523 0.9588 0.9551  0.9618 0.9430 0.9550 0.9412 0.9484 0.9481 0.9620 0.9526  
China Everbright Bank  0.9660 0.9262 0.9579 0.9649 0.9628 0.9434 0.9541  0.9640 0.9439 0.9478 0.9423 0.9618 0.9567 0.9659 0.9541  
Evergrowing Bank   0.9511 0.9277 0.9698 0.9257 0.8770 0.9281  0.9296 0.8135 0.8795 0.8081 0.8650 0.9119 0.8921 0.8984  
Shenzhen Development Bank  0.9558 0.8839 0.9337 0.8881 0.9064 0.9006 0.9289  0.9567 0.9078 0.9686 0.8627 0.8836 0.9353 0.9657 0.9198  
China Zheshang Bank           0.8373 0.8729 0.8842 0.9122 0.8766  
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Appendix 2a  SFA Cost Efficiency Scores for Chinese Banks 1994-2007 -Individual Bank Estimates (continued) 
Bank name  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Bank Average 
Bank of Beijing       0.9350 0.9541  0.9739 0.9412 0.9155 0.9081 0.9006 0.9306 0.9668 0.9362 
Tianjin City Commercial Bank      0.9252 0.9377  0.9441 0.8905 0.8731 0.8820 0.8626 0.5150 0.8729 0.8559 
Bank of Shanghai  0.9385 0.9598 0.9491 0.9590 0.9613 0.9558  0.9448 0.8780 0.9290 0.8929 0.8974 0.9089 0.9363 0.9316 
Bank of Jiangshu             0.6750 0.5794 0.8797 0.7114 
Bank of Nanjing    0.9398 0.9450 0.9365 0.9609  0.9395 0.9297 0.9340 0.9361 0.8914 0.9297 0.8897 0.9302 
Bank of Ningbo       0.9272  0.9257 0.8241 0.8255 0.8546 0.8561 0.8724 0.8163 0.8627 
Bank of Dalian         0.8519 0.8294 0.8327 0.8283 0.8298 0.9044 0.9036 0.8543 
Jinan City Commercial Bank         0.9250 0.8419 0.8941 0.8902 0.8536 0.7989 0.7902 0.8563 
Hangzhou City Commercial Bank         0.9443 0.8935 0.9363 0.9056 0.9340 0.9379 0.9336 0.9264 
Huishang Bank             0.8515 0.8955 0.8735 
Dongguan City Commercial Bank       0.8803 0.9375  0.8647 0.6942 0.6814 0.6699 0.7037 0.8832 0.9335 0.8054 
Xi'an City Commercial Bank       0.9003  0.9144 0.7886 0.8611 0.8018 0.9094 0.9271 0.9082 0.8764 
Nanchong-city Bank         0.3625 0.4697 0.6095 0.6158 0.6834 0.8944 0.6059 
Fuzhou City Commercial Bank           0.8233 0.7979 0.7975 0.9012 0.9214 0.8483 
Xiameng International Bank      0.9150 0.9187  0.9461 0.7751 0.7572 0.7890 0.8848 0.9116 0.9264 0.8693 
Wenzhou Bank       0.8997  0.8983 0.7342 0.7413 0.7623 0.7426 0.7154 0.8676 0.7952 
First Sino Bank      0.8333 0.9322  0.9563 0.8878 0.8812 0.8846 0.8719 0.8318 0.9317 0.8901 
Qingdao International bank      0.9507 0.9617  0.9517 0.8268 0.5359 0.7099 0.8984 0.8990  0.8418 
BNP PARIBAS (China)          0.9394 0.9588 0.8324 0.9269 0.9327 0.9533 0.9239 
Bank of East Asia (China)            0.9751 0.9082 0.7620 0.8818 
HSBC(China)              0.9387 0.9387 
Standard Chartered Bank (China)              0.8880 0.8880 
Year Average  0.9601 0.9425 0.9467 0.9477 0.9482 0.9374 0.9432  0.9445 0.8741 0.8765 0.8653 0.8812 0.8881 0.9200  
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Appendix 2b  Traditional DEA Cost Efficiency Scores for Chinese Banks 1994-2007 -Individual Bank Estimates 
Bank name  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Bank Average 
Industrial & Commercial Bank of China 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
China Construction Bank Corporation 0.8580 0.7660 0.7981 0.8808 0.7985 0.7946 0.7954 0.8981 0.8973 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8919 
Agricultural Bank of China 0.8594 0.8433 0.6536 0.8551 0.8632 0.9789 1.0000 0.7612 0.8398 0.8332 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8920 
Bank of China 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
China Development Bank  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Agricultural Development Bank of China  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8705 0.7647 1.0000 0.9431 0.8949 0.7889 0.8290 0.8568 0.9229 1.0000 0.9131 
Export-Import Bank of China   1.0000 0.9141 0.9675 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9909 
Bank of Communications 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8275 1.0000 0.7856 0.9168 0.8508 0.9558 
China Merchants Bank  0.8219 0.7867 0.8435 0.6961 0.7989 0.8473 0.9248 0.9381 1.0000 1.0000 0.6997 1.0000 1.0000 0.8736 
China Minsheng Banking Corporation   1.0000 1.0000 0.8522 0.8180 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8311 0.8413 0.7719 0.9262 
China CITIC Bank  1.0000 1.0000 0.6888 1.0000 0.8539 0.9009 0.9603 0.9044 0.7396 0.7158 0.9224 0.7822 0.8007 0.8056 0.8625 
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 0.8729 0.6757 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8878 0.9063 0.7986 0.8891 0.9312 0.8943 0.9328 0.8248 0.7544 0.8834 
Industrial Bank 0.8434 0.6862 1.0000 0.7956 0.8502 0.6097 0.8551 0.8376 0.9082 0.9590 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8818 
Hua Xia Bank  1.0000 0.8139 0.8112 0.6284 0.8007 0.7918 0.8802 0.8572 0.8360 0.8181 0.8134 1.0000 1.0000 0.8501 
Guangdong Development Bank 0.7741 0.7884 0.7641 0.6655 0.6481 0.7932 0.7338 0.7840 0.8269 0.9993 1.0000 0.8527 1.0000 0.9251 0.8254 
China Everbright Bank  0.9982 0.9342 0.9905 0.8798 0.7629 0.8336 0.8878 0.9390 0.8367 0.9704 0.9713 1.0000 0.9694 0.9481 0.9230 
Evergrowing Bank   1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9655 0.7894 0.7339 0.7568 0.7694 0.7941 0.9084 
Shenzhen Development Bank  0.9601 0.8367 0.7508 0.6964 0.6382 0.6535 0.7598 0.8116 0.7832 0.9364 0.7314 0.7299 0.7585 0.9065 0.7824 
China Zheshang Bank           0.9203 1.0000 1.0000 0.9679 0.9721 
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Appendix 2b  Traditional DEA Cost Efficiency Scores for Chinese Banks 1994-2007 -Individual Bank Estimates (continued) 
Bank name  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Bank Average 
Bank of Beijing       1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8527 0.9509 0.9843 0.9416 1.0000 0.9699 
Tianjin City Commercial Bank      0.7922 0.8026 0.8640 0.8216 1.0000 0.9445 0.9165 0.9252 1.0000 0.8963 
Bank of Shanghai  1.0000 1.0000 0.8792 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8733 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.7773 0.9638 
Bank of Jiangshu             0.7184 0.7908 0.7165 0.7419 
Bank of Nanjing    0.8558 1.0000 0.8112 0.8994 0.9956 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.7459 0.9371 
Bank of Ningbo       0.6462 0.6339 0.7234 0.8075 0.7730 0.9086 0.8393 0.8852 0.7771 
Bank of Dalian         0.5370 0.5929 0.7085 0.6693 0.6856 0.8341 0.6478 0.6679 
Jinan City Commercial Bank         0.7011 0.7511 0.8442 0.8696 0.8563 0.8323 0.7761 0.8044 
Hangzhou City Commercial Bank         0.9868 1.0000 1.0000 0.9223 0.9572 0.9142 0.7361 0.9310 
Huishang Bank             0.6257 0.6146 0.6202 
Dongguan City Commercial Bank       0.6224 0.7069 0.5600 0.5612 0.6345 0.5929 0.6894 0.8598 0.7175 0.6605 
Xi'an City Commercial Bank       0.6035 0.6331 0.7353 0.8243 0.7388 0.8101 0.8339 0.8187 0.7497 
Nanchong-city Bank         0.5464 0.8911 0.8927 1.0000 1.0000 0.7399 0.8450 
Fuzhou City Commercial Bank           0.7731 0.7804 0.8359 0.9387 0.8176 0.8291 
Xiameng International Bank      0.7322 0.8318 0.8203 0.6363 0.8168 0.8419 0.8409 0.9747 0.8738 0.8187 
Wenzhou Bank       0.6079 0.5928 0.5524 0.6593 0.7018 0.7934 0.7520 0.6516 0.6639 
First Sino Bank      1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8801 0.7751 0.7649 0.6545 1.0000 0.8972 
Qingdao International bank      0.9302 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000  0.9913 
BNP PARIBAS (China)          1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Bank of East Asia (China)            0.8089 0.8281 0.7092 0.7821 
HSBC(China)              0.9492 0.9492 
Standard Chartered Bank (China)              0.6257 0.6257 
Year Average  0.9242 0.9085 0.9032 0.9065 0.8731 0.8663 0.8840 0.8650 0.8617 0.8937 0.8965 0.8845 0.9064 0.8632  
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Appendix 2c  New DEA Cost Efficiency Scores for Chinese Banks 1994-2007 -Individual Bank Estimates 
Bank name 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Bank Average 
Industrial & Commercial Bank of China 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
China Construction Bank Corporation 1.0000 0.8067 1.0000 1.0000 0.9355 0.9433 1.0000 1.0000 0.9548 1.0000 0.9067 0.9750 0.9693 0.9365 0.9591 
Agricultural Bank of China 0.5042 0.6533 0.7993 0.9361 0.9490 1.0000 1.0000 0.9979 1.0000 0.9852 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9161 
Bank of China 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8872 0.9919 
China Development Bank  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9726 0.9641 0.9923 0.9968 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9943 
Agricultural Development Bank of China  0.3873 0.4582 1.0000 0.5829 0.8210 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8744 0.8384 0.9601 0.6080 0.7048 0.7873 
Export-Import Bank of China  1.0000 0.8467 0.9081 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9811 
Bank of Communications 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9027 0.9421 0.9140 0.9828 
China Merchants Bank  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9809 0.7035 1.0000 1.0000 0.9734 0.9866 1.0000 1.0000 0.9726 
China Minsheng Banking Corporation   1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9258 1.0000 0.8663 0.6913 0.9118 0.8725 0.8004 0.9223 
China CITIC Bank 1.0000 0.8089 0.6108 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9166 0.9538 0.7639 0.8699 0.8247 0.9314 0.9057 
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 0.9226 0.7924 0.8261 0.9014 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8259 1.0000 0.9727 0.7757 0.9315 0.9253 0.9446 0.9156 
Industrial Bank 0.6552 0.5887 0.8399 0.5872 0.6072 0.8632 1.0000 1.0000 0.9263 0.8830 0.6624 0.8765 0.8557 0.7106 0.7897 
Hua Xia Bank  1.0000 1.0000 0.9416 0.7560 0.5910 0.8750 0.8889 0.7557 0.9335 1.0000 0.8484 0.8995 0.8132 0.8695 
Guangdong Development Bank 0.5814 0.6173 0.6841 0.6096 0.7032 0.7573 0.6944 0.7606 0.7682 0.7218 0.8527 0.7674 0.8071 0.6429 0.7120 
China Everbright Bank 0.9049 0.6657 0.7848 1.0000 0.9832 1.0000 0.9287 0.9710 0.8947 0.8431 0.7448 0.9282 0.8063 0.9057 0.8829 
Evergrowing Bank  1.0000 0.8574 0.5944 0.6213 1.0000 1.0000 0.7821 0.7763 0.7552 0.4242 0.5382 0.8246 0.6995 0.7595 
Shenzhen Development Bank 0.6864 0.7817 0.8551 0.8601 1.0000 0.9423 0.9605 0.8934 0.8881 0.5934 0.5154 0.8144 0.7757 0.6838 0.8036 
China Zheshang Bank           1.0000 0.8357 0.6840 0.5714 0.7728 
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Appendix 2c  New DEA Cost Efficiency Scores for Chinese Banks 1994-2007 - Individual Bank Estimates (continued) 
Bank name 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Bank Average 
Bank of Beijing      0.7908 1.0000 1.0000 0.7362 0.6716 0.5922 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8656 
Tianjin City Commercial Bank      0.8877 1.0000 0.7433 0.6641 0.7439 0.3348 0.5301 0.9928 0.7226 0.7355 
Bank of Shanghai  0.8852 0.7898 0.4704 0.7152 0.8983 0.9397 1.0000 1.0000 0.9814 1.0000 1.0000 0.9759 0.9048 0.8893 
Bank of Jiangshu            0.8514 0.9062 0.8340 0.8639 
Bank of Nanjing    1.0000 1.0000 0.9877 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8792 1.0000 1.0000 0.7335 0.9637 
Bank of Ningbo       0.7039 0.6697 0.7679 0.6563 0.6592 0.8726 0.8548 1.0000 0.7730 
Bank of Dalian        0.4649 0.3926 0.4169 0.3508 0.4393 0.4951 0.9231 0.4975 
Jinan City Commercial Bank        0.7640 0.7672 0.5622 0.7333 0.8907 0.8509 0.8067 0.7679 
Hangzhou City Commercial Bank        1.0000 0.8518 0.8422 0.6369 0.8250 0.7864 0.7690 0.8159 
Huishang Bank             0.9432 0.8352 0.8892 
Dongguan City Commercial Bank      0.8395 0.8214 0.8146 0.8894 0.9564 0.7381 0.9299 1.0000 0.8379 0.8697 
Xi'an City Commercial Bank       0.5030 0.4492 0.5050 0.4980 0.3989 0.3094 0.3009 0.2969 0.4077 
Nanchong-city Bank         0.8258 0.8658 0.6968 1.0000 1.0000 0.9717 0.8934 
Fuzhou City Commercial Bank          0.9041 0.7569 0.8719 1.0000 0.9604 0.8986 
Xiameng International Bank      0.5153 0.4435 0.5503 0.8032 0.9690 1.0000 0.8812 0.6925 0.7804 0.7373 
Wenzhou Bank       0.7786 0.6286 0.8196 0.7660 0.5750 0.7194 0.8076 0.8347 0.7412 
First Sino Bank      1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8525 1.0000 0.9554 1.0000 0.9787 
Qingdao International bank      0.7669 0.6991 0.7647 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000  0.9038 
BNP PARIBAS (China)         0.9410 1.0000 0.8689 0.6987 0.9889 1.0000 0.9163 
Bank of East Asia (China)            0.8243 0.7469 0.9315 0.8342 
HSBC(China)              1.0000 1.0000 
Standard Chartered Bank (China)              0.9032 0.9032 
Year Average 0.8413 0.8326 0.8606 0.8904 0.8927 0.9068 0.9066 0.8622 0.8777 0.8633 0.7840 0.8629 0.8742 0.8548  
 
